The Hydrographic Confederation of Júcar recognizes that the “drainage” of the Poyo ravine is part of the “planned measures which were not carried out” of its area of expertise. The sudden overflow of this stream is the cause of the enormous floods of October 29 in the southern metropolitan area of Valencia.
He Flood Risk Management Plan for the Júcar River Basin District 2022-2027 was published in January 2023. It is a 215-page document whose objective is to compile the “priority actions” earrings, extract them “lessons learned” water floods that have already occurred and establish a “action protocol”.
The Plan admits that “the channeling, adaptation and drainage” of the Poyo ravine were one of these “structural measures”such as dams, canals, mounds or dikes in which, being within the “competence” of the CHJ, “have not been carried out or approved environmental feasibility, economic and social viability studies.
He “drainage” of the ravine was therefore one of the “planned projects” in the General Flood Risk Plan that the Ministry of Ecological Transition was to initiate. More specifically, “the adaptation and channeling in the urban area of Aldaia and the drainage of flows towards the Poyo ravine”.
Furthermore, it should be remembered that the Ministry of Therese Ribera recognizes that its policy is that of “minimal intervention” in the chains.
A The Government’s written response, to which this newspaper had access, explains this by adding that “the notion of ‘canal cleaning’ does not appear in water legislation”. And that, therefore, the Hydrographic Confederations carry out simple channel conservation actions“. The objective is therefore to “protect the current regime and its natural functioning”.
But the Flood Plan of the Hydrographic Confederation of Júcar also admits other circumstances that could have influenced the scale of the disaster of DANA.
Other shortcomings
For example, it is recognized that “currently, demarcation has not been implemented no protocol or signing of protocols or collaboration agreements to this effect with Civil Protection or 112“, the emergency service of the Generalitat Valenciana. It is also admitted that “currently, The CHJ does not have its own decision support system“.
Finally, other measures included in the first cycle of the Plan – the previous document, which this edition also evaluates to improve the management of the entire Júcar basin – which have not been carried out to date are detailed. That is to say that its processing or implementation has not started due to various circumstances.
Among them, to begin with, the “assessment, analysis and diagnosis lessons learned from previous flood management.
In addition, the CHJ recognizes that “the assessment reports were not carried out in sufficient detail” after previous floods in the area. AND and “new technical conferences on lessons learned have also not been organized“, competence, among other administrations, of the organizations of Civil Protection and the Confederation.
Favorite stocks
The first cycle of the Plan, prepared by the CHJ in 2018 and approved by the Council of Ministers, had already warned against “the need for basin organizations to implement hydrological alert systemsin the case of floods of fluvial origin, such as essential elements when it comes to being prepared and being able to act in possible risk situations“.
This is why this new 2023 Plan proposes that the CHJ itself impose four initiatives as “priority actions”.
First of all, “strengthen hydrological alert systems Basin Organizations, developing equipment and tools for forecasting adverse phenomena, “especially in cases likely to cause flooding”.
Second, “promote use of the National Flood Zone Mapping Systemby identifying the most vulnerable elements” for better civil protection in these areas.
Third, “strengthen linking civil protection planning in the areas of land use planning, land use planning and town planning.
And fourth, “encourage development of new predictive tools extreme weather events, particularly in cases likely to cause flooding.
Responsibility of the CHJ
The CHJ declared in its press release of Monday November 4 that among its powers is not to “issue public alerts in hydrological matters.
However, this is questionable to say the least, with the regulations in hand: a law, the Flood Plan, and the internal protocol of the Confederation deny it.
THE Law 17/2015 of July 9 on the National Civil Protection System forced him to do this, according to article 12.3:
“All Public Administration bodies that can contribute to the detection, monitoring and forecasting of threats of imminent danger to people and property will immediately inform the National Center for Surveillance and Coordination of Civil Protection Emergencies of any situation of which they are aware and which could give rise to an emergency situation in terms of civil protection”.
He Special plan against flood risks of the Generalitat Valenciana current, approved in 2021 by the previous socialist government Ximo PuigAlso gives you the skill.
Because it establishes that it is the “responsibility” of the Confederation”inform the Generalitat of the relevant increases of the flows which occur in the rivers and ravines of their respective basins”.
And it is CHJ herself who admits, in this same public note, that her “internal protocol” obliges you to inform the emergencies of the Generalitat “from a flow rate of 150 m3/s”.
The ravine and the hours
The Poyo ravine crosses several municipalities, such as those of chiva And Catarrojawhere it collects the waters that fall into the Sierra de Cabrera. It deposits its thickest sediments at the height of Chesteforming a stony channel which will flow towards the Mediterranean, crossing the communes to the south of the new Turia canal.
Or the localities most affected by DANA on October 29: Paiporta, Massanassa, Alfafar, User Benet, Beniparrell, Alba either Sedavi…
Las características morfológicas de este barranco, con un desnivel superior a los 1.000 metros en 50 kilómetros de cauce, se suma al fenómeno característico de las cuencas mediterráneas, que presentan precipitaciones de elevada intensidad en cortos espacios de tiempo.
Eso es lo que geológicamente explica que se haya conformado un barranco, y no un río. Y por eso, los caudales pasan del cero a muy elevados en poco tiempo.
La rambla suele estar seca, como corresponde a un barranco, que solo alivia agua cuando las lluvias son localizadas en su cabecera.
Así se puede comprobar en el gráfico adjunto. La rambla del Poyo estaba seca, sin agua, hasta las 10.00 horas del mismo 29 de octubre. Después, subió de caudal hasta las 12.00 del mediodía -sólo 20 minutos antes de que Emergencias de la Generalitat emitiera una alerta, que se mantuvo activa todo el día-, y bajó su volumen de aguas, de nuevo, hasta las 15.00 h.
Se da la circunstancia de que es en ese momento en el que la Confederación deja de enviar avisos durante dos horas y media por email a Emergencias de la Generalitat. No hay comunicación escrita entre las 16.13 y las 18.46 horas. Y tampoco la hay de palabra, según fuentes presentes citadas por la Generalitat, en la reunión del CECOPI, a partir de las 17.00 h.
Y eso que es a esa misma hora cuando empezó ya la situación de “peligro real” por la “subida brusca” del caudal, según explicó la CHJ en el citado comunicado del Ministerio de Transición Ecológica el pasado lunes. Pero esas subidas “espectaculares” del volumen de agua nunca se comunicaron a Emergencias de la Generalitat.
Así se puede comprobar, de hecho, en la nota de la CHJ, que adjunta una cronología.
Cronología de actuaciones de la CHJ el día de la DANA, 29 de octubre.
En la misma infografía se puede comprobar que a las 21.00 horas dejó de haber datos porque se había roto el medidor de la CHJ. Y que después vuelven a recogerse datos de subida de caudal, hasta que comienza a bajar repentinamente a las 4.00 de la madrugada ya del miércoles 30 de octubre. A las 7.00 de la mañana, el Poyo vuelve a estar casi seco.
Pero es que en la misma nota pública del organismo de cuenca dependiente del Ministerio de Teresa Ribera se dice lo siguiente: “De acuerdo con su protocolo interno, la CHJ notifica de forma redundante a las autoridades de protección civil [avisos] from a flow rate of 150 m3 per second“.
Nobody did it, the Confederation violated its own protocol when The Generalitat alert was in effect from 12:20 p.m. at noon, when scenario 2 was declared and this brought together CECOPI.
And that was the case until 6:43 p.m. It was reported that the ravine descended with “a flow of 1,686 m3/s with an upward trend and a very rapid flood”…when Paiporta was already flooded.
