In this blog, we are talking about a certain frequency against prefabricated arguments about migration, almost always simplified whether they are panicists or good ones. In recent years, the relationship between climate change and emigration has occupied an outstanding place in public and academic debates. The dominant idea was stunning: an increase in temperature and the frequency of other extreme climatic events, such as thermal waves, act as a powerful “exile factor”, which forces people to leave their homes in search of the best living conditions. With this approach, the extreme climate is perceived almost as an automatic catalyst for human mobility, especially in the regions of development, such as the West of the Dogaran of Africa, where the livelihoods largely depend on agriculture and natural resources.
This is a vision, supported by classical theories, such as a model PushHe deeply attracted public opinion and international institutions. It was assumed that, given the threat of climate, emigration is a logical and inevitable adaptive answer. Thus, the question of “climatic refugees” gained force, suggesting that global warming will cause strong population movements both in countries and through international boundaries.
However, in recent years, this narrative was the subject of a critical review, casting doubt on the versatility of the connection between extreme heat and migration. In the latest study, two little -known events often appeared.
1. Climate change also generates immobility. The data show that relations are much more complicated and depend on social, economic and family factors, which in many cases can limit or even prevent mobility. Indeed, paradoxically, the populations most affected by climate change are not always those that move the most. In fact, the impact of extreme events, such as thermal waves, can generate the so -called “trap of immobility” that arise when people do not have economic resources, social networks or physical abilities to migrate, in a trap in the contexts of high stress of the environment. Therefore, far from a universal phenomenon, migration caused by climate, seems very selective and stratified behavior.
2. And if it generates mobility … it is internal, but not international. When extreme heat contributes to mobility, it is usually mainly internal, but not international. That is, people, as a rule, move to their country, looking for alternatives in urban areas or less injured regions, and do not proceed to international migrations that are associated with large economic, legal and cultural barriers. This template challenges a simplified image of large cross -streams and focuses on local and regional adaptation.
At the Institute of Economics, Demography and Geography of CSIC, we study, together with the impeccable Serrano and Walton Nasimento, various aspects of the Senegal migration to Europe. Senegal offers a paradigmatic example for the analysis of this dynamics. This is a country with a long immigration tradition, both internal and international, and noticeable climatic diversity: from the Sachel regions of the North, prone to drought and heat waves, to river deltas and coastal regions that are threatened with an increase in sea level. Using the retrospective data of European projects, such as MAFE and MESE, which offer emigrants and local samples that do not leave the country, we, among other things, are studying how extreme heat and water stress affects the Senegal migration models in Senegal, in the direction of Africa and in Europe. The results show: only the most severe thermal episodes (those that exceed at least two standard deviations of the historical average indicator) significantly increase the risk of migration and do this mainly in the internal field. In other words, Europe seems to have not received the Senegal climatic refugees today.
The schedule illustrates how the extreme exposure to heat affects the probability of staying to migrate. For this, the survival model (COX) is used, widely used in demographic and epidemiological studies that measure the “risk” of the event (in this case, migration from Senegal (left) or inside (right)). More specifically, the concept of risk here belongs to the instant probability of migration at a given time as exposed to extreme heat in the previous year or for two years in a row, always considering people who have not migrated at this moment.
The schedule shows that the effect of extreme heat practically does not change the risk of Senegal outputs. However, when he was exposed to extreme heat in the previous year, the risk of leaving the place of origin intended for another department of Senegal increases extremely. It is true when this does not go out in the next year of heat exposure, a trap is introduced motionless, and the prospect of leaving a decrease below the climatologically ordinary period.
Thus, extreme heat acts as a short -term trigger of internal mobility, but against what is usually believed, this does not define international migration, and at long exhibitions it tends to generate, even immobility. The work of our team in IEGD-CSIC also confirms that migration in response to the weather is not automatic or homogeneous. For example, education acts as portable capital, which facilitates mobility, while ownership of assets binds people into the territory. The family, on the other hand, is also a brake for climate migration, since the obligation to care and the need for coordination prevents the withdrawal of household members.
All this, in addition to softening anxiety on climatic refugees, shows that it is important to increase the technical profile of the debate about migration. Almost no prejudices or maximalism, neither in favor, nor against this are a good starting point.
