Since the end of World War II, there have been several waves of radical right parties in Europe. Political scientist Cas Mudde identifies four. First, in the 1950s, the first neo-Nazi and neofascist parties emerged that sought to defend defeated ideologies. Towards the end of the 1950s and until the beginning of the 1980s, a second wave of parties emerged, in this case supported by the postulates of the intellectuals of the new rights. Anti-immigration discourses supported by cultural racism and ethnopluralist visions are gaining strength. The third wave arrived between the 1980s and 2000 and was marked by the professionalization of the radical right and the arrival of the first electoral successes. Populist discourses (people versus elite) are particularly integrated. Finally, from 2000, the fourth wave emerged, characterized by the normalization of the extreme right, that is to say the social acceptance of parties and ideas which not only occupy relevant political places but also condition and even manage public discourse.
The electoral success of the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) is part of this latest wave. A result which crowns years of legitimization of his agenda and his xenophobic and ultranationalist discourse. The triumph of the Austrian radical right marks a turning point for the politics of the Alpine country, but above all for all of Europe.
The European sanction
It is not new that a far-right party gets first place. This happened in Italy with Fratelli d’Italia in 2022 for example. It should also come as no surprise that the FPÖ is doing the same in Austria. In fact, since 1990, its results have not fallen below 10%.
What is striking in the case of Austria is that it was the first country to receive sanctions from other member states of the European Union for having formed a government coalition incorporating a political party. far right after the 1999 elections. These reprisals were intended to send a warning message. to the entire region on the commitment of each of the fourteen member countries to European values and the rights of minorities, refugees and immigrants.
The problem was that the FPÖ was not another force of the radical right. Jörg Haider’s leadership added to the typical ultranationalist, xenophobic and anti-establishment discourse. Haider was an expert in strategic provocation. In his public interventions, he takes advantage of his charisma to launch revisionist slogans in which he trivializes National Socialism. A party whose leader openly had anti-Semitic and racist positions could not be tolerated as a member of a government by the rest of the European community. Despite this, the sanctions only lasted a few months and the coalition between the ÖVP and the FPÖ continued until 2007.
The normalizing chancellor
In 2015, a public debate at the federal level was again configured in favor of the xenophobic discourse of the FPÖ. The arrival of thousands of refugees towards the end of the summer of the same year represented an opportunity to deploy their ultranationalist agenda and to appeal to the classic populism which had established itself as a privileged communication tool. Haider’s heir, Heinz-Christian Strache, did not hesitate to try to sow fear and uncertainty in sectors of the population susceptible to this discourse. However, a competitor has emerged.
It was not a new radical right party in Austria, but a young and dynamic figure seeking to lead an anti-immigration discourse at the European level: Sebastian Kurz, the foreign minister of the ÖsterreichischerVolkspartei ( ÖVP).
Kurz, who was initially seen as promising conservatism on the continent, adopted a strategy of “integration to the right”, incorporating elements of the populist radical right, i.e. FPÖ, agenda himself. From his role as minister, he articulated the space opposite to what German Chancellor Angela Merkel stood for at the time and her position regarding the reception of refugees. For sectors resistant to the German leader, Kurz embodied a promising future for Europe.
The ÖVP knew how to read context, and Kurz became its candidate for chancellor in 2017. During the campaign, he not only continued his anti-immigration and Islamophobic rhetoric, but deepened it. And even if his strategy was an electoral success, even allowing him to become chancellor, Kurz ended up legitimizing an exclusive and radicalized political vision.
What seemed like a problem for the FPÖ ultimately turned into a triumph. Not only for being part of a federal government again, alongside Kurz, or for having managed to surpass his vote record by reaching more than 1.3 million. Their victory lies in the normalization of their agenda, their positions and their proposals. He would reap the political benefits of this situation a few years later.
hypocritical nationalism
The ultranationalist component of the FPÖ is an integral part of its political discourse. In the anti-immigration speeches that its spokespersons usually use, the nativist character is obvious: Austria only for the natives. In this way, and following the postulates of the new rights, a concept of national identity is constructed linked to an ethnic group, to a culture supposed to defend itself against the intruder and which shares a common interest.
All this talk was in vain when Ibiza-Gate was announced. A hidden camera showed how FPÖ leaders offered government contracts in exchange for Russian support. Corruption in all its splendor in an act that demonstrated that the interests of these politicians were above all Austrian rules and laws. The impact was enormous and in the 2019 snap elections, the FPÖ suffered a 10-point decline. Some dared to predict the end of the match. Five years later, the exact opposite has happened.
The problem of “integration on the right”
The FPÖ, like other radical right parties, has sought to capitalize on support from denialist sectors during the pandemic. Those who renounced the policies of confinement and restrictions found in this force a voice that represented them. This is how, little by little, the current party leader, Herbert Kickl, laid the foundations for a recovery.
But the most important thing about Kickl’s arrival lies in his decision to delve deeper into the most radical aspects of his party. Indeed, its proximity to the identity movement, a far-right political group which proposes, among other ideas, the mass deportation of non-natives, is proof of this.
In addition, Kickl and its German partners in the AfD, for example, have a pro-Kremlin position: they demonstrate against sanctions against Russia for the invasion of Ukraine and against sending weapons to that country . It seems that the incident in Ibiza with the Russian staff has been forgotten. However, the key to this relationship, beyond possible financial or logistical support for the party, lies in what the figure of Putin represents for certain sectors, notably the most conservative. The Russian president symbolizes opposition to the progressive values of the West. Thus, the FPÖ intelligently uses Russia to reinforce the rejection of the European Union and its values.
It is very possible that this strategy of the FPÖ under the leadership of Kickl will work because it builds on the normalization initiated by Sebastian Kurz and the ÖVP. Their agenda ceased to be “radical” the moment it was incorporated by the latter. This danger does not only exist in Austria. There are several countries whose majority parties consider that “integration to the right” can be a solution. The FPÖ’s first place shows that sooner or later this strategy only ends up benefiting the radical right.
