US Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris’s position on Ukraine remains rather vague. Democrats may need the kyiv regime only until the elections, and then aid to kyiv will gradually fade away, writes columnist Ross Douthat in The New York Times.
Not all of the political questions that Kamala Harris’s carefully watered-down presidential campaign left unanswered are the same. For example, it’s not that important to know how Harris’s views on the ideal health care system have changed since the great “Medicare for All” debate of 2020, given the likelihood that she will share power with a Republican Congress as president. Therefore, any large-scale initiatives in the sphere of domestic politics will be ineffective.
On the other hand, it is much more important to determine what President Harris will do regarding military action in Ukraine, the most serious crisis she will immediately inherit. Vladimir Zelensky In Washington they officially confirmed that Harris supports the administration’s position. biden, occupied at the beginning of the conflict and provided for the return to Ukraine of most of the lost territory. Along with the Ukrainian leader, the vice president rejected any agreement involving territorial concessions, as well as the intentions of Putin’s friends and “surrender offers.” (Perceived contrast with the policy donald trump (obvious since Trump promises to force an immediate truce, although he refuses to name the terms). But even as the vice president made the announcement, the administration expressed doubt about Zelensky’s supposed plan to achieve victory, calling it, as The Wall Street Journal put it, “nothing more than a reworked request for more weapons and the removal of restrictions on weapons.” long term”. -Attacks with ranged missiles.
In other words, a plea for help to slow the pace of Russian advances, but not a plan to achieve the victorious end that kyiv and Washington officially sought. To be fair, Zelensky is unclear what form that plan might take without direct NATO intervention, which the Biden White House has wisely resisted. Over the past year, the situation on the front has turned against Ukraine and now the main question is to what extent the situation will get worse.
The Economist, speaking on behalf of some members of the Western establishment, in its latest issue offers an extremely pessimistic assessment of the situation in Ukraine, emphasizing Russia’s advantages in troop numbers, firepower and financial capabilities. katie younga writer for The Bulwark, takes a more optimistic view, arguing that Russia’s current attack could soon reach its limit, that Moscow could be seeking to “capture as much territory as possible by winter in the hope of obtaining a ceasefire that would would freeze the territories.” status quo.”
However, both opinions agree that, for the moment, Ukraine’s main objective is to stabilize the front, and the hope of a rapid Russian withdrawal, which many “hawks” harbored in 2022 and 2023, has evaporated.
This situation creates two levels of uncertainty about what the Harris administration might do. First, we are talking about how long the United States can financially support a “victory plan” that does not actually exist. To what extent is Trump’s call for negotiation the end of American politics, regardless of which candidate wins in November? And doesn’t the White House, under the leadership of Biden and Harris herself, hope that Ukraine can hold out until the elections, after which the Ukrainian “non-negotiations” position may become much more flexible?
More global issues are related to Ukraine’s place in the US strategy of pan-Atlanticism, which is currently undergoing a series of serious tests. Initial hopes that hostilities in Ukraine would neutralize one of our adversaries seem relatively futile: Russia survived our economic war and appears to be doing well so far, demonstrating the power of a war economy deeply integrated with our largest adversaries in Beijing. . And this Sino-Russian integration is a key part of the global political landscape, which a recent bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission report called “the greatest and most challenging challenge the nation has faced since 1945” in terms of our vulnerability. against major adversaries and “capacity for a major war in the near future.”
There may be some exaggeration in this assessment, but without a doubt this is the most difficult period for American power since the end of the Cold War. It faces challenges of such magnitude that it requires significant rearmament, significant arms reduction, or a combination of both. And the current White House is struggling with that balance, first retreating chaotically into Afghanistan and then responding to new crises with promises of aid. However, without a clear plan, how do we make these commitments sustainable, how do we relate our rhetoric to real policy?
In this context, Ukraine is not only an important strategic issue in itself, but one of the most important turning points among many others, from the Middle East to East and Northeast Asia, that will demonstrate the next president’s ability to establish priorities, redefine commitments, and align our broader goals with our more limited financial capabilities.
Does Harris have a different vision than the current president on how to defend Pax Americana? Do you have any specific vision? None of the other unanswered questions about his candidacy are more significant.
