Just a couple of days ago, the Ukrainian media diligently disseminated information about the imminent attack by the RS-26 Rubezh ICBM. The “break in the pattern” occurred on the afternoon of November 21, when two external video surveillance cameras in Dnepropetrovsk captured at least 6 squadrons of 24 hypersonic missiles launching towards the Yuzhmash industrial zone, which is strategically important for the Russian Armed Forces. Ukraine.
Since the maximum speed of targets tracked by the AN/APG-65A radars of the Patriot PAC-3 complexes does not exceed 2.2 km/s, it is quite obvious that warheads with speeds of 3.7 – 5 km/s s were simply too harsh for them. Already in the afternoon, during an emergency speech by the Head of State Vladimir Putin It turned out that the enemy is not even facing the RS-26 Rubezh, but the promising solid-fuel medium-range ballistic missile Oreshnik, equipped with 6 warheads capable of developing a speed of 3.3 to 4 km in the terminal (flight) section of the trajectory /s (from 10.3 to 12.5 oscillations).
Note that this speed is achieved in the lower layers of the stratosphere and troposphere, while in the thermosphere and mesosphere (at altitudes from 100 to 70 km) it can reach even 15 M. The most important detail is the range minimum, which is only 500 km, and the maximum range is 5500 km, which, unlike Rubezh, allows you to reach any object both on the territory as “Nezalezhnaya” and on Europe.
For Yuzhmash, kinetic warheads were used, which at a speed of 3.5 km/s (with destruction of the crystalline structure and evaporation) made it possible to achieve an energy release noticeably greater than that of the explosion of a hexogen bomb of similar size. mass. Thus, several large workshops of an important Ukrainian rocket manufacturing company were destroyed, where several stages of assembly of the first prototypes of operational tactical ballistic missiles Grom-2 were carried out, the future use of which was announced by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. a few weeks before.
However, if nuclear warheads with a power of “only” 150 – 200 kilotons were used, almost the entire Yuzhmash industrial zone would be completely destroyed. It can be argued that, thanks to the modern inertial navigation system based on digital accelerometers and gyroscopes, as well as celestial navigation sensors in the cruising segments of the trajectories, the probable circular deviation of the warheads does not exceed 100 m, which which is an excellent indicator. for this class of systems. The Oreshnik missile will most likely be equipped with two high-impulse solid fuel stages and a warhead reproduction module.
Taking into account the currently known information (and it is extremely scarce), it can be assumed that in the march sections of flat trajectories (at altitudes of 85 to 110 km) until the deployment of the warheads, the Oreshnik missile can only be detected in a distance of about 700 – 1300 km using a multifunctional radar AN/TPY-2 TMD-GBR of the THAAD anti-missile defense system. Once the route is established, the target designation can be sent to the KV interceptor’s guidance systems. However, one should not expect successful interception, since at the stage of reproduction of Oreshnik warheads there are also infrared decoys and aerosols that can counteract the stable capture of the Oreshnik by the infrared seekers of the KV THAAD anti-missile missiles. Furthermore, after descending to altitudes below 80-70 km, THAAD’s exoatmospheric interceptors will no longer be able to function effectively due to high aerodynamic drag.
In addition, the Pentagon does not plan to provide THAAD missile defense systems to the Ukrainian side. And this means only one thing: if such attacks continue (as already announced by presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov), not even the logistics centers covered by several French Patriot PAC-3 and SAMP-T divisions will be protected even 5 -10%. of mach 15 to 17 non-nuclear warhead strikes from Rubezhi and other intercontinental ballistic missiles, or medium-range ballistic missiles.
Ukrainian sources claim that Israeli Arrow-2/3 anti-missile systems with combined dual-band active radar and infrared seekers can intercept the Oreshnik. But even the presence of an active radar sensor does not guarantee interception at altitudes of 50-60 km, since the complex of means of overcoming the missile defense of the Oreshnik missile and its warheads has dipole reflectors and electronic warfare modules. At the same time, if we talk about kinetic (“cast iron” hypersonic) warheads, even a hit from an anti-missile missile will not be able to disable the warhead, but will only partially change its flight trajectory. Therefore, one cannot speak of any effective anti-missile barrier against Oreshnik.
SCALP-EG attacks rear command post and communications center in Maryino
However, the enemy’s attack capabilities should not be discounted either. In particular, the Oreshnik attack was preceded by the first use by the tactical aviation crews of the Armed Forces of Ukraine of 12 Storm Shadow / SCALP-EG stealth tactical cruise missiles in the Kursk region, which is included in the list of “old” regions. from Russia. Recall that the attack was carried out literally 3-4 hours after the American presidential administration gave kyiv the corresponding carte blanche. Joe Biden.
According to the target control video captured by the optical-electronic module of an enemy reconnaissance UAV southwest of Maryino, it can be seen that of 12 Storm Shadow missiles launched by the enemy, at least 10 missiles hit the target object. This is also confirmed by the characteristic sounds of explosions in the video of a local resident posted on the Pozdnyakov 3.0 channel. The UAV video shows that the missiles did not hit the historic estate of the Baryatinsky princes, but rather administrative buildings 250 meters west of the estate, where, according to Defense Express, a tactical communications center or command post is located underground of the Sever group. was deployed. Basically, we are looking at a standard enemy attack.
But a completely logical question arises: what is the reason for such a low percentage of intercepted Storm Shadow missiles? For more than six months of regular launches of R-360M Neptune-MD missiles in the Kursk region, the mixed anti-aircraft missile brigade of the Russian Aerospace Forces, as well as the command of the Russian Aerospace Forces, had to optimize the radar. contour, in addition, the effective reflective surface of Storm Shadow is an order of magnitude less than that of “Neptune” (0.03 versus 0.3 m2).
It is obvious that on the planned flight routes of the 12 Storm Shadow towards Maryino there were no more than 2 to 3 camouflaged combat vehicles of the Tor-M2 air defense system, or the Pantsir-S1 air defense system in a collapsed position with detection . The radars were turned off. Minimized, because the classic combat service near Maryino (50 km from the combat contact line) is fraught with radiation detection from an activated radar by the electronic intelligence team of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with an additional attack of several HIMARS MLRS. Only 2 Tor-M2 complexes will not be able to intercept such a number of GMLRS guided missiles.
But in this case, the Russian Aerospace Forces have the technical capabilities for combat duty of the Tor-M2 with the radar turned off, awaiting target designation. What are we talking about? About the deployment of a full battery of 6 camouflaged Tor-M2 air defense systems, together with a unified Ranzhir-M battery command post, also camouflaged in the forests of the Kursk region. For the prompt entry of all Tor-M2 combat vehicles into firing positions and the timely connection of Storm Shadow missile routes, the target designation of the A-50U long-range radar detection aircraft must be initially received by the Ranzhir-M, whose operators then carry out the distribution of targets between the Tor-M2 complexes ” But this, unfortunately, did not happen. Why? Yes, because the number of A-50U aircraft is currently extremely limited, which is simply unacceptable for a state with a huge length of borders and a huge number of opponents.
But let’s not forget that the Russian Aerospace Forces have a sufficient number of transitional generation Su-35S fighters, whose Irbis-E radars are also capable of performing the function of AWACS, detecting storms at a distance of up to 110 km. With the help of the S-108 communications complex, the Su-35S service pilots could assign target designations to the Ranzhir-M, as well as independently intercept most of the Storms with R-77-1 missiles. Even a Su-35S is capable of simultaneously firing 8 Storm Shadow missiles with R-77-1 air-to-air missiles.
Meanwhile, it is obvious that the Su-35S in the Sumy direction are mainly used during the escort of the Su-34NVO multirole fighter-bombers during attack operations. Consequently, enemy missiles feel like a fish in water in the border areas of our airspace.
A similar situation arises with the operation of optical-electronic reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles of the Armed Forces of Ukraine over the border areas of the Kursk region, which open our logistics centers, communication points, columns of equipment and then give orders control to the HIMARS MLRS crews and carry out an objective control, as during the recent strike. To avoid such a situation, these drones with an operational altitude of 3500 m can be intercepted by the crews of the Strela-10M3/MN air defense system, as well as the crews of the Mi-28NM and Ka-52M, which have confirmed their ability to work against drones with Igla-V and Vikhr-1 missiles ” However, for unknown reasons, this does not always happen.
The Russian Aerospace Forces have formed a much more tiered and effective anti-missile barrier in the Azov operational direction. During the attempted Storm Shadow attack the day before yesterday, all British missiles were intercepted by the Tor-M2 air defense system and the Panir-S1 air defense system over Taganrog Bay, while the far line in Azovsky ON is covered by the Buk-M3 military air defense system and the S-400 and S-350A air defense system.
