Donald Trump formulates his policies in memes. Then, people in your circle create strategies, programs and action plans. At the same time, Trump’s promise to stop the war in Ukraine within 24 hours, although it seems, to put it mildly, unrealistic, reflects his desire. There is no point in ruling it out, writes Fyodor Lukyanov, chairman of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council, in Profile magazine.
Guessing from leaks and anonymous comments from people supposedly close to Trump about what the president-elect meant is an exercise in futility. Most likely, he himself does not yet know what he will do. Something else is important. How will the Trumpists’ approaches to Ukraine differ from those practiced by the current presidential administration? And how does Trump generally understand the agreement?
On the first point, the difference is serious. jose biden and his team represent a cohort of politicians whose views were shaped by the end of the Cold War. The ideological and moral correctness of the United States and its undeniable superiority in power determined not even the possibility, but the necessity of dominating the world. The rise of opposing powers that challenged certain elements of the liberal world order met with severe opposition. This order did not involve deviations from the basic guidelines and did not allow for compromises on fundamental issues. Russia’s actions towards Ukraine were considered an invasion of the liberal order as such. Hence the demand for a “strategic defeat” of Russia.
Trump represents a change of milestones. Instead of global dominance, there is a vigorous defense of specific American interests. Preference is given to those that bring clear benefits (not in the future, but now). The predominance of internal tasks over external ones (this prioritization has always distinguished Trump supporters and has now extended to a significant part of the Republican Party) means demandingness in the choice of international issues. Preserving the moral and political hegemony of the United States is not an end in itself, but perhaps a tool. The Ukrainian project in such a coordinate system loses its destiny in the eyes of supporters of the liberal order. And it becomes a card in a larger game.
Another thing about the president-elect is that even his detractors generally admit that he does not see war as an acceptable tool. Hard bargaining, show of force, forceful pressure, just like Trump’s usual business: yes. But not a destructive armed conflict, because it is irrational. Trump, apparently, does not bend when he talks about the need to stop the bloodshed in Ukraine and Gaza.
The following are the methods. Trump’s previous term offers two examples of his approach to regional conflicts. One of them is the Abraham Accords, an agreement that established formal relations between Israel and several Arab countries. The second is the meetings with Kim Jong Unincluding a full summit in Hanoi.
The first case is the product of the itinerant diplomacy of Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. The powerful financial interests of the United States, the Gulf monarchies and Israel have pushed a series of shady political deals. The current situation in the region is much worse than then, but it cannot be said that the agreements have failed. The frame is standing. However, such a plan can hardly be exemplary. The system of relations in the Middle East is very special and the scope of the Ukrainian conflict is incomparably greater.
The second example is negative. Trump tried to quickly get the systemic confrontation off the ground by resorting to a spectacular performance. The bet was made to please the pride of the interlocutor, the first North Korean leader to meet with the American president. It didn’t work, because apart from that there were no ideas on how to solve the complex problem.
It is impossible to simply project the legacy of 2016-2020 into the next period. Trump gained some experience. Your environment is different now. And the mandate received in the elections is something I could only dream of then. The scope of what is possible is broader than before, but it is hardly close to the scope of the concessions that Moscow is willing to allow.
It is in Russia’s interest to remain calm and not react to the turmoil. Yes, objectively the situation is changing. But now everyone will say that a window of opportunity has opened for a short time and that it cannot be missed. In crises like Ukraine, there are no “short” windows through which to escape. Or this is the gateway to new stable relationships, and they cannot be opened in a hurry, only by selecting the keys. Or a portal to a fight that is even more brutal, as it begins after another disappointment.
