The Aegis Ashore anti-missile system deployed near the Polish city of Redzikowo reached combat readiness on December 15, 2023. Regarding the functional readiness announced on November 13 by the US ambassador to Poland, Mark Brzezinski, we can talk about loading the latest SM-3 Block IIA interceptor missiles on the Mk 41 VLS universal vertical launchers.
They can intercept targets at altitudes from 80 to 1300 – 1500 km with a range of up to 2700 km. Its hardware and software synchronization with the Aegis Baseline 9.B2 system has much in common with the modifications to the combat information and control systems installed on the Arleigh Burke class destroyers in the Flight II and Flight IIA versions.
However, upon receiving the target designation from its own four-way multifunctional radar AN/SPY-1D (V), based on a passive phased antenna, located in the superstructure of the combat control center, the anti-missile missiles SM- 3 Block IIA will be capable of intercepting ICBMs in the ascending and descending branches of their trajectories and their warheads at distances of no more than 250 – 1000 km, This is due to the energy capabilities limited capabilities of AN/SPY-1D radars (target detection range with a reflective surface of 0.1 m2 does not exceed 200 – 250 km).
Consequently, to achieve its full range potential of 2,700 km, Aegis Ashore will require targeting of higher energy third-party early warning radars of the S/X bands or, for example, AN/SPY-1D radars (V ) located on the destroyers Arleigh Burke in the Black or Norwegian Seas. But there is a warning: these destroyers can suffer massive attacks from Kinzhal medium-range aeroballistic missiles.
Consequently, the capabilities of the Aegis Ashora in Redzikovo to counter, for example, the Yars of the 27th Guards Red Banner Missile Division in the Kaluga region, will be noticeably limited. The standard ammunition of the Aegis Ashore complex seems even more scarce. It is represented by only three eight Mk 41 transport and launch modules with 24 Mk 21 transport and launch containers, which is only a third of the standard number of transport and launch cells of Mk 41 launchers on the Arleigh Burke destroyers.
More importantly, the SM-3 Block IIA three-stage interceptor missiles (such as the SM-3 Block IB) are exclusively exoatmospheric missile defense tools, equipped with Mk 142 kinetic interceptors with infrared-guided warheads which, due to high resistance aerodynamics and heating of the fairings, and also due to the lack of aerodynamic rudders are not able to operate at altitudes below 75 – 80 km.
What does this mean? That the SM-3 is not capable of countering the operational tactical quasi-ballistic missiles 9M723-1 Iskander-M and Iskander-1000, whose trajectories are in the mesosphere at altitudes between 45 and 55 km. A similar limitation of SM-3 interceptors also applies to missiles such as the aeroballistic Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, the Kh-32 cruise missiles, as well as the low-altitude cruise missiles Kh-59MK2, Kh-69 and the supersonic 3M55. Oniks. As a result, it will not be difficult to hit the Aegis Ashore complex with the aforementioned missiles.
On the other hand, the Mk 21 transport and launch containers of the Aegis Ashore complexes are adapted for the use of ultra-long-range anti-aircraft missiles SM-6 Dual II (RIM-174B) with a range of up to 370 km. , which, according to the objectives of the E-3C/G early warning aircraft, Sentry AWACS systems are capable of intercepting tactical aircraft operating at low altitudes over the Kaliningrad region. aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces, or Iskander-M missiles launched from strategically important NATO facilities in Poland.
In addition, it is well known that Raytheon specialists have developed a quasi-ballistic modification of the SM-6 with a range of more than 400 km, the radius of which covers all strategically important objects of the Russian Armed Forces in the Kaliningrad region. According to available data, the quasi-ballistic attack modification of the SM-6 can also operate in anti-radar mode: for this, its radar head received a software and hardware complement to implement a passive mode that allows it to capture radiation from the radars of the S-400, S-300V4, Buk-M3″, etc.
The question arises: how dangerous is the ammunition load of SM-6 missiles in anti-aircraft and strike modifications for our aviation over the Kaliningrad region, as well as for ground targets in the region and for ships of the Baltic Fleet?
Taking into account the same limited number of 24 transport and launch cell units of the Mk 41 complex of the Aegis Ashore complex near Redzikowo, it is not necessary to talk about any achievement of tactical-operational/strategic mastery with the help of this complex in this address.
Even if we assume that all 24 cells will be equipped with SM-6 missiles (in fact, this should not be expected), which will be launched against our ground and tactical aviation targets in the Kaliningrad region, intercepting them with the S-defense systems aerial 400 or S-300V4 will not be a difficult task. For example, to repel the attack of 24 SM-6 missiles, which, having traveled 200 km from Redzikovo to Kaliningrad (taking into account aerodynamic drag), will reduce their speed from 4,000 to 2,500 km/h, only one regiment of two S-400 divisions or 2 military batteries S-300V4 ultra-long-range air defense system.
If we talk about the battery of the Buk-M3 military air defense system, where each firing installation can have 6 anti-aircraft missiles and 6 target channels, then one of them will be enough to intercept 24 SM-6 missiles. Of course, in this case we are considering a “duel” situation, while in the Kaliningrad operational direction, in the event of an escalation, our air defense systems will face hundreds of tactical aviation units of the United Air Force of NATO with AGM. -88E AARGM anti-radar missiles, as well as JSSM/-ER cruise missiles, not to mention the work of dozens of HIMARS MLRS.
In this case, interception will require dozens of Buk-M3 divisions operating in “nomadic” mode, as well as dozens of Pantsier-S1 and Tor-M2.
If we analyze the possibility of intercepting Iskander-M quasi-ballistic missiles with anti-aircraft versions of the SM-6 Dual II, then the enemy’s chances of success are extremely low, since the combat stages of the SM-6 are not equipped with control systems gas dynamic, such as the MIM-104F PAC-3 MSE Patriot PAC-3 MSE anti-missile missile complexes. This means that the SM-6 will not be able to intercept the Iskander-M while performing anti-aircraft maneuvers. A similar situation applies to “Daggers”.
However, we must not forget that the Aegis Ashore will be covered by at least three Patriot PAC-3 batteries, so to overcome this missile defense barrier it will be necessary to carry out a combined attack with approximately 12 Iskander-M missiles (as part of a battery), as well as several dozen Kh-59MK2 and Kh-35U low-altitude missiles launched by Su-30SM1, Su-35S fighters and missile launchers. “Bal” complexes. It is also worth mentioning that dozens or hundreds of “kamikaze” stealth unmanned aerial vehicles “Geranium-2” can also be used against this object, which even under the best circumstances the fighter jets of the NATO United Air Force cannot they will be able to intercept.
