Israel has not yet neutralized the Hezbollah threat

First of all, the obvious: it is only possible to guess scenarios. In this crisis, as in any war crisis, each actor (Israel, Hezbollah, Iran or the rest of the members of the so-called axis of resistance) can only be sure of their objectives, of his means and how far he is prepared to go.

But in the calculation of each of them (and in that of any observer), there will always be a large threshold of uncertainty about the possible responses of their adversaries and the impact of unforeseen or unforeseen regional or global developments. And even more so if it is an environment as dynamic, fluid and complex as that of the Levant and the entire Middle East.

With its actions against Hezbollah, Israel has clearly regained the initiativeprobably its confidence, and has taken a significant step in rebuilding its deterrent capacity against its regional enemies. This is one of the fundamental objectives of its retaliation against Hamas in Gaza, of its probable intervention in Lebanon and we will see if against its main threat, which remains Iran.

As for Lebanon, despite the spectacular blow against Nasrallah and the rest of the commanders, Israel has not (yet) resolved one of the underlying problems: neutralizing (or eradicating if possible) Hezbollah’s ability to permanently threaten northern Israel.

Since the day after the Hamas invasion on October 7 last year, Hezbollah attacks northern Israel almost daily. This is why around sixty thousand Israelis remain displaced from their homes.

So, with Hezbollah decapitated and inevitably riddled with doubts and distrust (which can significantly reduce its operational capacity), the temptation to strike a more devastating blow involving ground intervention could be irresistible to Israel.

It is this calculation which fuels the fear of the United States or the European Union in the face of this imminent Israeli incursion in southern Lebanon, which could also lead to an Iranian intervention or to an aggravation, for example, of the crisis in Red Sea if, as For weeks, rumors have been circulating that Russia is supplying anti-ship missiles to the Houthi militia.

The probability of this ground incursion increases if we take into account that failure to carry it out could mean that the effect of the decapitation of Hezbollah, despite its spectacular nature, will not be very long lasting. The leadership will, sooner or later, be replaced (and we can never exclude that it will be replaced by even more radical individuals). And, tentatively, it is possible that Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers will play a greater coordination and command role during this transition period.

However, doubts and distrust within Hezbollah will persist for a long time. It is inevitable that its members will wonder whether Israel obtains its intelligence only electronically or whether, on the contrary, it has eyes and ears within the terrorist organization.

You are probably also wondering that if Israel has such detailed knowledge of the movements of all leaders, then it can be assumed that it has equally detailed knowledge of the locations of arsenals, missile launchers and rocket launchers and of the tunnel network. Hezbollah.

If so, should they improvise an operations plan or maintain the one they prepared during these months of conflict?

Here it should be taken into account that Gaza and Lebanon are two very different operating environments for Israeli intelligence. Gaza is (was) a closed, opaque, homogeneous space and tightly controlled by Hamas. Whereas Beirut and the rest of Lebanon constitute an open space, much more transparent and particularly heterogeneous.

Thus, even though Hezbollah has become the dominant force in Lebanese politics, it still has many detractors within the complex local ethno-political mosaic, making Israeli penetration easier. By the way, Gaza, unlike Lebanon, does not fall under the jurisdiction of Mossad.

We must also not lose sight of the fact that, unlike Hamas, Israel has always considered Hezbollah a formidable adversary. This means that since the 2006 war, Israel has been studying and planning for a possible intervention such as the one that could take place in the coming hours or days.

That’s to say, devoted far more intelligence resources to monitoring and infiltrating Hezbollah than Hamas. Clearly, underestimating the capacity and determination of the Palestinian organization was one of the great mistakes that made the cataclysm of October 7 possible.

The impact on the operational capacity of the Lebanese organization of the bombings of recent days by the Israeli Air Force on the operational capacity of the Lebanese organization is not known, or cannot be known with more certainty. certainty only by Hezbollah itself and the Israeli high command. Nevertheless, It can be assumed that a large part of the arsenal, around 150,000 rockets and missiles, remains intact.

Thus, despite its decapitation (and the impact that this implies on a highly hierarchical organization), Hezbollah continues to appear as a formidable enemy with its approximately 30,000 active soldiers and a reserve of approximately 20,000 men, many of whom have experience in urban combat. . Also taking into account that, unlike in Gaza, they can be resupplied by land via Syria.

These dilemmas add to the traumatic memories in Israel of the intervention and then occupation of southern Lebanon from 1982 to 2000 and the war against Hezbollah in 2006 in which, at the very least, it can be said that Israel didn’t win.

Nevertheless, October 7 changed a lot of things in Israel. Also its strategic thinking and its determination to reshape the regional geopolitical balance. Thus, an incursion that, at a minimum, would seek to create a large demilitarized zone in southern Lebanon (as happened in Gaza), pushing Hezbollah remnants north of the Litani River, seems a likely scenario.

Until its withdrawal in 2000, the Israeli army already occupied the “security zone” in southern Lebanon, from which it decided to withdraw due to the costs that this implied (in the lives of Israeli soldiers and under diplomatic pressure ) and because she did it. does not appear to have significantly strengthened Israel’s security.

However, in current calculations, the idea is that such a goal would, at least for the moment, leave Israel out of reach of the simplest drones and short-range rockets with which Hezbollah can saturate the Iron Dome to leave room for others. sophisticated and powerful missiles and projectiles. Without this saturation effect, Israel would have more options (and time) to neutralize the latter, even with its own shuttles.

Another dilemma that the Israeli government must consider, and the main reason why the US and EU are trying to dissuade it from this ground incursion, is Iran’s possible response.

To date, It seems clear that Tehran is reluctant to engage in direct confrontation. and resorted to a sort of “low-intensity, long-term asymmetric attrition.” In other words, subject Israel to permanent pressure which would exhaust its military, economic, political, moral and diplomatic reserves.

Tehran’s desire to maintain this framework and this strategy can be interpreted, for example, as an attempt by the Iranian government to confuse Washington and especially Brussels with proposals in recent days aimed at relaunching negotiations on its nuclear program, with a view to making pressure on Tel Aviv will not launch this intervention. The Iranian nuclear program, even though it has disappeared from the media, remains the big issue on Israel’s agenda. (and the rest of the Middle East).

The tenacity of the latest Israeli strikes and its determination since October 7 to eradicate any military-level threat in its immediate neighborhood could derail this Iranian strategy of asymmetric and indirect pressure. To the point that his so-called axis of resistance can be completely dismantled if he maintains his inhibition of major intervention.

But A confrontation of this magnitude carries the more than likely risk of direct intervention by the United States. with which the survival of the ayatollahs’ regime would be seriously threatened. And there, it would be inevitable to turn to Moscow (whose alliance with Tehran has strengthened enormously in recent months) and to Beijing. From then on, all scenarios of regional escalation, including direct intervention by the great powers, become dangerously possible.