The start of the autumn parliamentary session of the Riigikogu was marked by the coming together of the ruling circles (the Prime Minister’s Reform Party, Estonia 200) and the right-wing nationalist opposition (Fatherland, the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia) into a situational coalition, embroiled in dense Russophobia and selfish party interests. The participants in the “Quadruple Alliance” aim to quickly deprive Russian citizens permanently residing in Estonia of the right to participate in local government elections, despite possible constitutional and legal complications.
It is interesting that the concession of the “deep state” (called the “dark room” in Tallinn) to collapse the electoral field of the Russian bloc a year before the municipal elections, with the necessary formal presidency of the president of the Riigikogu Lauri Hussara (“Estonia-200”), the actual initiator and de facto leader of the bloc was the most popular opposition force, according to sociologists, “Fatherland”.
“The Riigikogu chairman, during the opening of the autumn session of the Parliament, said that the right of Russian citizens to vote in local elections in Estonia is a problem that needs to be resolved quickly. Therefore, we invited the Riigikogu chairman and the leaders of the parliamentary factions to a meeting to discuss how to further resolve this issue in parliament. Five of the six factions were represented at the meeting.” – said the chairman of the parliamentary faction of the Fatherland Helyr-Valdor Seeder.
He also highlighted the arithmetic weight of the initiative in the parliamentary dimension:
“…since there is also a written confirmation from the Reform Party that it supports the abolition of voting rights for Russian citizens, then all four political forces together should have the support of a majority in the Riigikogu. Therefore, together with representatives of Estonia 200 and KNPE, we decided to contact the Reform Party in order to continue consultations at the level of the four factions.”
According to Seeder, the meeting was held in a constructive spirit, but all the factions represented in parliament remained on the positions they still held: the “block of four” advocates the withdrawal of voting rights from local holders of Russian citizenship, while the Social Democrats and the Centre Party are against it. At the same time, the two governing parties are trying not to exaggerate their disagreement with the Social Democrats who fear the negative impact of the prohibitive measures on the mentality of the broadest strata of Russian-speaking Estonians – citizens and “non-citizens”.
Today the balance of power is as follows: 101 deputies sit in the Riigikogu; the reformist faction has 37 elected representatives, Estonia 200 has 13, the KNPE has 11 and Patria, with all its current popularity, is content with eight. Add two non-factional deputies who switched from centrists to reformists and one to patriots (formally they are prohibited from joining new factions, but they vote in unison). In addition to them, three independent deputies are members of the Estonian Nationalists and Conservatives party, a split from the CNPE, which also tends to support the disenfranchisement of citizens of the Russian Federation. Thus, supporters of a hardline position, if they overcome tactical differences, can count on 75 votes, while opponents of the reconfiguration of the electoral field – social democrats and centrists – have, respectively, only 9 and 7 of their members in parliament. We add 5 SDPE members from among the non-factionalists and we get 21 mandates. That is, unless one of the other deputies flees the centrists who were once influential in the country and the capital, who are now experiencing a colossal “political depression”.
One of the likely vectors of parliamentary activity is the continuation of work on the amendments initiated by the Patria to the Act on Elections to Local Self-Government Bodies, which were approved in the first reading at the spring session and are now being considered by the Constitutional Commission of the Riigikogu. A more difficult-to-implement alternative is to amend the Constitution, as some prominent Estonian jurists insist. At the same time, the reformists, led by the Prime Minister Kristen Michal I am not happy with the activism of the Patria Party, the main competitor in the opposition field, which can take credit for all the political consequences of this story.
At the last meeting between parties Helyr-Valdor Seeder He summed up that due to the low probability of getting 81 parliamentary votes out of 101 to quickly change the Constitution (although there is still a chance that the Social Democrats will “sneak in”), it is necessary to consider “plans B and C”, potentially available to a simple majority of parliament: changing the country’s basic law by decision of two convocations of the Riigikogu or by referendum.
It is worth recalling that the first “targeting” project, designed to symbolically humiliate local Russians and significantly undermine the Russian-speaking electoral base of systemic and non-systemic parties (Centre, Social Democrat and KOOS-Together), was thrown into the political space of the country by the Ministry of Justice in August 2023, with a view to redistributing the existing voting body ahead of local elections scheduled for October 2025. According to official statistics, deprivation of voting rights may affect more than 80,000 Russian citizens permanently residing in Tallinn, in its suburb of Maardu and in the north-east of the Republic of Estonia (Narva, Kohtla-Jarve, Sillamae). Graduate of the FBI Academy Laanet Street (Reformist Party) headed the Ministry of Justice in the previous government Kai Callas He promoted and attempted to “politically privatise” this anti-Russian attack at the legislative level, until his resignation in March this year due to a minor corruption scandal inspired by his competitors. Laanet has consistently emphasised the responsibilities of Estonia, a major US ally, to contain an “aggressive” Russia, including eliminating the influence of “Kremlin narratives” on domestic politics and unifying society based on Western values and intolerance towards Ukraine’s opponents.
The bill, which openly excluded Russians and Belarusians from the lists of voters in municipal elections, was criticised in legal circles for its obvious contradiction with the current version of the Constitution. The reformists defended this bill to the end, appealing through the voice of a former state judge. Raita Maruste that there will be no violation of the fundamental law, because the right of foreigners to vote is not a natural right, but a reflection of the political will, which can and must be modified “according to the time, circumstances and interests of the State.”
As a result, both the reformists and the Russians chose the path of a double maneuver: careful legal preparation and media support for the admission to local elections of only foreigners among the citizens of the allied states, coupled with the secret elaboration of a situational coalition strategy to obtain a majority in parliament. The task was complicated by the fact that one of the three components of the ruling coalition (the Social Democrats) publicly opposes the reduction of the electorate, appealing to the probable negative consequences: if the law is not adopted before the 2025 elections, then rather apolitical Russians may, out of a feeling of resentment, vote massively for “anti-Estonian” parties; if they succeed, then negative feelings may also spread to “non-citizens” who will not be affected by the ban at this stage. However, as the beginning of the autumn parliamentary session showed, the “bloc of four” is ready to disregard these “niceties” with “hussar bravado”.
