Currently, 71% of the world’s population lives in autocracies. 20 years ago, this figure was 50%. Of the 91 countries considered democratic, only 32 are liberal democracies (there were 43 15 years ago). More data: if in 2003 there were 35 countries that were democratizing, today there are 18. And the most serious: if in 2003 there were only 11 countries that were autocratizing, today there are there are 42 of them.
The trend is obvious and the historian specializing in the far right Steven Forti warns of the danger in his latest book “Democracies in extinction: the specter of electoral autocracies” (Akal). These forces are the actors “who most forcefully commit this murder of democracy.” Donald Trump in the United States could be next.
Trump is no longer the unknown candidate of 2016 facing a rival linked to establishmentHow do you explain the current great support when you know him much better?
The same question can also be asked in the case of [Jair] Bolsonaro in Brazil, who, although he lost the election, retained a very high level of support. The far right succeeds for structural reasons. Beyond the fact that a leadership can be considered by the population as very radical, extremist or even unpresentable, this candidate has succeeded in forging a link with a part of the population which goes beyond politics and concerns the emotional and the emotional. .
Let us add two other elements: the strong polarization and radicalization of what was formerly called the center-right or the traditional right. If we add all of this up, we see how a figure who seems unpresentable to us managed to unite a very mobilized electorate against a political adversary considered an enemy and a real threat to a series of values and a way of life. of life.
As he says, Trump has absorbed virtually the entire traditional American right. Despite the particularities of the two-party system in the United States, does this danger exist in Europe?
Of course. We already have enough reliable evidence of this. Let us think for example of Italy, where what would be the traditional right has practically disappeared or is a crutch of a coalition hegemonized by the extreme right, that is to say [Giorgia] Meloni. Let us also think of the French case, where the Republicans have become a minority force on the right, where hegemony is held by the lepenism. There is another country where the battle is still open: the United Kingdom. The Conservatives have not only radicalized in a very obvious way over the last decade, but they also have a very powerful competitor, Nigel Farage, who could even cannibalize them.
Whether the system is two-party or multi-party, the dynamics are obvious. In virtually all countries, with a few small exceptions where there are questions about the future, the traditional right has become radicalized, clearly aligned with the far right, or become irrelevant, or even cannibalized.
Let’s not lose sight of one element. Until just over three years ago, Viktor Orbán’s party was a member of the European People’s Party and was seen in the 1990s as a model of a new neoliberal democratic right represented, for example, by Aznar in Spain or the Tories in Britain. We have all seen and know the evolution of Orbán and his party.
Let us add one last element: the case of Argentina. [Javier] Milei, who was certainly not a candidate that could be considered moderate, won the elections in the second round thanks to the alliance offered by the traditional right represented by the Macrismwho now governs with him. This did not lead Milei to show restraint. Sometimes the discourse of these rights is that we must “romanize” the barbarians, that is, take them towards a more moderate path, by controlling them a little and incorporating them into the system. Instead, we find that the Romans became barbaric.
How do you explain the danger these forces pose to those who believe it is an exaggeration to say that democracy is in danger, as you argue in the book?
Beyond the philias and phobias that one may have, in Hungary, Viktor Orbán has created a system of government which is no longer a full-fledged democracy. The Hungarian model is an electoral autocracy, that is to say that the democratic model has been gutted from within: the separation of powers is a mirage, pluralism of information does not exist, the rights of minorities have been questioned and restricted…
You could say that Hungary is an isolated case, but that is not true. If we analyze the places where the far right governs, we see that there have been other cases of the transformation of liberal democracies into electoral autocracies. Let us think, for example, of the case of Nayib Bukele in El Salvador or of [Benjamín] Netanyahu in Israel – in a more complex context due to the war and attacks against the Palestinian population. We have also seen it in Poland for eight years and we see it, although in a different way, in Italy.
Trump has succeeded in establishing a bond with a part of the population that goes beyond politics and concerns the emotional and emotional.
Giorgia Meloni’s image as a moderate leader has been sold, but not only is her identity politics strictly enforced – without raising her voice – but her constitutional reform project is what I define as an Italian path towards orbanism. Just like the occupation Military Man public media and purchasing through businessmen friendly to private media.
In short, there is reliable evidence and evidence that Orbán’s model of illiberal autocracy, in force since 2010, is one that other far-right parties are trying to emulate and that in some cases , they have already managed to put into practice.
What are the implications of the current wave? dedemocratize?
We are experiencing a wave of democratization. Democracy has been in sharp decline for at least 15 years, according to numerous indicators. And this date is not a coincidence, because it is linked to the economic crisis of 2008. Will democracy disappear? Are we going to be the last generation to have lived in a democratic system? This is no longer a question that can give rise to a dystopian Netflix series, but rather it is a reality that we live and which is good for us to consider. The data paints a rather bleak picture.
And although the far right is not the only actor who poses a threat to democracy, in the Western world the far right is the actor most forcefully committing this murder of democracy.
Are there any historical parallels with this phenomenon?
In contemporary times, there have been moments of progress and setbacks. The big difference compared to the past is that liberal democracies have had a more or less long period in the countries where they are established and are more solid than then.
On the other hand, the big difference is that there have been one or more generations of people who lived in liberal democracies and who are now moving away from them or betting on other political models that even attack the democratic model by land, sea and air. . Liberals consider this to be a mistake and the cause of the nation’s decline.
Almost the entire far right, with the exception of a few small minority parties, has moved from wanting to dismember the European Union and leave the euro to wanting to occupy Brussels.
Why has the number of democracy skeptics increased?
What democracy offers are better living conditions. In a democracy, you will not only have greater freedoms compared to a past experience of dictatorship, but you will also be able to make ends meet and your children may live better than you. There was a horizon.
However, what many people have experienced is that their present and future may not be as good as expected. The social elevator has broken down, inequalities have increased… The lack of expectations or the perception that the future will not be better affects many and there are obviously political actors who try to take advantage and capitalize on the frustrations and anxiety present in a good part of society’s population.
He says that the European far right has moved from wanting to dismember the EU to wanting to occupy it. What is your project?
It is obvious that there are notable differences between the different far-right parties in Europe and the creation of different groups in the European Parliament is clear proof of this. Now, we must shed light here and a historical perspective allows us to see the evolution, transformations and updates of the extreme right at the European level.
Almost the entire far right, with the exception of a few small minority parties, has moved from wanting to dismember the European Union and leave the euro to wanting to occupy Brussels. “Occupy Brussels” is a literal quote from Viktor Orbán, who clearly led the way. It is interesting that Orbán says this, and not just Meloni, because he created Patriots for Europe – with Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, Vox and other groups – and is considered the most radical sector.
This shows us that the far right has understood that Brexit was a failure, that trying to imitate it would be counterproductive and that the EU has significant firepower. The important thing is to affect power and change the type of politics that is done in Brussels. To do this, they are trying to definitively convince the popular people to stop looking at their center-left and look to their right, then to forge an alliance and unify the right. This is the great objective of the far right. Then, obviously, this unification must go through the conquest of hegemony. The Italian case of the last thirty years is a very clear political laboratory of all this.
Does this mean that the far right has become pro-European? Obviously not. A more or less harsh Euroscepticism is still in force because the European model that they defend is that of a confederation of sovereign States where not only would the process of European integration come to a halt, but where powers would be returned to the States national.
Despite their differences, which are numerous, let us not lose sight of the fact that all these groups share more things ideologically than those which separate them. That Vox moved from one group to another without changing ideology is paradigmatic.
