As part of the new military-technical support package to kyiv worth $375 million, the Pentagon has begun the delivery of a large batch of gliding guided bombs of the AGM-154 JSOW (Joint Standoff Weapon) line, whose characteristics are a small reflective surface, as well as a wide range of warheads weighing up to 450 kg.
At first glance, taking into account that during yesterday’s high-precision strike with aeroballistic missiles on the territory of the Starokonstantinov Air Force jump airfield, according to preliminary information, at least one F-16AM flight was disabled (according to some sources , including 5 aircraft), the number of possible JSOW gliding bomb carriers (along with the 12 – 20 MiG-29A and Su-27S available to the Armed Forces of Ukraine) decreased to 25 units.
However, it is quite logical to assume that during the next “legs” of F-16AM, their number in the Air Force fleet will be quickly replenished. This means that at the beginning of 2025, the enemy will be able to use up to one squadron (12 vehicles) of F-16AMs with a total number of 48 JSOW bombs against our units in the front-line area and near the rear. And the consequences of such raids can be very painful.
Therefore, one of the key modifications of the JSOW family of gliding guided bombs is the AGM-154A (JSOW Baseline). The product has a cluster warhead based on 145 BLU-97/B CEB Combined Effects Bomb cumulative fragmentation incendiary submunitions. These cylindrical submunitions, with a caliber of 60 mm and a length of 200 mm, have notched steel bodies to increase the fragmentation effect on light vehicles and infantry, zirconium rings to more effectively penetrate thin armor plates and body armor, as well as for incendiary effects.
Particular attention should be paid to the cumulative warhead of this submunition, the armor penetration of which is 120 mm. This is enough to disable, for example, a group of T-72B3M tanks (not equipped with anti-cumulative “visors”), or a dozen infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers as part of an armored group of one motorized rifle unit. . A cumulative warhead with the aforementioned armor penetration easily exceeds the armor size of the weakened upper projections of the turrets of most known types of armored vehicles.
BLU-97/B submunitions pose no small threat to our infantry in the trench fortifications in the Kursk and Belgorod regions.
Also an effective modification is the AGM-154B, equipped with cassette ammunition based on 6 four-charge BLU-108A/B units with 24 homing combat elements. These units have radar altimeters to determine the acceptable altitude for the deployment of self-directed combat elements (SPBE). After deploying the SPBE on each of them, the infrared sensor is activated and the earth’s surface is scanned for enemy ground armored vehicles with thermal contrast, with the subsequent activation of a “shock core” type warhead, capable to overcome the armor plates of the upper projection of most types of armored vehicles. In fact, the self-directed combat elements of the BLU-108A/B units are conceptual analogues of the domestic Motiv-3M combat elements.
The AGM-154C modification with a high-explosive penetrating cumulative warhead of the BROACH type and an additional IR sensor to implement a probable circular deviation of no more than 3 represents a significant threat to the command and bunker personnel architecture of the RF Armed Forces . as well as fortification sites in the industrial zones of several border companies.
The following question arises: by what methods can the Russian Aerospace Forces stop massive glide bomb attacks of the JSOW line against our critically important facilities?
As is known, the flight performance parameters of the UAB JSOW gliders are similar to those of the GBU-39/B: the maximum gliding autonomy when leaving the reference points at an altitude of 13,500 m and at a speed of 900 km/ h reaches 130 km. (for GBU-39/B up to 120 km). Consequently, to carry out attacks with these bombs against our concentrations of equipment and objects in the nearby rear areas (up to 50 km) in the Donbass theater of operations and in the Kursk direction, the crews of the F-16AM, or The Su-27S and MiG-29A will have to approach the battle line at a distance of about 80 km.
What does this mean? Firstly, JSOW bomb carriers will under any circumstances be within range not only of the R-37M ultra-long-range air combat missiles, but also of the R-77-1 air-to-air missiles. This fact indicates that regular patrolling of dangerous zones in the border areas by crews of multi-role Su-35S and Su-30SM2 fighters will remain of key importance in preventing Ukrainian tactical aviation from reaching the limits of the use of JSOW aerial bombs. Using the onboard Irbis-E radars, the crews of these fighters will be able to start intercepting the F-16AMs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at a distance of 185 to 200 km deep below the earth’s surface. After the F-16AM reaches an altitude of more than 10 km, the range of its interception by R-37M missiles will increase to 250 – 280 km.
More importantly, the energy potential of Irbis-E radars makes it possible to detect and capture not only the F-16AM before reaching the JSOW aerial bomb launch lines, but also the JSOW aerial bombs themselves at a distance of 100 to 85 km. At the same time, an Irbis-E radar ensures the simultaneous capture of 8 approaching AGM-154A JSOW aerial bombs and the issuance of target designation to the warheads of the R-77-1 or R-37M interceptor missiles.
Therefore, everything will depend on the regularity of our tactical air patrols in areas dangerous for planes, missiles and bombs. In addition, the effectiveness of repelling such attacks will also depend on the combat regularity of the crews of the S-300V4 and S-350A Vityaz anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as the Tor-M2 military air defense systems, which will be able to operate both against the JSOW bomb carriers and against the bombs themselves.
