The dispute between the central government and the Valencian Generalitat over the distribution of responsibilities for the desolation caused by Dana continued this Monday.
Carlos Mazon He gave his reasons on the two most controversial points of his handling of the disaster: why he did not issue the flood alert earlier and why it took so long to seek help from the army.
Concerning the first, Mazón criticized the Júcar Hydrographic Confederation (CHJ), dependent on the Ministry of Ecological Transition of Therese Riberaafter “deactivating” the overflow alert three times last Tuesday.
Regarding the second, the Valencian president maintained that, although he concentrated the actions of the Military Emergency Unit (UME) in only two localities, the operational command of this unit had the ability to request more troops and also cover ground zero of the disaster.
On the first point, the Ministry of Ecological Transition responded that it is not up to it to issue public alerts in hydrological matters, but that these “correspond to the emergency services coordinated by the autonomous communities”.
Concerning the second, the UME explained that its soldiers could not enter the emergency zone without authorization from the regional government.
The truth of Mazón’s arguments will likely be open to debate in light of the provisions of the legislation. But there is no doubt that The Spanish emergency system responds to a diabolical and tortuous model which, apparently, has not worked.
Because the meaning of the regulatory provision is precisely that public action is not subject to human errors like those allegedly committed by the administration led by Mazón.
On the other hand, it has been demonstrated beyond doubt that the alert mechanism is poorly thought out. A dysfunction that becomes obvious when compared to the American system.
In the United States, emergencies are managed by a single organization under national jurisdiction, the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
But in Spain, These are atomized and compartmentalized between national and regional levels. Even the body that monitors the evolution of precipitation (Aemet) and the one that monitors the river flows that it causes (the Hydrographic Confederations, in this case Júcar) are divided.
In addition, unlike the American National Hurricane Center, dependent on the National Meteorological Service, Aemet can only activate alerts based on observed phenomena, while its American equivalent does so based on forecasts. A difference which allows politicians greater room for reaction.
The National Hurricane Center is also authorized to issue emergency alerts itself. A power that Aemet lacks, which is limited to publishing information, leaving political leaders to assess the dangerousness of alerts, assign their level of risk and determine emergency measures.
The imbalance born from this separation between foresight and prevention organizations This explains the Aemet red notice activated at 7:30 a.m. last Tuesday only led to the triggering of an emergency alert by the civil protection services at 7:17 p.m.
But apart from the flagrant lack of agility and efficiency of the system, what cannot be explained is the escalation of the government’s criticisms of Mazón’s management.
Because yes, as he maintains Marguerite Roblesthe emergency “is not as well coordinated as possible”, Why is the Central Executive still not taking command?
Moncloa may be right when he says that the Valencian president failed in the risk assessment and that at no time did he request the declaration of a national emergency, which would have entrusted the rescue operations, aid and reconstruction to the central government.
But even admitting that Mazón did not act diligently by not requesting on Tuesday evening or Wednesday morning the declaration of national emergency provided for by the law of the National Civil Protection System, why did the government not do so? not done?
This law also empowers the Ministry of the Interior to decree it “on its own initiative”. And the truth is that From the first minute, all the conditions were met for the Valencia disaster to be declared a national emergency.
The government hides behind the fact that it did not want to upset Valencian autonomy and provoke an institutional conflict derived from its takeover. The government defends that its role is not to lead the response, but rather to “help” the Valencian Community.
But Sanchez He admitted on Saturday that “the response provided is not sufficient”. What sense does it make then to wait for the Generalitat to move the emergency from level 2 (the one in force today, which allows you to request state aid, while maintaining control) to 3, instead of the government itself?
Since, according to Moncloa, Mazón declined his offer of military and material aid on Tuesday, the government has suggested that the Valencian president was “overwhelmed by events” and that he has been “dragging his feet” since then.
Can we then assume that the government is abandoning the Valencians to their fate, in the hands of a supposedly “incompetent” person whose ability to respond it has never trusted? Or can we suspect that Sánchez is instrumentalizing the catastrophe with partisan intentions aimed at politically destroying Mazón?
