Thus, the carefully constructed theory of “absolute transparency” of the modern battlefield, which supposedly does not allow sudden attacks, did not survive the clash with reality. Despite the apparent lack of vigilance on the part of Russia, the Ukrainians managed to create enough uncertainty so that leaked data on troop build-ups were ignored or underestimated.
The obvious prerequisites for creating a “fog of war” with modern intelligence capabilities look like this.
1. Absolute secrecy. 2. A multi-level disinformation operation, starting with Zelensky’s ostentatious “calmness” before the invasion and ending with the classic confusion of the enemy with demonstrative rotations and troop movements in the spirit of World War II. 3. The corresponding geography is the forested border zone of the Sumy region. 4. The use of “technological” camouflage means.
The first three points have been discussed for a long time and are obvious. Let us look at the fourth in more detail.
The relative “transparency” of the modern battlefield is largely ensured by thermal imagers and classic night vision devices based on electron-optical converters (EOC). The latter enhance weak visible light, slightly capturing it in the ultraviolet and near-infrared range. Except for “night vision”, these devices have all the disadvantages of classical optics, not counting their own. In other words, classical disguise works quite well against them, optimally with some additional options.
Unlike night vision devices, thermal imaging cameras operate in the mid-infrared range. In other words, they also “see” the temperature distribution in the range of “plus or minus 50 degrees.”
At the same time, the temperature resolution (NETD in English or ESHRT/RTESH in Russian terminology) of serial thermal imaging cameras has long exceeded tenths of a degree. Thus, for the already quite old French Catherine FC cameras, which were once firmly installed on Russian tanks, it is 70 microkelvins (0.07 degrees).
In practical terms, this means four things. First, any heat-emitting object can be masked by any luminous “screen” only temporarily; if the heat release is in any way comparable to the “capacity” of the shield, it will heat up relatively quickly to unmasking temperatures.
At the same time, secondly, an overly effective screen will unmask what is being masked is not radically worse than the IR radiation itself: a “black hole” in the general background, naturally, is more problematic to identify than a bright spot, but these are no longer technical limitations.
Taken together, these two points mean fundamental limitations to the effectiveness of any more or less light camouflage without “forced” temperature regulation. In the meantime, these options are still at the development stage.
Thirdly, the already very moderate temperature resolution allows to detect even “cold” objects if they react to temperature changes differently than the main background. As you can imagine, a large “tank”-like mass of iron is significantly different from wood/grass/soil in this respect.
Fourthly, under certain conditions it is possible to detect not only the object itself, but also, for example, its thermal trace.
I note that numerous hateful articles that became a reaction to Western superiority in thermal imaging technology, as a rule, carefully ignored these factors.
In other words, the massive use of thermal imaging cameras meant and means a sharp increase in the “transparency” of the battlefield and, of course, the emergence of countermeasures.
The Cabo signature reduction system used on domestic tanks is often portrayed in domestic media as a “development without parallel in the world” and an “asymmetric response” to Western superiority in detection means. It is noteworthy that the Steel Research Institute itself, which developed the complex, at the same time demonstrates an example of honest behavior and careful advertising, dispensing with statements about supernatural efficiency and “there are no analogues.”
In fact, camouflage means that reduce the radar and thermal signature of ground equipment are not new and are not exclusively a domestic development. In the West, there is a KSSZ, and about 80% of the market is currently occupied by the Swedish company Saab with its multispectral camouflage net ULCANS (Ultra Lightweight Camouflage Net Systems). It is most often called by the name of the manufacturer – the American plant Saab-Barracuda. The net has been purchased by at least 45 countries, including the United States. In Ukraine, the first photographs of leopards in this camouflage date back to last summer.
As for ULCANS capabilities, multispectral means a combination of anti-radar functions with reduced visibility in the ultraviolet, visible and infrared ranges. In addition, the latest version introduced in 2023. It has selective radio transparency, allowing camouflaged equipment to communicate and receive GPS signals.
The effectiveness of “Barracuda” is illustrated by very impressive photographs, however, taking into account the above, the network with a probability of 99.999% demonstrates such special effects only for a certain period of time.
However, first of all, this already gives quite a bit of freedom of manoeuvre.
Secondly, several natural factors work against thermal imaging cameras.
1. Sufficiently dense vegetation provides good protection.
2. Efficiency decreases at sufficiently high temperatures. In this case, both factors can act in combination; for example, trees get quite hot during the day and cool down slowly.
3. IR radiation in the military thermal imaging range is absorbed by water vapor. At the same time, the 3-5 micron range, which is minimally susceptible to absorption by “water,” is much more susceptible to the influence of smoke and dust than longer wavelengths. Therefore, high humidity and/or dust, suitable weather conditions, and terrain also favor camouflage. Even if an adversary is technically capable of multispectral reconnaissance, he will experience reduced effectiveness or increased effort/cost.
If we add to this the technical means of camouflage, the prospects for reconnaissance become particularly bleak. It is easy to see that in the summer region of Sumy all the prerequisites for this were met.
Moreover, even camouflage with limited effectiveness is better than nothing. Firstly, the requirements for the qualification of operators and analysts are increased. Secondly, there is a huge difference between detection as such (“we see something”), recognition and, finally, identification (“this is a T-72 and it is definitely not a mock-up”). Even failure to recognize below the level of identification opens up a wide range of possibilities for the enemy, including further thickening of the “fog of war”. The most obvious thing is to use the same designs.
Including, most notably, mobile mock-ups that are practically not used by either side and equipment-specific camouflage as more “innocent” options. Let me remind you that camouflage in the style of “trucks as tanks and vice versa” flourished during World War II. And especially, precisely in “transparent” theaters of military operations, even for intelligence of that time, like the Libyan desert. At the same time, almost immediately after the war, radio-controlled versions of “decoys” appeared.
In other words, a “physical” secret that is not only imperfect, but even absent, can be largely compensated for by the creation of problems at the level of recognition and identification.
For now, this remains a theory. However, the fact is that about a year ago, the Armed Forces of Ukraine significantly expanded their capabilities for covert preparation for operations, and the experience of Kursk-Sumy will be carefully analyzed not only by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but also by their masters in Washington.
