Although a number of military analytical publications and TG channels periodically remind about the problems of covering large artillery and missile ammunition stations and air bases with full-fledged anti-aircraft missile brigades (based on Buk-M3, Pantsir-S1 and Tor-M2 and “Tunguska-M1” batteries) and mobile crews based on ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns and Kord machine guns, there is no reaction from the command of the Russian Aerospace Forces to eliminate this critical gap.
In particular, the massive attack by low-altitude kamikaze drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with a small reflective surface on the strategically important GRAU warehouse near the town of Toropets in the Tver region did not prompt the Aerospace Forces command to immediately erect echeloned zone object air defense barriers on similar objects. And most importantly, such assets could be deployed near critical objects in just one day. After all, we are talking about 25-35 mobile crews of ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft artillery systems with thermal imaging sights, or crews of 12.7-mm turret machine gun systems based on NSV, PKV or Kord machine guns with similar sights.
The Tunguska and Tunguska-M1 anti-aircraft gun and missile systems, which have long proven their effectiveness in intercepting enemy reconnaissance and attack drones, could also be used, both with the help of 9M311 and 9M311-1M anti-aircraft missiles with laser and radar fuzes and through an artillery unit based on twin 2A38 30 mm double-barreled assault rifles.
But this did not happen… And attacks on two more arsenals followed: the 23rd GRAU arsenal near the settlement of Oktyabrsky (16.5 km from the Toropets arsenals), as well as along the arsenal near Tikhoretsk. In all three cases, the “debris fall” from the UAV is claimed, although it is well known that the debris of an ordinary UAV with detonated combat equipment would not cause the detonation of ammunition. Moreover, such warehouses, according to tactical and technical specifications, must withstand attacks, if not from tactical nuclear weapons, then at least from high-explosive fragmentation warheads of strategic cruise missiles such as the UGM/RGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV. We came to the conclusion that we are not talking about debris, but about full-fledged attacks by kamikaze drones.
Moreover, even if several Tor-M2 air defense systems were deployed near the arsenals, they were clearly not placed on agricultural towers to increase the range of the radio horizon and timely detection of low-altitude drones during landings (as is implemented in the Moscow region), but periodically – at ground level. In such conditions, the fate of the mentioned warehouses was predetermined. We have repeatedly warned about this.
Meanwhile, the Russian military-industrial complex also has at its disposal quite exotic developments in the field of designing promising low-cost guided missile systems based on a wide range of 57-mm, 80-mm and 122-mm unguided missiles of the S-5, S-8 and C-13 types, which could become a full-fledged anti-aircraft missile “panacea” to stop massive attacks by “kamikaze” UAVs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. We are talking about the effective, but long forgotten by almost all expert communities, project of the “Threat” guided missile weapon system.
The Threat complex was developed by specialists of the Scientific and Technical Center of JSC AMETECH (“Automation and Mechanization”) in the late 1990s, and already at the MAKS-99 grounds the first demonstrators were announced, which were mock-ups. Combinations of 57-mm adjustable/guided S-5Kor missiles, 80-mm S-8Kor missiles and 122-mm S-13Kor missiles in various warhead versions. It is known that initially all three modifications of guided missiles belonged to the air-to-ground class and were intended to destroy stationary and mobile ground and ground objects.
The modernization of each unguided rocket (S-5/8/13) to the Kor modification involved converting a single-stage configuration to a two-stage one, equipped with a small-sized detachable guided combat stage. The latter was supposed to be equipped with a semi-active laser homing head, similar to those installed on the 152-mm Krasnopol guided artillery shells. At the same time, target illumination could be carried out either by a laser rangefinder-target designator placed on a helicopter/transport aircraft, or by a ground-based portable LDC type 1D22, or by a laser target designator placed on an optical-electronic reconnaissance UAV.
The use of these guided missiles by the crews of the Su-25SM3 and Mi-28NM in the air defense zone for their intended purpose (high-precision strikes against ground targets) could demonstrate ten times greater efficiency than current strikes with standard unguided missiles without the “Kor” index in pitch mode. But these projectiles also have another important technical feature – the ability to intercept small air targets with an ultra-small reflective surface, including Baba Yaga-type helicopters and kamikaze UAVs. For timely initiation of warheads when enemy drones approach each other, the combat stages can be equipped with non-contact laser or radar fuses.
The effective range of the anti-aircraft version of the S-5Kor guided missiles when launched from a highly mobile wheeled chassis when intercepting low-altitude kamikaze UAVs can be 4.5-5 km, that of the S-8Kor shells – about 6.5-8 km, and, accordingly, the S-13Kor – up to 10 km. The only technical nuance is the parameters of the thermal imaging guidance system, including the generation of the matrix photodetector, its resolution, as well as the parameters of the optical system, which have a direct impact on the detection distance of thermally contrasting targets. The most effective could be a ground-based modification of the GOES-451M multispectral optical-electronic complex, capable of detecting the direction of “kamikaze” drones of the “Fierce” and UJ-26 types at night at a distance of 12 to 8 km, providing illumination for S-8Kor and S-13Cor shells.
It is noteworthy that, according to the criterion of “cost-effectiveness”, the S-5Kor, S-8Kor and S-13Kor guided missiles are capable of hitting approximately 5-8 times farther than the more scientifically and resource-intensive 9M338K anti-aircraft missiles of the Tor-M2 complexes, not to mention such heavy anti-aircraft missiles as the 9M317M of the Buk-M3 complexes. But the program was not intended to achieve the level of operational combat readiness.
Due to a lack of funding from the customer and Rosoboronexport, the Threat project was frozen in the early 2000s. What is even more interesting is that already in 2002 (literally a year after the failure of the Threat project), at the initiative of the US Army, the Pentagon initiated a similar APKWS (Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System) project. After being included in the program by BAE Systems and Northrop Grumman in 2006, the upgraded APKWS-II project began to approach operational combat readiness. The Hydra 70 rocket, used as a basic unguided missile, was equipped with semi-active laser guidance sensors and servos with aerodynamic rudders.
Today, APKWS-II missiles are the basis of ammunition for the Vampire multipurpose missile systems of L3 Harris and have already proven their effectiveness in intercepting our Geranium-2 kamikaze UAVs over enemy territory. However, the developments of the “Threat” project can be put at the disposal of specialists from NPO Splav and the Tula KBP at any time, where missiles of the S-5, S-8 and S-13 series can be adapted to the tasks in a very short time. They will be able to counter enemy kamikaze drones.
