And two days ago, Germany and Finland They warned against communication cable breakage in the Baltic because of an “external force”, while the authorities of Suedefor its part, opened an investigation into the damage in another communication cable who unites his country with Lithuania.
“It is of course always possible that Russia sabotages electricity interconnection cables in Europe or that countries ‘friendly’ to Russia do so,” sources in the European energy sector tell EL ESPAÑOL-Invertia.
“And more precisely, the most vulnerable are the submarine cables, although after what happened with NordStream 1 and 2, the NATO is very aware and vigilant of all this underwater infrastructure and it is more difficult to act by surprise,” they add.
But it’s not just about electricity, we also monitor the gas pipelines that connect European countries. “One of the critical points is the Baltic Connectora bidirectional gas pipeline natural gas between Finland and Estoniawhich allows Finland access to Latvia’s underground gas storage facilities.
How to protect them?
Protecting submarine cable networks poses many challenges. Among them, protecting them throughout the kilometers they travel between countries on the seabed. This makes them very vulnerable to sabotage attempts from submarines or unmanned underwater vehicles.
The situation is further aggravated by the fact that many submarine cables are located in remote locations, but their location is common knowledgebecause it makes sabotage easier.
Another important challenge is that many submarine cables are located in international waters. While the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea gives countries jurisdiction over their territorial waters and certain law enforcement obligations in contiguous areas, the responsibility to protect infrastructure outside these areas remains unclear.
And according to him CER (Center for European Reform)a group of experts dedicated to improving the functioning of the European Union and strengthening its role in the world, the cyberattacks They could also be used to attack network management systems that control wired infrastructure. Especially with greater digitalization of the entire process of control and data monitoring of energy infrastructure.
In the north, greater control
According to the CER report, “Protecting Europe’s critical infrastructure against Russian hybrid threats”particularly Northern European countries, have taken steps to improve the resilience of national critical infrastructure.
Norway, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands strengthened security around vital energy infrastructure; France, Italy and United Kingdom have invested in the protection of underwater infrastructure; And Czechia has published a national strategy specifically dedicated to combating hybrid threats.
Studies conclude that there is a greater Russian monitoring of European energy infrastructure. As the EU moves away from Russian energy imports and Norway becomes the main gas supplier to the Old Continent, any interruption of its energy production would be a dangerous event for Europe’s energy security. It would be almost impossible for the EU to find a substitute for Norwegian energy.
While protecting critical infrastructure is primarily the responsibility of each country, the EU and NATO have stepped up their efforts to counter and protect hybrid threats.
Sweden paralyzes wind power
Critical energy infrastructure is not just electrical cables or gas pipelines, it is also production plants and renewable parks.
And this is what happened in Sweden. It has only been a fortnight since the military veto was imposed on all offshore wind projects on the central and southern coast of the Swedish Baltic Sea. A decision that endangers the country’s industrial competitiveness and energy security, while private investments of up to 47 billion euros ($50 billion) could be lost.
The canceled parks could have hindered ability of the Nordic country’s air defense system to respond to a missile attack from the Russian enclave of Kaliningradlocated just 300 kilometers from the Swedish island of Gotland, Swedish military experts said.
Nervousness is also visible in the far north of Europe. On November 16, a Russian spy ship was escorted out of Irish Sea after entering Irish-controlled waters and patrolling an area containing critical underwater pipelines and cables for energy and internet.
On Thursday, British planes were also sent to monitor a Russian reconnaissance plane flying near British airspace, according to the country’s defense ministry.
And this same Wednesday, Denmark is closely monitoring a Chinese ship after suspicions of sabotage in the rupture of an underwater cable in the Baltic. Russia and China reject any suggestion that they are involved in the damage to this and other cables..
“The entire infrastructure of European submarine cables is closely monitored, but that does not mean that it could be damaged in one way or another if this escalation of the conflict with Russia continues,” conclude the sources.
