Could lives have been saved if the Hydrographic Confederation of Júcar (CHJ) had warned better than it did of the overflowing of the Poyo ravine, which ended up flooding more than fifty municipalities in the province of Valencia on October 29?
The government of Pedro Sánchez and the Generalitat Valenciana do not agree when it comes to evaluating the action of the Júcar Confederation, a fundamental body for settling responsibilities in the greatest natural disaster recorded in Spain during of this century. They are already counted 216 dead and 16 missing in the province.
The Central Executive maintains that the information systems of the Hydrographic Confederation, which depends on the ministry headed by Teresa Ribera, “worked well”, and that “the professionals and political leaders” of the Generalitat did not know how to interpret the real risk. These are the data used by the two Administrations.
The Poyo ravine
“The DANA timeline shows that the information systems were working. The signs were clear“, state government sources say, “but the best information is of little use if there is no intelligence and professionalism to take appropriate and timely executive decisions in the territory.”
The Generalitat Valenciana confirms that the CHJ quickly reported the variations in the flow of the Magro River. But it was not the same for the Poyo ravine, the overflowing of which caused devastation.
In this regard, the Mazón executive denounced the fact that the CHJ maintained silence for two and a half hours on the evolution of the Poyo ravine. “This information blackout was deadly“said the Generalitat. The Hydrographic Confederation reported at 4:13 p.m. that this canal was carrying 28 cubic meters of water, which implies that the situation was out of danger.
And it was only at 6:43 p.m. that the CHJ sent the following email, in which it reported that the flow had skyrocketed to 1,686 cubic meters. The time between the two alerts would have been crucial to alert the population and save lives.
In his speech on Friday before the Valencian Courts, Carlos Mazón recalled that the CHJ is obliged to send alerts on the flow of the Poyo ravine when it exceeds 150 cubic meters per second.
But the CHJ did not do it at 5 p.m., when the flow rate was 325 cubic meters, nor at 4 p.m., when it was already 1,725. The email sent at 6:43 p.m. arrived too late.
Was an email enough?
“The signals were clear”, insists the Government, “the CHJ transmitted flow variations in real time and with alerts”. But the Generalitat Valenciana wonders if it was enough to send an email, when the situation was already so dramatic.
In fact, a representative of the Hydrographic Confederation participated in the meeting of the emergency center (Cecopi) of the Generalitat, and at no time did he allude to the overflowing of the Poyo ravine. He only mentioned the risk of rupture of the Forata dam, located on the Magro river, which could have caused an even more serious disaster.
The Forata dam
“The CHJ is responsible for risk management at the Forata dam. It therefore focused on the risk of rupture of the reservoir, which would have directly affected thousands of people,” says the government.
However, the Generalitat recalls that the Hydrographic Confederation is also responsible for the public hydraulic domain (DPH), which includes the Rambla del Poyo: both reporting on their situation and carrying out work of general interest for their conditioning.
The chains
But there are also controversies over the maintenance tasks and work that must be undertaken to avoid floods like those of 29-W, or at least to mitigate their effects.
“Experts, all scientific literature and real examples,” according to official government sources, “agree that cleaning rivers to transform them into naked ramblas” worsen the effects of flooding. The speed and force of the water is accelerated. The land does not drain. “Riparian forests are necessary.”
On the other hand, the Generalitat considers that this is a “question discussed at the scientific level”, on which there is no consensus.
“The renaturalization of sectors“, that is to say returning them to their natural state, “is the most effective measure to minimize the impact of flooding”, affirms the government.
There is no agreement on this point either. The Generalitat Valenciana recalls that the Flood Risk Management Plan itself prepared by the CHJ recognizes the need to carry out “structural works” in the Poyo ravine, to cope with “floods with a return period of 500 years”.
Climate change
“Climate change kills; we saw it“, declared President Pedro Sánchez on Tuesday, to explain the causes of DANA in Valencia, during his participation in the climate summit in Baku.
The Government agrees, displaying a whole series of data. He points out that, according to the EU’s Copernicus program for environmental Earth observation, 2024 was the hottest year in history.
The Mediterranean broke a temperature record with 31.8º and remember that the temperature of the water in the seas and oceans is essential in the formation of extreme climatic phenomena.
“Parties, organizations and other actors who questioning or ridiculing climate change threatens the protection of citizens“, the government concludes from all this.
The Generalitat does not question any of this data. But it is also true that torrential rains and floods have had a cyclical character in the Valencian Community, the effects of which have been limited thanks to infrastructures such as the diversion of the bed of the Turia river, carried out after the 1957 flood which claimed the lives of 81 people.
THE the cold fall of October 1982 caused the rupture of the Tous dam and left more than 30 dead. On this occasion, rainfall of more than 1,000 liters per square meter was recorded in the town of Muela de Cortes.
Again, the cold drop of November 1987 It caused flooding in towns like Oliva (817 liters per square meter), Gandía (more than 700) and the Vega Baja of Alicante. THE DANA 2019 It hit this region of Alicante again and caused six deaths.
