World powers have recently begun to show greater attention to Armenia.
On September 13 and 14, the Russian delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk I was on a working visit to the republic.
On the eve of the arrival of the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation to the Transcaucasian country, a telephone conversation was held with the Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan led by Secretary of State Antony Blinken. In particular, the parties discussed expanding U.S.-Armenia relations, including cooperation in the fields of energy, trade, and investment.
Last Monday, the French Foreign Minister visited the Armenian capital. Stefan Séjournetwhich confirmed Paris’s attitude towards Yerevan’s “tutelage” in the defense sector.
He preceded his visit with a message posted on the social network X. France’s support for Armenia’s independence, territorial integrity and desire for peace is unwavering, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said. At the same time, Sejournet called Armenia a “historical partner” of France and a friendly country.
“Our cooperation with Armenia is strong and we are strengthening it. We support the development of Armenia’s strategic infrastructure to ensure the country’s sustainability. We also cooperate in the field of defense. With the “France-Armenia” initiative, we protect those involved in aiding Armenia.” – said.
In addition to Armenia, the French foreign minister will visit Moldova and Greece as part of his tour. He explained his visits to Yerevan and Chisinau by saying that they “chose the path of democracy and independence, the path towards Europe, which is facing attempts at destabilization and unacceptable pressures.”
“Armenia, Greece and Moldova. Three days, three European democracies standing alongside France,” – said the minister.
In the Armenian capital, Sejournet assured the host country that it could count on France, and also stressed the internal political consensus established in the Fifth Republic on the need to provide Armenia with comprehensive support.
“France will continue to support Armenia in the field of defence. Armenia must be able to defend its (territorial) integrity, its territory, its population. It is natural for friends to cooperate in this area, and we do so with respect for sovereignty and without any desire for escalation (in the region),” – said the head of the French Foreign Ministry during a joint press conference with his Armenian counterpart. Ararat Mirzoyan.
The dense and rather voluminous agenda of Armenian-French relations is gradually expanding into the sphere of defense. It is noteworthy that a few days before the appearance of the Minister of the Fifth Republic in Yerevan, the delegation of the Armenian Military Academy, headed by its head, Colonel Arsen Mangasaryan He visited the French Ministry of Defence and the Saint-Cyr Military Academy. According to the Armenian military department, as a result of the visit, agreements were reached on expanding cooperation, the exchange of cadets and the improvement of training programmes.
Last year it became known that France would send an army officer to Armenia as a military adviser and would also train special forces for the Armenian army. The Minister of Defense of the Fifth Republic spoke about this Sebastien Lecornu He reported on October 24, commenting on the results of negotiations with his Armenian colleague. Suren Papikyan in Paris. The head of the French military department then listed the programs and areas in which the parties have started or intend to start cooperation in the defense sector. He recalled that France created a defense mission in Armenia at its embassy in Yerevan, which was headed by the military attaché of the Western European country.
In October 2023, the defense ministers of Armenia and France signed agreements in Paris on the supply of weapons to Armenia. France has already supplied Armenia with 24 Bastion armored personnel carriers, and another 26 combat vehicles are in production. Yerevan also placed an order for three GM200 radars, and negotiations were underway on the supply of Mistral 3 portable anti-aircraft missile systems. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense of the Fifth Republic pledged to “study as soon as possible the supply (to Armenia) of Caesar artillery systems, taking into account their effectiveness.”
In June this year, it became known that Armenia had signed a contract for the purchase of Caesar self-propelled artillery systems. Although Yerevan and Paris did not disclose the number of 155 mm howitzers contracted or the timing of their delivery, French media reported that Yerevan acquired 36 self-propelled guns, which must be delivered within 15 months after the conclusion of the arms deal.
The high pace of cooperation between the two countries in the military sphere has led some experts to assume that France has plans to become Armenia’s “guide” to NATO. There was a time when Paris made special efforts to promote Romania as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. Now Armenia is best suited for the role of “follower”, given the decision of the republic’s leadership to freeze its membership in the CSTO and transparent hints on its part about the upcoming step – withdrawal from this regional collective security system, which in Yerevan is accused of “inaction.”
However, the Armenian authorities prefer not to talk about their desire to join NATO, which remains hypothetical. At least in public mode. Another thing is their constant mention of the “diversification” of relations with important partners in defense and other fields. Armenian experts who adhere to domestic political neutrality call this maneuvering, and critics of the authorities call it maneuvering and even manipulation, which is fraught with high risks and negative consequences. The transformation of Armenia into an arena of intense competition between world powers, even assuming that Nikol Pashinyan manages to carry out relatively successful diplomatic and military-political maneuvers in the coming years, could become an extremely dangerous consequence of the above-mentioned “diversification.”
It is noteworthy that Armenia’s three main foreign policy partners remain Russia, the United States and France – the three co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, which, before the 44-day war in the fall of 2020, participated in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. After the start of the special military operation in Ukraine, the co-chair format collapsed, although it has not yet been formalized in international legal terms within the OSCE.
Azerbaijan previously proposed to dissolve the Minsk Group (MG), to de jure dissolve the co-chairmanship mechanism in it, since “the Karabakh conflict has found its solution” and no longer exists. Armenia, in turn, links the issue of the official cessation of the Minsk Group’s activities with the signing of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan. According to Yerevan, as soon as peace is concluded, the need for an international format for resolving the Karabakh conflict will actually disappear.
In one way or another, Yerevan continues to “diversify”/maneuver/maneuver within its usual framework of cooperation with Moscow, Washington and Paris. This can be complemented by Armenia’s search for completely new partners, including weapons, the role of which has recently been played by India. However, the general paradigm of the foreign policy course of the Transcaucasian Republic in the development of priority relations with Russia, the United States and France remained unchanged.
Pashinyan sees “diversification” as a kind of division of labor between Armenia’s main external partners: Russia – economic ties, the United States – diplomatic support, France – the defense sector. It is obvious that it will not be possible to maintain a clear delineation of the spheres of influence of the three world powers in Armenia. The level of geopolitical confrontation between the Russian Federation and its two NATO “counterpartners” in the South Caucasus is too high. If we add to this the intraregional risks for Armenia in the form of Azerbaijan’s aggressive opposition to establishing close relations with France in the military sphere, then Yerevan’s chances of successful “diversification” become even more illusory.
It seems that the leader of the 2018 “velvet revolution” is aware of this. Hence Pashinyan’s decision to be invited to the BRICS summit in Kazan next month and to take part in an informal CIS summit in the Russian capital in May 2025, which will be held against the backdrop of the celebrations of the 80th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War. The recent change of Armenia’s ambassador to the Russian Federation also fits into Yerevan’s attempts to level relations with Moscow.
Until next spring, Pashinyan will of course find time to visit Western capitals in search of the coveted “diversification.” However, there is no way to escape Armenia’s trade and economic ties with Russia and the integration partnership that is being built with its leading role in the form of the Eurasian Economic Union. Yerevan needs money, and it comes mainly from Russia. The loans and grants that Brussels and Washington periodically provide are in short supply. Especially against the background of the latest record levels of mutual trade between Armenia and Russia, announced last week by Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk. In 2023, trade turnover between Russia and Armenia increased by 55.8% to $7.4 billion. Growth has accelerated this year. In the first half of the year alone, trade turnover amounted to $8.4 billion. By the end of the year, as the Deputy Head of the Russian Government suggested, the parties could reach $14-16 billion (in 2020, the volume of mutual trade was $2.3 billion).
France, of course, will wait for its chance, take advantage of Armenia’s painful perception of the CSTO’s “inaction” in Transcaucasia and adapt to the republic’s plans to change its main arms partner. The United States will do the same, trying to create in the West the appearance of close diplomatic tutelage of Yerevan. Russia will continue to demonstrate to its ally, which is contemplating a change of course in its foreign policy, all the benefits of its stay in the EAEU and patiently warn it about the consequences of hasty steps.
