Tuesday’s unprecedented, coordinated bombings, followed by Wednesday’s walkie-talkie explosions, represent the largest security breach Hezbollah has suffered in its history. The attacks, widely attributed to Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, although they have not yet been officially claimed by Israel, pose a serious dilemma for the militia.
On the one hand, they increase the pressure on the group to retaliate against Israel, but on the other, they seriously limit its military options. These attacks also represent a severe blow to Hezbollah’s morale and credibility as an armed group with high levels of security. After the latest attacks, Hezbollah can no longer claim to be impenetrable.
For decades, the group has presented the secrecy of its operations and communications network as necessary to its role in supporting Lebanon’s defense. This is why it has insisted on a telecommunications network that is completely separate from the national network. This is also why Hezbollah has defended its clandestine activities in Beirut’s port and airport. It imports and exports goods through these government facilities, as well as across Lebanon’s border with Syria, without any supervision or intervention from Lebanese state authorities.
To minimize the risk of detection, Hezbollah oversaw the entire process of acquiring or selling goods in Lebanon, including weapons and drugs. It also dealt swiftly with anyone who infiltrated its ranks. The group maintains extensive surveillance in its areas of influence in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut. These measures help to reinforce Hezbollah’s image as a group running its own high-security state within the Lebanese state.
The pager and walkie-talkie blasts by its members have shattered this image. They have shown that Hezbollah is vulnerable to Israeli interception not only of its communications network, but also of its supply chain. With this level of exposure, the group will carefully calculate its next moves against Israel. There will also be widespread paranoia within the group about what else Israel may have sabotaged. This, in turn, lowers morale within Hezbollah’s ranks.
The level of confusion generated by the pager attack adds to Hezbollah’s concerns that Israel is following in its footsteps. Since last October, Israel has been steadily attacking hundreds of its officers and commanders in southern and eastern Lebanon, and even in Beirut.
Hezbollah men have been killed by Israeli attacks not only on the battlefield, but also in homes and vehicles. When Hezbollah realized that Israel could track its movements through cell phones, it ordered its operatives to use pagers, as this less sophisticated technology allowed for more secure communication.
In the past, Hezbollah has repeatedly vowed revenge on Israel for its attacks on the group, but even Israel’s assassination of Fouad Shukr, one of its top commanders, failed to trigger a forceful retaliation. This is partly because it is uninterested in taking actions that could lead to an all-out war with Israel, and partly because its security vulnerability limits its ability to plan military action.
The search engine detonation attacks have made it clear that the level of vulnerability is much higher than Hezbollah had calculated. It has practically paralyzed its military arsenal. After all, any military plan would require the use of communication tools, and Hezbollah’s have proven dangerous.
Israel has the opportunity to use Hezbollah’s growing weakness to conduct a large-scale military operation against the group in southern Lebanon. However, Israel will not necessarily choose this path, because it does not benefit it. Hezbollah is used to fighting Israel militarily and can take many losses in this regard: it can then rebuild its arsenal, as it did after its last war with Israel in 2006. These attacks, however, have a deterrent rather than a military character.
The success of the latest actions will benefit Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu politically. Netanyahu has been under intense public pressure to secure Israel’s northern border with Lebanon. You now have the opportunity to view these attacks as a concrete and significant step forward toward achieving that goal. Meanwhile, Israel continues its military strikes in southern Lebanon at the same pace as before September 17, indicating that this week’s attacks are an isolated incident and not part of a broader change in strategy.
The attacks also undermine Hezbollah’s exceptional status in Lebanon as the country’s only armed entity outside the Lebanese Armed Forces. Hezbollah uses this status to strengthen its political position in the country. The operational paralysis caused by Israel opens the door to a possible political loss.
All of these challenges place Hezbollah under unprecedented pressure as it seeks to salvage its political position in Lebanon and maintain its credibility in its fight against Israel. While the next steps in the conflict are uncertain, Israel has already deeply humiliated Hezbollah, reducing the group’s room for maneuver. But until a ceasefire agreement is reached to end the conflict in Gaza, the possibility that Israel and Hezbollah will eventually escalate their fighting remains on the table.
Lina Khatib is Director of the Soas Middle East Institute and a Research Associate in the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House.
