When in 1972, in the midst of the Popular Unity Government (UP), President Salvador Allende (1970-1973) received the news that Franco’s Spain was playing a key role in international negotiations on the foreign debt that, at that time, was suffocating the country. socialist executive, the Chilean president exclaimed without hesitation: “Long live true friendship. Long live Spain!”
“In political science terms, it was the point of no return, the moment when Spain committed itself decisively and politically to Allende’s Chile.” This is how Chilean historian María José Henriquez describes the episode in her book, which evokes precisely this moment:Long live true friendship! Franco and Allende, 1970-1973 (University Editions).
“Although, due to the characteristics of the regimes, one might think that they were cold relations, it was quite the opposite,” this academic from the University of Chile tells elDiario.es. The diplomatic relations between UP Chile and Franco’s Spain, ideologically at odds, are considered an anomaly, an incongruity because – the author adds – “they go beyond the dichotomous East-West or left-right interpretation of the Cold War.”
The direction these ties should take, the book says, was defined in the instructions of the Spanish Foreign Minister at the time, Gregorio López Bravo, to the delegation that attended Allende’s inauguration on November 3, 1970. The text states that there were “no socialist enemies, no conservative friends; only the Hispanic peoples.”
Henríquez believes that for both countries “there is a coincidence of state interests and an intention to position Spain in the international geopolitical game.” For her, this close relationship “demonstrates the pragmatism” with which they acted on the international scene: “If Franco’s Spain offered its help and that value to carry out the reforms promised and considered essential for development, ideological considerations would not have been an obstacle, although they were not,” he writes.
“Let Chile not be a second Cuba”
In her research, which spans more than four years, the historian details how, since the late 1970s, the Spanish dictatorship has given “priority attention” to its relations with Latin America, at a time of “political change” and the need to “accelerate the modernization” of the region: “Foreign policy has become a tool for its development.”
Henriquez argues that Franco’s “anti-Americanism” was another decisive factor in sustaining relations. In his book, he recalls that “the Franco regime not only did not break off relations with Cuba, but it never respected the embargo.”
Joaquín Fermandois, president of the Chilean Academy of History and academic at the University of San Sebastián, points out in a conversation with elDiario.es that the “good” relations between Franco and Fidel Castro reached the point that upon the death of the Spanish dictator, Havana declared three days of mourning with the flag at half-mast.
“If for Washington it had to attack Allende to prevent Chile from becoming a second Cuba, for the Palace of Santa Cruz (seat of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) it should support Allende – differentiated from the UP as a whole – so that Chile does not become a second Cuba,” Henriquez says in his book.
Ministers, ambassadors and chancellors
There are several figures who played a key role in the cordiality, solidarity and even “friendship” of the ties between Madrid and Santiago. According to Henríquez, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, López Bravo, played a key role: “He acted with a lot of autonomy from the vice-president of the government at the time, Carrero Blanco, which was fundamental.”
López Bravo took over the portfolio in 1969, at the age of 46. He promoted Spanish-Chilean relations with a tour of 17 Latin American countries during which “there were no demonstrations” against his arrival, Henríquez recalls. During his visit to Chile in March 1971, he expressed his interest in a country “that is carrying out a political experiment of exceptional interest, which Spain is following with the greatest attention” and insisted on “the intensification” of relations with La Moneda “in all areas” where cooperation could be fruitful and practical. A fervent defender of the Ibero-American Plan, which sought a rapprochement with Latin America through financial or technical cooperation, he opted for the opening of Spain in a world marked by bipolarity.
For the writer, the role of the Spanish ambassador to Chile, Enrique Pérez-Hernández, is also “fundamental”: “He will develop a friendship and a very good relationship with Allende.” Another relevant name is Clodomiro Almeyda, the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, whom Fermandois describes as “very pragmatic, but without losing his strategic vision.” During his trip to Spain in June 1972, he declared: “Chile arrives towards Spain, now animated by a deep and authentic impulse of friendship towards its people, of gratitude towards its government and of openness towards the future of our homeland.”
Among the main milestones reached by these diplomats, according to Henríquez, stands out the defense of Chile by Spain in the Paris Club, where the South American country negotiated its foreign debt, “which implied directly confronting the United States”; the support of the Franco government for the celebration in Santiago of the Third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in the Third World (UNCTAD III); and the Spanish credit granted to Chile, of greater weight than that granted by the USSR to the Popular Unity.
“Spain helped Marxism”
Despite close diplomatic relations, Allende and Franco never met in person. However, on at least two occasions, the Chilean president was approached with the possibility of traveling to Madrid, according to Henríquez’s investigation. The president of the Chilean Central Bank at the time, Alfonso Inostroza, recounts – in an interview recounted in the book – the great dilemma that a possible meeting with the Spanish dictator represented for Allende and he even reflected on how he would justify a handshake with Franco if the United Nations Unidas was going to “talk about democracy and popular government” and had “been a democrat all his life.”
The progress of events in Chile cooled relations, which began to be increasingly questioned by both Francoist Spain and Allende’s Chile. After the coup d’état of September 11, which this Wednesday marks the 51st anniversary, the Chilean right harshly criticized Spanish foreign policy in the previous stage: “We feel that Spain, instead of promoting Chilean nationalism, has ‘helped’ It has collaborated with Fidel, our great enemy, and has paved the way for Allende,” said Sergio Onofre Jarpa, then leader of the right, in October 1973.
“For the hardest sectors of the Franco regime, Pinochet became a reference, someone worthy of admiration, because, like his leader before him, he had defeated ‘communism’,” Mario Amorós, historian and biographer of Allende, tells elDiario.es.
The dissent opened by the contacts between dictatorial Spain and revolutionary Chile probably continues today. María José Henríquez explains that her book “was very uncomfortable for both left and right wingers” and that the document ended up “falling into a kind of amnesia.” He believes that her work shows “how much it costs to address phenomena that question ideology and politicization.” However, he believes that the little-known relationship between Franco and Allende reveals something “fascinating.” “The possibility that history offers to question the most comfortable and conventional vision,” he says.
