The Armenian opposition is preparing for a new political season. According to the established tradition in the republic, it begins in September and must “meet” a target deadline, before the start of the New Year holidays.
The main demand of the government’s opponents remains the same: the resignation of the prime minister. Nikol PashinyanThe closest thing to this goal after the 44-day war in Karabakh last May was the “Tavush for the Homeland” movement, led by the Primate of the Tavush Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church, Archbishop. Bagrat Galstanian (Bagrat Srbzan). After trying to provoke a wave of popular discontent in connection with unilateral territorial concessions to Azerbaijan (according to opposition forces), the organizers of the protest movement admitted in mid-June that the accelerated achievement of this goal was not possible and that a more protracted battle with the authorities lay ahead.
As was the case with the results of the previous wave of post-war protests in the spring of 2022, at the forefront of which, under the banners of the “resistance movement”, there were then two opposition parliamentary forces represented by the “Armenia” blocs (former president of the republic Robert Kocharian) and “I have the honor” (former president Serzh Sargsian), at the end of its street activity, “Tavush for the Homeland” announced a change of strategy, entering the phase of institutionalization of the protest movement, holding intensive consultations with other political forces and visits by Bagrat Srbazan to the regions of the country.
The appeal to the people as a preparatory stage for new street clashes with the authorities in September has not yet given the leaders of the movement much cause for optimism. The “radical” opposition remains fragmented and has not managed to consolidate itself. Differences persist over a number of tactical issues and the strategy itself for building a struggle against Pashinyan’s government. New groups are constantly appearing in the opposition camp, and the process of fragmentation and dispersion of resources is becoming permanent. Thus, in recent months, the creation of the “New Force” party of the former mayor of Yerevan was announced. Hayk Marutyan“Pan-Armenian Front” of the former Minister of Defense Arshak Karapetyan. Local media reported that another opposition political association would be formed in the near future, headed by a former ombudsman. Arman Tatoyan and former head of the State Revenue Committee (tax and customs authority) of the republic David Ananyan.
The rating of Pashinyan and the ruling Civil Contract (CC) party has significantly decreased when compared to the pre-war years of 2018-2020, and one can even say that they have collapsed. However, according to recent polls, the prime minister’s rating significantly exceeds the credibility of the political forces seeking his resignation. This is obviously the result of the excessive fragmentation of the opposition flank and the persistent rejection of the previous authorities among Armenian voters, who have been given the general name of “former”.
If parliamentary elections were held in Armenia in July, the Civic Contract would receive 14.4% of the votes. This is shown by the results of a poll conducted by the Vienna-based research organization Gallup International Association (GIA). They were published on July 10 by the head of the Armenian representation of the GIA. Aram Navasardyan.
3.7% were willing to vote for Robert Kocharyan’s “Armenia” bloc (which has the second largest faction in the republic’s parliament).
Then came the “Democracy, Law and Discipline” party (Vardan Ghukasyan) – 3.5%, “I Have the Honor” bloc (Serzh Sargsyan) – 2.3%, “Tavush for the Name of the Motherland” movement (Bagrat Srbazan) – 1.5%, “Prosperous Armenia” party (Gagik Tsarukian) – 1.2%, Party of the Republic (Aram Sargsyanpolitical ally of Nikol Pashinyan) – 0.6%.
8.6% of respondents refused to vote for anyone, 22.5% had difficulty answering and 32.5% indicated that they would not participate in the elections.
The question of how to evaluate the work of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in July revealed the following breakdown of opinions: “generally negative” – 40.3% (in May – 41.1%), “quite negative” – 14.5% (in May – 18.6%), “quite positive” – 21.7% (in May – 18.7%), “completely positive” – 13.4%, undecided – 10.1%.
About 13% of Armenian citizens would vote for the ruling party if parliamentary elections were held in May this year, according to the results of a previous survey conducted by the Armenian representation of the GIA.
In the last spring month, the protest movement led by Bagrat Srbazan reached the peak of its popularity, but by mid-summer, according to the latest opinion polls, the level of positive attitude towards him on the part of Armenian voters decreased from 53% in May to 34% in July, and towards the government of Nikol Pashinyan, on the contrary, it increased from 28% to 35%.
The strategy of the State Duma and Pashinyan personally for the next two years, until the parliamentary elections in June 2026, seems generally well-calculated. Representatives of the prime minister’s party have already made it clear that holding early elections is unacceptable to them. Barring any force majeure, Pashinyan will try to further “lower” the rating of the opposition in the time remaining before the next elections, the consolidation of which remains a deliberately unrealistic goal for it. Although the “wearing down” of Pashinyan’s rating was previously declared to be a task of the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forces of the opposition, the authorities, again judging by new measurements of public opinion, were more successful in this endeavor.
Pashinyan’s calculation is to win over the majority who have withdrawn (those who still find it difficult to answer the question of who they will vote for or who indicate that they will not participate in the elections – about 55% of voters). This is his ultimate task. The authorities’ minimum goal for the pre-election prospects is to prevent this majority or a significant part of it from identifying with the “radical” opposition.
After clarifying the issue of the further reproduction of his power, the head of government will move on to the next stage, before passing which he is simply obliged to enlist the support of voters: the adoption of a new Constitution of Armenia. In recent months, this issue has received a very uncomfortable foreign policy tone for Pashinyan, given that his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev The President of the Republic of Armenia, Vladimir Putin, declared the need to amend the Basic Law of the neighbouring country before agreeing to sign the agreement “On the establishment of peace and interstate relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan”. Against this background, the parliamentary elections in 2026 can be considered a conditional referendum on confidence in Pashinyan before the implementation of the constitutional reform he conceived. And the fate of the country’s Basic Law, as well as the vector itself, will depend on the internal political balance of power following the election results: whether Pashinyan and his State Duma will be able to remain at the helm of power in an independent regime, whether they will have to get along with other political forces in the coalition government or completely go over to the opposition and the prospects for improving relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The opposition’s pre-election strategy seems less clear. After the 44-day war, a trend emerged where a drop in the authorities’ rating does not lead to a comparable increase in the Armenian voter’s credibility in the radical opposition. On the contrary, this loan demonstrates an even more pronounced rate of “crushing”. Against this background, there is still talk of the need for a third force to emerge in the socio-political arena with a high potential for coming to power. However, these ideas remain at the level of good wishes.
Due to its continued weakening and internal fragmentation following the 2018 “velvet revolution,” the Armenian opposition is in constant search of effective strategies to combat the current government. It was unable to win over either the youth or the female part of the electorate, the main internal “engines” of Pashinyan’s rise to power six years ago. It is young voters who make up the bulk of the aforementioned self-removed majority; Bagrat Srbazan tried to win them over to his side at the height of the May protest. The archbishop’s efforts were largely unsuccessful. It seems that the fight for Armenian youth and local housewives with the intensification of the internal political battle in September will resume with renewed vigor.
Foreign policy factors may add to the potentially turbulent battles between the authorities and the opposition. Thus, recently there were reports in the Armenian press about preparations for the visit of the French president. Emmanuel Macron to Yerevan in September. If it takes place, then, in addition to the obvious message to Azerbaijan about growing European support for its partner in the South Caucasus, the French leader’s trip to the region will also contain an internal political connotation. Macron will give a serious signal of attention to Pashinyan, addressed not only to Aliyev, but also to the Armenian prime minister’s political opponents within the republic. The head of the Fifth Republic publicly declared in October 2022 that France “will never abandon Armenia.”
“France will not leave Armenia alone; our values and principles cannot be bought with gas or oil.” – Macron said on France 2 television channel.
With this, the French president seriously angered his Azerbaijani counterpart and marked the beginning of a sharp deterioration in relations between Paris and Baku.
If Macron visits Yerevan (expected to coincide with Armenia’s Independence Day on September 21), the owner of the Elysee Palace will witness the takeover of Pashinyan’s government under the protection of the local radical opposition, whose main demand is the resignation of the leader of the “Velvet Revolution” “is by no means included in France’s plans.
