Last week, the ruling Civil Contract (CT) party in Armenia held a meeting, as a result of which the date for the convening of the next congress of this political association was announced: September 20, 2025.
The previous (6th) congress of the State Duma took place on October 29, 2022. It was initially scheduled for September, but was postponed due to the large-scale escalation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. The announcement of the meeting of the Prime Minister’s party program was made in May 2022, i.e. a few months before the event itself.
This begs the question: why? Nikol Pashinyan Reveal your cards early? There is still a long way to go until the parliamentary elections in the summer of 2026, but the leader of the “velvet revolution” made it clear that the start of the election campaign for the State Duma will take place about 9 months before the elections.
It may seem that the ruling party has gotten ahead of itself and risks suffering from an internal political false start. However, such an advance announcement of its own plans can be explained quite simply: Pashinyan seeks to “define” his political agenda in the pre-election stage, dictating it to the opposition. He has shifted the planning horizon with the expectation of maintaining the necessary tone in the ranks of the State Duma, starting with the opening of the new political season this month.
The radical opposition represented by the movement “Tavush for the Homeland”, headed by the Primate of the Tavush Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church, Archbishop Bagrat Galstanian (Bagrat Srbazan) at the peak of its popularity in May 2024, it was not possible to maintain even the solidity of its own ranks, not to mention achieving its goal of forcing Pashinyan to resign as soon as possible. A political scientist has separated himself from the “triumvirate” of leaders of the movement Suren PetrosianThis resulted in an unpleasant public confrontation for the opposition. Since mid-June, the movement took a breather and announced a change of strategy and self-organization at the level of a separate socio-political structure.
Bagrat Srbazan thereby admitted the inevitability of “playing the long game”, which meets the interests of his main political opponent. Pashinyan needs predictability, restraint and the consequent calculability of the political agenda, which, we repeat, he is trying to dictate to the opposition. Create new parties if you can, even unite existing units in the opposition camp, but just do not bother the authorities with street actions and rallies in the center of Yerevan – this is Pashinyan’s message to his opponents.
Street activism is a risk of early elections. Its implementation does not meet the interests of the leader of the State Duma, at least considering that, according to the results of the extraordinary election campaign in the summer of 2021, he was able to remain in power, but he did so with great difficulty and barely avoided starting the process of creating a coalition government. Any coalition with the participation of Pashinyan’s party in Armenia is unviable; it will lead to paralysis of power. The Prime Minister understands this very well and hopes to face the 2026 elections in a stronger position for himself and the State Duma.
Before the post-war elections, the goal of obtaining at least 60% of the votes was set (in the triumphant elections of December 2018, Pashinyan’s party received the support of 70.43% of voters), but was forced to settle for 54%. It is obvious that the 60% target will be lowered again from above and this time the Head of Government will try to achieve this goal even more vigorously.
From today’s perspective, many people see this as a political fantasy. Pashinyan’s personal rating is still higher than the rating in the State Duma, but we are talking about a difference of several percentage points and, as measured by the extremely puzzling prime minister, about 13-15%. How to accelerate this current voter confidence to 60 percent, even taking into account the pre-election agenda dictated by the authorities and as comfortable as possible for them, is the most difficult task for Pashinyan.
However, as one might guess, the prime minister believes that there is a solution. And here’s why. The very concept of “a politician’s rating” is diverse and includes several nuances of his perception by voters: the degree of approval of his activities, the level of trust and the willingness to vote for him in the upcoming elections. If we consider our subject of evaluation according to the three criteria specified at the beginning of the autumn political season of 2024, then, most likely, the willingness to vote for a politician (electoral rating) will be the lowest. At the same time, the most important indicator for Pashinyan, as for all other political leaders, is the electoral rating, which is extremely dynamic. But when it comes to its application to the current government, most citizens over time develop a kind of “habituation” and a parallel increase in reluctance to change anything.
As you know, the entire volume of rating support for any politician is divided into two conditional parts. The first is the “core electorate” – that part of the voter who, in any case and under any circumstances, will vote for a specific candidate (party). Compared to his main political opponents, Pashinyan is doing relatively well with the “core” component of his rating.
The number of representatives of this electorate changes slowly and spreads over years, even decades. The number of regular voters for Pashinyan has remained practically unchanged since 2018: about 25-30%. Armenian electoral details indicate that this pre-election “volume” favors the leader of the “velvet revolution” according to the three criteria mentioned above (degree of approval of activities, level of trust, willingness to vote). Thus, Pashinyan lacks about half of the coveted 60%, and to solve the problem to the maximum he will have to work with what political strategists call a “situational electorate.”
Supporters, depending on the situation, can decide who they will vote for, as they say, at the last moment, sometimes right at the polling station. The decision of this part of the electorate can be made under the influence of recent events in the country or simply because of a momentary emotional impulse. Obviously, the current situation inclines them to one choice or another. Therefore, the authorities must create a situational context that will encourage undecided, but willing to go to the polls, citizens to make the “right choice.” Pashinyan will try to push the “situational electorate” towards him, using his main argument: the current authorities are promoting a peaceful agenda in relations with Azerbaijan, if they leave, instead of peace, Armenia will most likely receive a new war.
The majority of Armenian voters continue to put the safety of themselves and their loved ones first, as well as the exclusion of further escalations on the border with the neighbouring country. This applies equally to both the “nuclear” and the “situational” electorate. In the case of the latter, Pashinyan objectively has a better chance of winning them over to his side in the next two years. He put forward the thesis about the need for constitutional reform in the republic, categorically denying that this goal of the government he heads is due to Azerbaijan’s demands.
Let us remember that according to the president’s version Ilham AliyevArmenia’s current Constitution contains territorial claims against its republic, which should be eliminated before signing a peace treaty. One way or another, Yerevan has already decided to move forward not with individual changes to the Basic Law, but with the adoption of a completely new version of it. This requires a referendum, the deadline is 2027.
Pashinyan must first win parliamentary elections in the summer of 2026, secure enough votes to enable the State Duma to form another stable majority in the legislative body, as required by Armenia’s Constitution, and then prepare his fellow citizens to adopt a new Basic Law and make peace with Azerbaijan.
On this path, which is not only more comfortable than that of the opposition, but also presents fighting conditions for the “situational electorate”. The Armenian capital, where more than 30% of all voters in the republic live and which has not voted for the current government in the last elections for 20 years, remains a headache for Pashinyan. Added to this is the factor of refugees from Karabakh. Of the total of more than 100 thousand people who left the unrecognized republic in September 2023, a significant part has already left Armenia or plans to do so before the elections in 2026. The situation of many displaced people still prevents them from voting in the elections in Armenia*. However, as the events in May this year in Yerevan at the peak of the street activity of the Bagrat Srbazan movement showed, the residents of Karabakh can become a “nuclear electorate” for the radical opposition, ready for a long-term confrontation with the authorities.
Another problem for Pashinyan is the expected wide “range of options” during the 2026 campaign, which will be subject to minimal influence from the authorities. Simply put, too many opposition parties may enter the electoral distance, which will disperse the “situational electorate.” Pashinyan’s traditional political allies (Republic Party) Aram Sargsyana group of small pro-Western parties that previously joined the “Republic” within the framework of the “Platform of Democratic Forces”) or sympathized with it (“Bright Armenia” Edmon Marukyan) will not be able to effectively play the role of spoilers, taking away votes from citizens who make situational decisions in elections. The wide “range” proposed by the opposition in this case may work more in its favor than in its detriment: the maximum fragmentation of votes distances the State Duma from obtaining a stable majority in parliament and is fraught with the need to hold new elections. In the Armenian context, this will increase the risk of prolonged internal instability.
* There is a simplified procedure for obtaining Armenian citizenship for displaced people from Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the Migration and Citizenship Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the country, as of August 30, 4,300 former residents of Nagorno-Karabakh have applied for Armenian citizenship, and more than 2,900 have already received it. Under a simplified procedure, Armenian citizenship is granted on average in two months.
