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Germany is approaching France – and vice versa – in the open issue of the general European defense, but the differences in the financial and strategic interests of the two countries remain large, which makes the so -called Franco -German axis extremely difficult for supply.
“From a longer historical point of view, the degree of convergence (between the two countries) is undoubtedly higher than they were here, and I would say, decades,” that Bruggelsky is associated with Bruges Jacob F. Kirkegaard.
Both capitals consider Russia as the greatest long -term threat, and both promised to invest hundreds of billions of euros in their military and defense industrial base. In Berlin, he was called “Zeitenwende” (or historical turn), while Paris said that the recent law on the new military doctrine is “the final strategic step”.
The convergence was caused by a full -fledged Russian invasion of Ukraine, which restored the usual war in European territory, the return of Donald Trump to the White House, which called up the long -term obligation of the US security for the security of Europe.
The young Chancellor, Friedrich Mertz, “accepted essentially what I can describe only as a global attitude,” said Jacob F. Kirkegaard, saying that “Europe should be ready for the future without guarantees of US security.”
“France converges with Germany”
Nevertheless, an example of how this approach to defense remains a difficult process last week, when the Frenchman Emmanuel Macron and Friedrich Mertz tried to overcome their differences in the general defense project, a budget of 100 billion euros.
The contradiction is based on the French requirement to provide 80% of the FCAS Air Battle Air System (FCAS) project, rejecting previous agreements that predict that the project will be jointly distributed between the two countries and Spain, which also participate in the project.
The French requirement, however, “should not be so surprised”, Euronews Expense, Rafael Loss, a scientific policy partner in the European Council for International Relations (ECFR), since one of the most important differences between France and Germany is how much they perceive their armed forces and their goal.
The Armed Forces in France are part of the national foreign policy – as the recent operations in Sachel showed with foreign territories and the possession of nuclear weapons that make up the country’s global strategic aspirations.
“That’s why the French army feels much more comfortable when it is in one -sided or outside the EU, NATO (than German), and this speech then applies to the types of defense systems that the French armed forces prefer to acquire.”
“Everything related to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence should work independently. And this means that the FCA, who should replace the Rafale fighters and bring French nuclear weapons to the future, the French military and political leadership will not accept it.
“The French industry should be able to produce this plane independently, if necessary. They are ready to work together when strategic orientation is in line, but in the end they must produce everything to others. Again, this is that many in Germany and all in Germany.
Nevertheless, the loss emphasizes, “France converges with Germany” with “the realization that for the sake of European security it should show that it invests in its partnerships and relations with Europeans, especially in the eastern border.”
“Great lost opportunity”
Another important obstacle to promoting the general defensive agenda at the EU level is the strong difference in the financial situation of the two countries.
The German debt index in the gross domestic product (GDP) amounted to 62.3% in the first quarter of the year. France was at the level of 114.1%, which is significantly higher than what the EU financial rules are imposed (60%).
This discrepancy means that since European countries seek to significantly increase their defense costs and military capabilities in order to prevent the possible attack of Russia at the end of the decade, Germany has a luxury to invest significant amounts in defense, and France does not.
For example, Germany asked for the use of Brussels to weaken financial rules for defense costs, which France cannot do, which is aimed at the process of excessive deficit.
France, which has constantly invested in defense in recent decades, has leadership, but the amounts intended for investing in the German government (including the Fund of 500 billion euros to increase the army and infrastructure) means that, according to forecasts, it quickly covers lost positions.
But the public finances of the two countries “supply them mainly to various aspects on the negotiation table” at the EU level, Kirkegaard said.
The European Commission introduced Europe for the re -equipment of Europe, which, according to forecasts, will push the member states to invest up to 800 billion euros until 2030. But most of this money will come from the member states themselves, which in the case of France is permission.
Given the scale of the project, the commission asked to offer “innovative” options for financing defense. Emmanuel Macron urged that one of these options to become a common lending to the EU, that Germany is categorically rejected.
For Kirkegaard, this means that the crisis caused by the Russian war in Ukraine is a “large lost opportunity” for the block.
“This crisis, the war in Ukraine, will not lead to much greater institutional or fiscal integration of the EU. This will lead to the expansion of the EU in Ukraine and, possibly, in other countries, but this is a different change in the EU, ”he said.