Carlos Mazón’s actions on the day of the DANA disaster, last Tuesday, October 29, are the main key to unraveling what went wrong in the actions of the Generalitat Valenciana. All the sources consulted by this newspaper during this tragic week – whether from the PP, the Valencian Executive or various agencies involved in the response to the disaster – agree that Mazón arrived extremely late (around 7:30 p.m.) at the first meeting of the Integrated Operational Coordination Center (Cecopi) at Eliana, the epicenter of the emergency response. When he arrived, with a completely uncontrolled situation, he further delayed the development of Cecopi because the technicians had to explain the delicate situation to Mazón. Which, added to the lack of agility of his advisor Salomé Pradas, led to the sending of the alert, already with Mazón in the Cecopi, at 8:12 p.m., when hundreds of people were already trapped or, directly, dead .
Before Mazón’s arrival at the Emergency Coordination Center of L’Eliana, regional television In Punt had already broadcast live the brutal ravages of DANA. The Valencian president felt the first signs of the approaching disaster at the Palau de la Generalitat. This Tuesday morning, he had three events outside of DANA without canceling his schedule at any time. The last, with employers and unions, to address the budgets for next 2025.
In addition, after the last event with the employers’ association and unions, which ended at 2:30 p.m., the president left Palau for a private meal, as elDiario.es learned. The carelessness of the head of the Consell in those hours was such that he did not connect to the 5:00 p.m. Cecopi, even by videoconference, as other institutions did. Where was the president between 2:30 p.m. and 6:45 p.m. when he received a call from Minister Pradas warning of the risk of the Forata dam overflowing?
A PP source maintains that Mazón’s team thought that DANA “would cause some flooding, as is usual in Valencia, but of no importance.” “Until it was irremediable, they were not aware of the seriousness of the situation, there was nothing to do, they sent the alert out of despair,” says the same source, who underlines a relevant aspect for understanding the actions of Carlos and Mazón. his team: “Just trust [José Manuel] Cuenca and Cayetano [García Ramírez]who are two people incapable of managing the Administration”, he recalls in reference respectively to the regional secretary of the Office of the President and the regional secretary of the Presidency, two senior officials who rubbed shoulders all week with the head of the Consell, in a sort of bunkered “politburo”.
The Minister of Justice and the Interior, Salomé Pradas, had called the Cecopi meeting for 5 p.m. around 3 p.m. However, a source involved in the operation, constantly scandalized since last Tuesday, believes that, given the signs of imminent disaster, “it should have been called for 3 p.m. at the latest.”
Sources consulted by this newspaper, belonging to one of the agencies participating in the response to the tragedy, assure that Cecopi was summoned “late in the evening”, given the extreme seriousness of the situation, which was already seriously aggravated by noon. and even before. Despite the signs, Mazón left the Palau de la Generalitat and went to a Ministry of Health event on the other side of town.
A source from the Valencian executive confirms that Pradas, very overwhelmed and blocked, dedicated herself to entering and leaving the Cecopi room trying to contact Mazón by telephone. “The advisor didn’t know what to do,” remembers the same source.
In the agencies involved in the disaster response, many sources report the chaos and lack of coordination that reigns daily in Cecopi. And especially the first afternoon of last Tuesday. Until 5:00 p.m., according to sources from the Regional Executive, all the detailed information was not yet known in Cecopi. Several of the officials involved in the emergency response logged into the meeting electronically. This is not the case for Mazón, who remained at the Palau de la Generalitat.
A source present at the Cecopi meeting ensures that, around 6:45 p.m., the councilor contacted Mazón by telephone to inform him of the risk of overflowing the Forata dam. It was at that moment that the president left the Palau de la Generalitat towards the Emergency Coordination Center of L’Eliana.
Official sources from the Presidency of the Generalitat assure that Mazón “worked and received information punctually”. “It was when he was informed of the risk of the Forata dam breaking that he physically and immediately joined the Cecopi meeting,” add the same sources. In fact, he goes by car from Palau – in the center of Valencia – to Eliana, about 20 kilometers away.
The presidency places the responsibility for managing the crisis on Minister Pradas: “She headed the Cecopi, convened from 3 p.m., as provided for by regional law. »
The late arrival of the president further slowed down the decision-making process, while Salomé Pradas had been leading Cecopi for hours. “Mazón arrived and slowed everything down because the technicians had to explain it to him again,” says a source close to the depths of this first catastrophic Cecopi. “It is not possible that politicians have taken the lead,” adds the same source, referring to Mazón and the Minister of Justice and Interior, Salomé Pradas.
A source involved in the deployment from the first minute also doubts the capacity of the emergency team of the Generalitat Valenciana: “They are very lazy and not prepared.” These are the senior officials who replaced the previous team of Vox councilor Elisa Núñez. With the distribution of powers within the first executive of Mazón and its far-right partners, emergency management has returned to a party well known for its climate denialism and much more interested in the regional competition of bullfighting celebrations, the world of it. Vicente Barrera, former bullfighter and then Valencian vice-president, is a native.
After the departure of Santiago Abascal’s party from the Valencian executive, Salomé Pradas assumes the powers of Justice and the Interior. In fact, as reported by elDiario.es, the minister left vacant for three months the position of Director General of the Interior, with delegated functions in areas such as Civil Protection or Regional Police, transcendental powers in the response in any emergency.
Mazón personally chose the candidate to occupy the position, appointed by decree a few hours before the disaster: the bullfighting expert Vicente Huet, whose educational background is limited to his professional experience in a company in the sustainable packaging sector and to the municipal policy of the PP. (He was mayor of Barxeta and chief of staff of the president of the Provincial Council of Valencia, the popular Vicente Mompó). The priority imposed on the new director general was the bullfighting celebrations, a fishing ground for disputed votes between the right and the far right.
The power of Minister Pradas
Among popular Valencians, almost no one supports the leadership of Mazón, who has become a sort of political “zombie”. Even less to Salomé Pradas. Many party officials or former officials have belittled the president and the councilor, privately and mercilessly. There are also thunderous silences.
A PP source bluntly declares, in reference to the department headed by Salomé Pradas: “I don’t think any senior official in this department was qualified to handle the emergency, he surpassed them.” The same source assures that the capacity of the main advisor for emergency response is “limited”. “We saw that it was too big for him,” he adds.
Councilor Pradas had to face the initial management and decision-making alone while Mazón went to Cecopi despite the fact that “she has no management experience,” they recall.
The error in the disaster response paints an extremely complicated picture for popular Valencians. Their leader is already synonymous with incompetence.
