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The Constitutional Court considers that the workload of judges does not constitute a “sufficient cause” to justify late trials

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The Constitutional Court considers that the workload of judges does not constitute a “sufficient cause” to justify late trials

The Constitutional Court (TC) concluded that the workload of judges does not constitute a “sufficient reason” for justify late judgments and granted protection to a woman who, in May 2022, had a trial scheduled for October 2025 in the Social Court of Seville for a claim regarding social security benefits. The magistrates believe that “their right to a trial without undue delay has been violated”.

“Regardless of the complexity of the matter which is the subject of the trial (…), it is appreciated that the delay of more than three years (…) the deadline is excessively long, even considering the effects derived from the delays accumulated by the situation linked to the covid-19 pandemic”, declares the court in the judgment to which Europa Press had access.

The Guarantees Court emphasizes that “the structural reasons put forward by the judicial body to justify this delay” – the permanent overload of work and the lack of personal resources and the materials necessary to complete it within a reasonable time – “cannot be accepted by this court (…) as sufficient grounds to neutralize the violation of the right to trial without undue delay”

On this point, the magistrates recall that “this situation does not change anything in their unjustified character“, according to the repeated jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court itself and the European Court of Human Rights, “while the citizen is unaware of the causes of these circumstances”.

However, the Constitutional Court explains that the protection it now grants to the complainant “should not include the nullity of the contested resolutions nor any measure related to the anticipation of the appointment for the hearing because, given the structural nature of the aforementioned delays, this could worsen the situation of third parties.

Right to a trial without delay

In the request for protection to which this news agency had access, lawyer Daniel Sánchez Bernal insisted that a trial was planned “more than three and a half years from the presentation of the complaint”, alleging that there was a violation of rights of your client effective judicial protection and a procedure without undue delays.

The magistrates believe that, although the woman referred to the two rights in questionhis entire argument was directed towards just one of them: the right to a trial without undue delay which, he claims, was violated.

The court assures that “the fact that the delay reported is due to structural reasons, not directly attributable to the judicial body, does not prevent the assessment of the violation of the applicant’s right to a trial without undue delay, since this situation does not detract from its unjustified nature, since the citizen is unaware of these circumstances.”

The prosecution requested that the request for protection be partially granted. He certainly notes a violation of the right to a trial without undue delay, considering that the period of three and a half years is “excessively long”, but he does not appreciate violation of law to effective judicial protection. The public prosecutor, for its part, declared that the request was inadmissible because, in its opinion, it did not have any particular constitutional significance.

State compensation

The Constitutional Court recalls that it has “consolidated the jurisprudence on the right not to suffer unjustified delays, when they come from structural causes without omission or negligence of the judicial organs.”

The court understands that in cases where late trials are set for “structural causes” and without personal responsibility of the judges, there is room for “corresponding compensation for a abnormal operation of the Administration of Justice. And he specifies that this would be possible “even without it being necessary to file an appeal for protection which, if approved, will only have declaratory effects”.

In this sense, the Court recalls that the Constitution “imposes on the State” the obligation to repair damage caused by a judicial error or which is a consequence of the abnormal functioning of the administration of justice.

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