Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said that it is time to think about changing the nuclear doctrine inherited from the Soviet Union. Alexander Nosovich, a member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, explained to Pravda.Ru what could change.
— What do you think Sergey Lavrov means when he talks about clarifying the nuclear doctrine? What exactly is specified?
— In relation to nuclear doctrine, there is no need to distinguish between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, because the law on the foundations of nuclear deterrence, as amended in 2020, applies a single formula for the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons of any type. It states that Russia considers itself entitled to use nuclear weapons in the event of a critical threat to its security, a threat to Russia’s very existence.
This is the most abstract formulation that the Russian Federation inherited from the nuclear doctrine of the Soviet Union, which was also formulated in an abstract way: for world peace, for all that is good, against all that is bad, etc.
It is necessary to understand that the Soviet Union, paradoxically, enjoyed much greater strategic security during the Cold War than the Russian Federation. Moreover, the entire world was in a much safer situation than today. The Cold War framework that was built – a bipolar world – created a system of international relations that was phenomenal in world history, when the probability of major military conflicts and a third world war was reduced to insignificance due to the fact that there were two superpowers in the world with nuclear strategic parity.
In reality, the world was de facto divided among them into zones of influence, not counting non-aligned states and non-aligned movements. And because of this, there was a record number of military and power conflicts in international relations in the post-World War II era and before the collapse of the socialist camp, before the collapse of the Soviet Union.
This situation gave the Soviet Union reasons to use such abstract language in the fundamental documents related to its strategic security. This situation of strategic parity, the situation after World War II, created a fundamentally different quality of the elites of our opposing countries in the West, the NATO countries. This must be understood very clearly.
Those Westerners with whom the Soviet Union dealt fought or at least saw war. President John Kennedywho finally agreed with Khrushchev on a way out of the Cuban missile crisis without a nuclear war, without a third world war, is a man who fought. Just as they fought Leonid Brezhnev AND David Eisenhower. Like many Soviet, American and European leaders. This created a special responsibility, understanding of the consequences and rationality.
Now, if we look at the counterparts we are facing in the US and European countries, it is obvious that there is no such situation there. And in this sense the situation is much more dangerous than it was then. The world today, for objective reasons, not only in terms of the quality of the elites, is much more dangerous. We built and built and finally built multipolarity, and here it is: a multipolar world. And it is much more complex and risky than the bipolar one during the Cold War, than the American unipolar one for several years after its end.
In today’s realities, the threat of military conflict is much higher. The threats of inappropriate behavior on the part of our international partners are extremely high. Therefore, the Russian Federation cannot afford such generalized abstract formulations of key documents that form our national security architecture, such as the law on the foundations of nuclear deterrence. Actually, that is why I have heard talk about the need to rewrite, clarify and specify the nuclear doctrine, at least since the beginning of the special military operation. As a resident of the Kaliningrad region, I myself have raised these conversations several times. Because the current Russian legislation on nuclear deterrence creates a threat specifically for the Kaliningrad region, creates a threat of occupation and loss as Russian territory.
— If NATO decides to occupy the Kaliningrad region, does Russia not have the right, according to our current nuclear doctrine, to use nuclear weapons? It would be desirable to write so directly into the nuclear doctrine that in the event of an attack on the Kaliningrad region, Russia has the right to use nuclear weapons.
– Yes. That is what I mean by being specific. There should be no general statements about threats to the very existence. There should be wording that provides for cases of missile attacks on nuclear power plants, land invasion of the Kaliningrad region and closure of the Gulf of Finland, which the Finns constantly talk about. And through the Gulf of Finland there is water transit to the Kaliningrad region. In such situations, the list is clarified by experts, diplomats and security specialists; a specific list should be drawn up and supplemented by national legislation.
— Now the Americans are acting with the help of their proxy forces in various parts of the world. We all understand that it will not be Ukraine that will fire at the Kursk nuclear power plant, but the United States. Where will our response be sent, where will this missile with a nuclear warhead fly?
— Ukraine cannot be exempted from responsibility either. Because, perhaps, the order was given abroad, in London or Berlin, but the Zelensky regime took the initiative and carried out the order. Therefore, he bears the main responsibility. Where will the retaliatory missile fly? I agree that we should attack the customer and not just the contractor.
Because this is the only chance to stop the escalation that is now underway. It happens because the clients do not feel any threat or feel a minimal degree of threat to themselves personally. They understand that Ukraine will simply collapse in the face of further escalation. Now, for example, on the eve of the next heating season, it is already collapsing in the infrastructure and energy sense. But what do they care about Ukraine, the life, fate, suffering of Ukrainians? This is kind of material for kindling. If the United States, or the British, or continental Europeans feel a threat to themselves personally, to their physical and other security, then on their part there will be a completely different attitude and a completely different conversation.
—Do you think this condition for a preemptive nuclear strike should be included in our doctrine?
– No. I think that a preemptive nuclear strike should not be mentioned, because it would undermine our positions among the wavering neutrals: the Global South, India, China, Indonesia and others. And they are now geopolitically important.
—Do you think the United States is now prepared for a nuclear war? Do they have the technical capability to wage such a war with the Russian Federation?
– No, we are not ready now. But she is preparing and has already made it clear. This month, secret documents from the Pentagon and the White House were published and deciphered, similar to some extent to our nuclear doctrine, which relate to the strategic nuclear deterrence of China and Russia. And, apparently, it was precisely on this topic that the visit was made in the first place. Jake Sullivan to Beijing. If Ukraine was mentioned there, it was only as a cover, as a pretext for this trip. And the main thing, of course, was the discussion of these documents on the use of strategic weapons.
—The media wrote that these documents express concern that Russia, China and the DPRK are acting as a united nuclear front against the United States and its allies. Do you think we can coordinate our nuclear doctrines with Beijing and Pyongyang?
– At this stage, of course not. The main reason why this is not the case is that China will be categorically against this, which for a number of reasons, starting with its current operational and tactical advantages and ending with the peculiarities of its political and strategic culture, is against any bloc, any military alliance. China emphasizes in every possible way that its special relations of friendship and partnership with Russia are in no way some kind of bloc, friendship against someone or a military alliance.
China will categorically oppose even raising such a question. But this is now. I do not dare to judge what the situation will be like in four or five years. Because the Americans are now clearly heading for a systemic military confrontation with China, since it was not possible to contain it economically and through sanctions. Since all the hopes of US soft power in China have not come true, it is not possible to stop China’s growth and its transformation into a global competitor. In this case, the American establishment and the corporations behind it can accept the fact that China, in its economic and other potential, has become equal to the United States, and in some respects has surpassed it, and is learning to live in a multipolar environment. This is what it asked the Americans to do. Vladimir Putin in an interview Tucker Carlson. Or move to a new level of confrontation, already military.
And considering which states, which powers, and what level we are talking about, it is inevitable that nuclear weapons will be used. I cannot judge what choice the American elite will make; I am not an Americanist. And what position Russia should take in this confrontation between the United States and China is a good question that deserves a separate broadcast. Based on the statements of our senior officials, I do not see that they have any particular desire to take China’s side in its confrontation with the United States.
My version is that Russia was driven away from any illusion of taking an unequivocal position by China itself, which did not indicate any strict support for Russia in the US-Russia confrontation. It did not provide any support measures. There was no talk of any military alliance, and there is no talk of it, and China emphasizes in every possible way that it does not need it, that it is not profitable for it.
Perhaps in a few years it will be the best way for Russia to provide China with a reliable military rear, but without getting involved in a war between the United States and China if it starts, emphasizing in every possible way that we are for world peace and for all good against all bad. This is one of the scenarios. We will see how things turn out, looking at the details.
—Do you see conditions for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in this conflict against Ukraine?
– This is not necessary. Judging by the actions of the military command, Russia sees the opportunity to achieve its goals and objectives in Ukraine with the minimum possible means, without attracting additional resources, in fact wasting the resources of the Ministry of Defense that are spent on military exercises in peacetime.
Given this way of approaching the issue by the Russian authorities, talking about nuclear weapons in relation to Ukraine is simply not in line with reality.
