“My indignation is greater because, in addition to having suffered harm, I know what should have been done and what was not done.” The local police commissioner of Xàtiva and former member of the local police coordination committee of the Valencian Community, Antonio Justo, speaks in these terms about what he considers to be poor management of the DANA disaster due to manifest non-compliance with law 13. /2010, of November 23, on Civil Protection and Emergency Management, as well as the Special Flood Risk Plan.
The two documents establish several points whose compliance would be called into question on the basis of the information known so far on the management of the disaster by the Emergency Coordination Center which depends on the Ministry of Justice.
Justo, a resident of Algemesí, whose house is one of those affected by the torrential rains, mainly highlights the lack of timely creation of the five basic units provided for in the Flood Risk Plan, namely the Intervention, Security, Health, Shelter and Assistance and Support Units. Each base unit has a leader who is part of the advisory committee that monitors the emergency once the Integrated Operational Coordination Center (Cecopi) has been established: “On Monday 28 we already had information about what was going to happen and on Tuesday 29 , at around 7:30 a.m., Aemet already raised the alert to the red level due to torrential rains which were beginning to intensify. It was necessary to summon the Cecopi at 8 a.m. (it was created at 5 p.m.), create the basic units. With the information we have, it is not normal that traffic is not cut off or that people are not prevented from going to schools and work centers.
The commissioner cites two situations as examples of non-compliance with the two documents. Firstly, “the forest firefighters, who are an emergency unit that depends on the Generalitat, with 400 soldiers and 40 bilge pumps, had a normal day, like any other day”. Secondly, “the local police officers who were training at the Valencian Institute of Public Safety and Emergencies (Ivaspe), in response to Aemet’s opinion and as experts, requested the suspension of the courses and were refused: they had to follow both in the morning and afternoon with the risk that this entails.
According to articles 59 and 60 of the law on civil protection, “the service responsible for civil protection and the management of emergency situations may entrust the ordinary and extraordinary management of the Rescue Brigade Unit to the prevention service , fire extinguishing and emergency services (SPEIS) of provincial character”, which will have specialized personnel” and among its functions will be “intervention in emergency situations of meteorological origin such as snowfall , floods, strong winds and other adverse weather phenomena.
The Special Flood Risk Plan specifies, among other things, that the Emergency Coordination Center, in terms of monitoring levels in the canals, must inform the municipalities of the basins concerned, although they can also adopt their own measures prevention through municipal groups. As reported by elDiario.es, several municipalities such as Aldaia, Sedaví, Paiporta or Algemesí have not received this information from the Generalitat Emergencies.
In this regard, emergency sources assure, in response to questions from elDiario.es, that “the Special Flood Plan is fully deployed from the first moment, and with the basic units made up of operational personnel that make up each of the different zones”. : from firefighters, police, health or social assistance. All personnel participating in the emergency are integrated into the corresponding base unit. However, Justo explains, wildland firefighters were not needed. In addition, as this media confirmed, certain municipalities were not informed.
Concerning the law on civil protection, article 4 establishes that citizens have the right “to be informed of serious collective risks which may affect them and of the actions planned to deal with them”, as well as to “receive information and instructions on safety measures. adopt and the course of action to follow. The only alert that reached the population directly was the one they received on their cell phone at 8:12 p.m., when thousands of people were already trapped.
According to article 12, “it is up to the chief minister of the department responsible for civil protection and emergency management”, that is to say of the Ministry of Justice, Salomé Pradas, “to exercise alone the emergency command” to determine, among other things. things, “the most appropriate protection measures for people, property, the environment and for the personnel of the intervention services” as well as “the decision to create the Integrated Operational Coordination Center” (Cecopi), when the “evolution of the emergency situation advises.”
As for the Emergency Coordination Center, “it will serve to ensure the essential coordination of the different administrations and entities that must act in each emergency and emergency situation, guaranteeing an agile and effective response to citizens’ requests for help “. All this, “respecting the competence that corresponds to each organization in the material execution of the requested service and in the organization, mobilization and management of resources deemed appropriate for the specific action”.
The functions to be performed by the Emergency Coordination Center are, among others, “to communicate and notify the various pre-emergency or declared emergency situations; coordinate the actions of essential or complementary services involved in resolving an emergency or disaster situation; inform the essential and complementary intervention services involved in its resolution of the evolution of the emergency; ensure dialogue and coordination in emergency management with local administrations, state administration and other autonomous communities; set up, upon decision of the planning director, call centers to inform the population and affected people of the emergency situation.
