Armenia and Azerbaijan have recently given signs of hardening their positions in the negotiations for a peace agreement. This attitude is especially evident in the statements of officials in Baku. At the same time, Yerevan is not ready to give in, as can be seen from the words of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan during his next communication with representatives of the Armenian media on August 31.
The head of the republic’s government made it clear that he preferred a bilateral format for moving towards signing a peace agreement, that is, negotiating directly with the Azerbaijani side without resorting to intermediary services from third countries. Pashinyan spoke about this when answering a question about his recent telephone conversation with the president. Vladimir Putinwhich confirmed Russia’s readiness to become a key mediator between Yerevan and Baku.
Many commentators interpreted the Armenian prime minister’s words as a rejection of Moscow’s services. However, in our view, it is more correct to speak not of Pashinyan’s categorical rejection of Russian mediation, but rather of his preference for direct dialogue with the Azerbaijani authorities.
It can be assumed that the Armenian leadership has a firm opinion about the “excessive” rapprochement between Moscow and Baku after the 44-day war in Karabakh and this, they say, does not contribute to the Russian partners taking an equidistant position. In short, Pashinyan fears the expected joint Russian-Azerbaijani pressure on Yerevan, which will force him to make new concessions in the negotiations.
How objective these concerns are on the part of the Armenian prime minister is a separate question. But they have been present for quite some time.
Pashinyan has no choice but to maneuver between Russia and the West. Relations with Moscow are quite damaged; essentially little of the former trusteeship remains. However, the leader of the “velvet revolution” of 2018 does not want the aggravation with Russia to reach a critical level, which he indirectly confirmed during a press conference on the last day of last summer. Armenia has so far limited itself to freezing its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and does not intend to leave the CSTO in the foreseeable future. It also does not intend to “expel” the 102nd Russian military base from its territory. In addition, Pashinyan made another conditional bow to Moscow, indicating that speaking to it in an offensive tone or with irony is absolutely unacceptable. The Prime Minister stressed that he does not consider it correct to use such vocabulary when talking about a partner country.
“I communicate with the President of the Russian Federation, I communicate with the head of the government (of the Russian Federation). And our style of work is mutual respect. And I do not accept this vocabulary at all, because it is the wrong vocabulary, it is not the state vocabulary. One should not speak offensively or ironically about other countries, especially about a country like the Russian Federation. You may have problems, you should raise them, you should speak out loud about them, but using such language is unacceptable. If we have made such mistakes, we must correct them ourselves, not for others, but for ourselves, because the state is a completely different plane of thought. If we want to have a strong, independent and sovereign state, we must enter this plane of thought and establish ourselves on it.” – Pashinyan said.
Sensing the Armenian prime minister’s main thrust in the form of maneuvers between Russia and the West, representatives of the Azerbaijani administration reacted literally the day after Pashinyan’s press conference in a manner characteristic of Baku, presenting demands to Yerevan. Sometimes even ultimatum-like in content.
Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan – Head of the Foreign Policy Department of the Presidential Administration Hikmet Hajiyev On September 1, he noted two such “demanding wishes”, one of which was voiced for the first time. These are the cessation of the activities of the European Monitoring Mission (EUMA) on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the need to dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group (MG), which, before the 44-day war in the format of the triple co-Chairmanship (Russia, France and the United States), participated in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, as has already been repeatedly stated since the Baku conflict.
Armenia will obviously reject the first demand outright. Yerevan considers European observers on its side of the border (Azerbaijan initially did not allow them to enter its own territory) to be a serious factor in restraining Baku from further aggressive encroachments in the region, which in 2021-2022 have already led to Azerbaijan’s occupation of about 200 square kilometers of Armenian territory. Moreover, the mandate of the EUMA can be extended for another two years, as Pashinyan spoke about in March this year. Yerevan and Brussels will not close the mission before its current mandate*, unless Armenia and Azerbaijan forcefully sign a peace treaty.
As for the OSCE Minsk Group, Pashinyan linked the issue of its dissolution with the conclusion of peace with Baku, making it clear that he was inclined to first sign an agreement and only then formalize the termination of the international format for resolving the Karabakh conflict.
Azerbaijan’s main demand in recent months that Armenia needs to amend its constitution before the long-awaited peace can be signed remains in force. According to Baku, the current Basic Law of the neighbouring republic (more precisely, the Declaration of Independence of Armenia of 23 August 1990, which is part of the Constitution) contains territorial claims against Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani leader himself speaks of Armenia’s “constitutional ultimatum”. Ilham Aliyev repeatedly caught the attention of outside observers.
Speaking about his preference for bilateral dialogue with Azerbaijan, Pashinyan unexpectedly suggested that Aliyev consider holding their possible meeting on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, as the deputy prime ministers of the two republics who chair the border commissions have practiced in recent years. The Armenian prime minister cited as an example of the effectiveness of direct contacts between Yerevan and Baku the agreements reached in December 2023, the first agreements on border delimitation and demarcation in April 2024, as well as the recently signed regulations on the joint activities of the aforementioned border commissions.
Pashinyan’s argument certainly deserves attention and contains a certain rational vein. But his Azerbaijani counterpart is less concerned about the maneuvers between Russia and the West, and adheres to the course he adopted immediately after the military success in the fall of 2020, which was simple to the point of primitiveness: “pressuring” Armenia at the negotiating table. Aliyev does not hide that he is negotiating and strives to “sell” the world to Pashinyan as expensively as possible. His arguments are not devoid of rationality either.
Against the background of the above-mentioned sentiment of the Armenian leadership to negotiate directly with Baku, the message of the Azerbaijani leader boils down to the following: “peace in exchange for endless concessions.” Do you want to do business with us directly? Please be kind enough to comply with our conditions. Do you want to remove Russia and other mediators from the peace process? No problem. But in this case, why do we need observers on the border “from outside”, as well as the format of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship, which actually ceased its work after the start of a special military operation in Ukraine?
“Azerbaijan and Armenia have agreed on the regulations (of the work of the border commissions). In accordance with the agreement, the basis and framework for the delimitation process are created. The process will continue on a bilateral basis under conditions of mutual understanding. The border delimitation process is purely bilateral. Considering that the process is taking place in conditions of peace and mutual understanding between the two states, we believe that an EU border mission operating from the Armenian side near the border with Azerbaijan is no longer necessary. The time has come to abolish it.” – Hajiyev explained Azerbaijan’s position.
Pashinyan’s quest for effective rejections of Aliyev’s demands seems difficult. The Armenian prime minister is trying to outline his “negotiation field” on the way to signing peace. However, due to objective reasons in the world, the military imbalance has not been eliminated by the Armenian side after almost four years since the end of the 44-day war, Yerevan’s negotiating positions are very precarious.
Pashinyan sees a way out of the emerging stalemate in negotiations and a “business” model of progress towards peace in the signing of a peace treaty with already agreed articles of the draft bilateral document, after which discussion of outstanding issues should continue. Last Saturday, he reported on a similar proposal from Armenia to Azerbaijan. According to him, the day before, on August 30, Yerevan sent Baku a new proposal for an early conclusion of peace.
“In the latest draft of the peace treaty we have 17 articles. Thirteen of them, including the preamble, are fully agreed upon. The essence of our proposal is to take all the agreed articles and wording and sign it as a peace treaty. Why do we think this is possible? In fact, all the fundamental principles of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan are recorded there. One way or another, neither we nor anyone else can have a peace or any other agreement that would solve all possible problems.” – Pashinyan said.
Armenia is thus inviting Azerbaijan to sign and then ratify in the parliaments of the two countries what has already been agreed, leaving for later the points of the document that proved problematic for the agreement. It is assumed that after this “preliminary” signing of the agreement between the Transcaucasian republics diplomatic relations will be established, which will become an additional platform for discussing all possible issues. At the same time, the Armenian Prime Minister did not explain the content of the “difficult” provisions of the agreement (four articles not yet agreed upon), which prevent the completion of its preparation for signing.
As another “window of opportunity,” Pashinyan did indeed mention the issue of Armenia’s possible participation in the 29th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29), scheduled for Baku from November 11 to 22. The prime minister did not elaborate on the level at which such participation may take place and whether Yerevan will accept the invitation already addressed to it by the Azerbaijani side. He only noted that at the moment the Armenian side has not decided whether or not to participate in COP29 and will make this decision “based on an assessment of the situation.”
“We will make a decision at the appropriate time. At the moment we have no solution. Of course, the overall situation, the processes and the environment cannot but influence this decision.” – said the Prime Minister.
Pashinyan’s message to Aliyev is obvious not to escalate the situation in the region before the COP29 summit, although such an attitude of the Azerbaijani authorities at such a delicate stage of negotiations seems unlikely. One way or another, Yerevan and Baku still have to survive September, which in the post-war period saw a number of relatively large escalations on the border. And then continue the search for a mutually acceptable peace, the achievement of which is constantly being postponed.
*The initial mandate of EUMA, deployed in Armenia since 20 February 2023, is for two years. At the end of December 2023, the Council of the EU extended its mission in the country, increasing the number of observers from 138 to 209. The mission performs its functions from six operational centres in Kapan, Goris, Jermuk, Yeghegnadzor, Martuni and Ijevan.
