On the afternoon of October 29, as DANA dumped hundreds of liters of torrential rainwater on the province of Valencia, all eyes of the Hydrographic Confederation of Júcar (CHJ) were on the risk of rupture of the Forata dam. During the two and a half key hours of the flooding of the Poyo ravine, which caused most of the deaths and destruction, there was a “information blackout”.
But here it is, a document to which EL ESPAÑOL had access [consúltelo aquí en PDF] would prove that the CHJ also did not know how to predict the risk of the dam which protects the banks of the Magro River.
The Forata Automatic Hydrological Information System (SAIH) informed the On October 29 at 6:04 p.m., it was forecast to “reach the level of 388.49 meters above sea level in 13 hours.”. That is to say, until 7 a.m. on October 30, it was not planned to reach the “meters above sea level” which mark the filling level of the dam.
But that “extreme avenue levelwhich implies significant spills due to crowning”, was achieved at 7:33 p.m.just 89 minutes later.
The forecast error occurred in a e-mail who is in possession of this diary, sent by the CHJ to the emergencies of the Generalitat Valenciana and to Civil Protection. The email announced the move to “Scenario 2” in Forata. That is to say what is also called “Exceptional setting”in which there is “a risk of failure or serious damage to the dam and we cannot guarantee with certainty that it can be controlled by the application of available measures and means.
The dam has, however, reached the level of total risk of rupture, announced for the following morning, in less than an hour and a half.
Critical minutes
HAS 6:24 p.m.the dam already needed to open its floodgates, and it released water at a rate of 250 cubic meters per secondaccording to emails sent by the SAIH to the Emergency Department of the Generalitat and to the rest of the entities responsible for managing the crisis by DANA. And to 6:55 p.m.that’s when the situation got really complicated. The dam was already flowing 633.67 m3/s to evacuate water and prevent its collapse.
And to 7:00 p.m.the tank had already reached 37.17 cubic hectometerswhen its maximum level is 37.4 hm3. And to 7:33 p.m. This same October 29, all the red alerts were triggered at the Emergency Operational Coordination Center (CECOPI).
At that time, the dam was already discharging more than 900 cubic meters of water per second through its spillways. And according to sources present at the CECOPI meeting, “the situation was already that of scenario 3”. That is to say, what is the emergency plan for the dam?Limit scenarioin which the probability of rupture is high or has already startedresulting it is virtually inevitable that the flood wave will occur generated by the breakdown or breakage”.
According to sources present at the meeting cited by the Generalitat, “no representative of the CHJ warned of what was already happening in the Poyo Ravine“, which multiplied its flow almost by 100 and was already causing the first floods downstream.
However, if the Forata dam had not held, its collapse would have caused an explosion of water, debris and sediment in the Magro River which would have caused a tragedy “infinitely greater” than that which ultimately occurred with more than 220 deaths.
CECOPI meeting, chaired by Carlos Mazón (center with reflective vest), last Tuesday, October 29.
The Forata reservoir, in the region of La Hoya de Buñolnot only had he reached his maximum level, but water relief with doors open was less than water inlet by the flow which feeds the reservoir.
When were the 7:33 p.m.CECOPI was informed out loud, by the representative of the CHJ, that the reservoir fell into this “Scenario 3”, a circumstance which was never officially declared.
During the meeting, the technicians of the Generalitat made direct questions to CHJ officials present, so that they can clearly state the seriousness of the situation. The Confederation responded that could not guarantee the situation in the tankbecause more water comes in than comes out.
They explained that at that time the dam was “releasing water through the spillways”, but when more water came in than it could release, it filled and The pressure of this flow could affect the foundations of the dam and cause it to rupture..
Only at 8:00 p.m.the Secretary of State for the Environment, Hugo Morancall by phone from Colombia to advise Salome Pradas alarmed by the situation. In this conversation, Morán admits to Pradas that cannot assure you that the Forata Dam can retainand there is a high risk of rupture.
After this telephone conversation and after deliberation and agreement within CECOPI, with the telematic presence of the Government Delegation and the CHJ and the personal assistance of the Generalitat, the Provincial Deputation of Valencia and the UME, it was decided to send the massive message to the population through the system Es-Alert, which arrives at 8:11 p.m..
Inconsistencies
Remember that at 5:35 p.m., half an hour before e-mail which gave 13 hours of margin to the dam, The Generalitat emergencies had already sent a hydrological alert in the Magro River and in the Júcar from the confluence of Algemesí.
All neighboring municipalities were informed that the flow at that time already implied that widespread overflows could occur in areas near the river. And the population was advised to move away from areas near the river.
It is only when 5:56 p.m. that the CHJ had warned that the dam was already releasing water, and that there could be flow rates up to 1,000 m3/s…which is incompatible with the 6:04 p.m. email which, although it declared “Scenario 2”, still anticipated 13 hours before the greatest risk.
Despite everything, at 6:10 p.m.the Emergency Department of the Generalitat sent a convene a telematic meeting with mayors of the municipalities concerned, according to official sources. Anyway, communications were already affected, connection was failing and no one was able to connect.
The Ministry of Therese Riberain any case, was aware of the entry into “Scenario 2” at 6:24 p.m.because their services confirmed by e-mail that they had received warnings that the barrage could hold for another 13 hours.
In summary, according to the sources consulted, It is not correct to say now that since 5:30 p.m. we already knew that there was a high risk of breakage. of the dam, as revealed by Ecological Transition last Saturday. Because at 6:04 p.m., the SAIH technicians gave 13 additional hours of margin to those who managed the crisis at CECOPI, information to the Generalitat which can now be taken into account. a technical and forecast error.
