The Generalitat Valenciana, the PP and associated media have been trying for days to shine the spotlight on Vice President Teresa Ribera and, more specifically, on the Hydrographic Confederation of Júcar (CHJ) – an organization under the jurisdiction of her ministry –, in order to divert attention Mazón’s responsibility is to have sent too late the massive mobile alert which could have saved dozens of lives on DANA day. The PP and the Valencian Government stated that the CHJ sent “no communication between 4:13 p.m. and 6:43 p.m. on Tuesday, October 29, despite the sudden increase in the flow of the Poyo ravine.” This was announced by the Generalitat Valenciana on November 4 in a press release, where it specified that the notices were cut off for two hours. However, as elDiario.es was able to confirm, the Confederation sent to the Civil Protection of the Valencian Community, the Government Delegation and the National Center for Monitoring and Coordination of Emergencies (Cenem) at least two emails in this time slot (at 4:37 p.m.). and 4:50 p.m.) which sounded the alarm due to the accumulated rain in Chiva, at the head of the deadly Poyo ravine.
The president of the PP, Alberto Núñez Feijóo, again insisted this Wednesday to defend the thesis of the “information blackout”, which places the responsibility on the department dependent on Ribera, despite the fact that the Valencian government has activated an alert a few hours earlier, at 12:20 p.m. due to the collapse of the ravine detected by the CHJ meter located in Riba-roja.
“The President of the Generalitat made decisions based on real-time information provided by the Hydrographic Confederation of Júcar. And when there is a period of significant information blackout, more than two hours, crucial for decision-making, you will understand that it does not seem right to me to try to transfer responsibilities to those who simply made decisions based on information that falls within the scope of responsibility. from others,” Feijóo said this Wednesday.
The deputy general secretary of the PP, Esteban González Pons, went so far as to assert this Tuesday that “Minister Teresa Ribera lied to the European Parliament by affirming that the Hydrographic Confederation of Júcar had raised the alarm”.
In reality, the Confederation reports the flow of the ravine in real time, with meters updated every five minutes on its website. Any citizen can check it and at the Emergency Coordination Center (CCE) of the Generalitat Valenciana, an alert has been activated from 12:20 p.m.
The “subject” of the CHJ emails to which this newspaper had access is “Alarm Notice”. They were sent by the Automatic Hydrological Information System (SAIH) at 4:37 p.m. and at 4:50 p.m. by the CHJ to the Civil Protection of the Generalitat of Valencia. In the body of both emails you can also read “alarm in Chiva” and the increase in accumulated rains there is reported. The meters that give the alert are recorded at 4:26 p.m. and 4:46 p.m.; These alerts are triggered when the Chiva rain gauge detects that the threshold of 30 liters per square meter in one hour or 50 liters per square meter in four hours is exceeded. In the first email the water volume was 36 liters per square meter in one hour and in the second it was 54 liters. When the thresholds are exceeded, an automatic notification is generated and sent by email to the aforementioned organizations.
Up to 198 emails between the CHJ and the Generalitat de Mazón
In total, that day, the CHJ sent up to 198 emails to the emergencies of the Valencian Generalitat. There were also emergency alerts at 4:57 p.m. and 5:02 p.m. on Rambla del Poyo in Riba-Roja, at 5:27 p.m. due to precipitation in Chiva, and at 5:57 p.m. again on Rambla. del Poyo in Riba-Roja.
That is to say, the Valencian Generalitat received two emails from the CHJ between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., and other messages later, which made it possible to anticipate the enormous increase in the flow of the Rambla del Poyo (which is also precisely called the Chiva ravine). It was the flooding of the Rambla del Poyo which, from 7 p.m. – while the Government of the Generalitat still did not know how to act – caused the greatest damage and hundreds of deaths in Chiva, Aldaia, Torrent , Catarroja. , Sedaví, Benetusser, Alfafar, Picanya, Albal and Paiporta, in the municipalities of Horta Sud.
This Rambla del Poyo has started to collect massive rainfall in Chiva, according to public rainfall data available in real time on the website of the Automatic Hydrological Information System (SAIH) of the Confederation.
These same data, in addition to being available in real time and open to the public on this website, were sent by email on two occasions. To this information was added flow data, also offered by the CHJ.
By 11:45 a.m., the Emergency Coordination Center – the autonomous body responsible for communicating hydrological alerts – had already issued a “special notice” containing information from the CHJ to municipalities in the Magro River basin, a watercourse which flows parallel to the south of the Poyo ravine.
At 12:20 p.m., the Generalitat sends the second hydrological alert of the day after receiving another informative email from the CHJ. The Rambla del Poyo transports 264 cubic meters per second. This hydrological alert is not deactivated throughout the day, as the Generalitat itself recognized in writing on November 4.
Before going to eat for hours with a journalist, Mazón appeared at 1:14 p.m. to say that “according to forecasts, the storm is heading towards the Serranía de Cuenca, so it is expected to diminish around 6:00 p.m.” intensity in the rest of the Valencian Community. These are statements that Mazón posted in a tweet at 1:14 p.m. and then deleted. It is unclear where Mazón got these erroneous weather forecasts from, as all organizations, including those in his own government, have claimed the opposite. At no time was the hydrological alert in the Poyo ravine deactivated. He insisted that he read the weather report from Aemet, which maintained the red level all day, as can be seen on his social networks.
At 4:37 p.m. and 4:50 p.m., the CHJ sends to the Generalitat these two alert emails on precipitation in Chiva. Questioned by this editorial staff, the CCE of the Generalitat did not confirm receipt of the emails. At 5:00 p.m., the Confederation recorded a “sharp increase” in the flow of the Poyo ravine. Logically, it rains first, then the streams fill.
While the Integrated Operational Coordination Center (Cecopi) was already assembled, but without the presence of Mazón, who was eating according to his office, the representative of the CHJ verbally reiterated at 5:00 p.m. the “generalized increase in flows”. At the same time, at 5:30 p.m., the Valencian Community Emergencies issued a third hydrological alert (never on cell phone), this time due to the situation in a basin of the Júcar and Magro rivers, further south, and due to the Forata . dam, which threatens to overflow.
At 6:55 p.m., the Confederation reported how the force of the water washed away the Poyo sensors and measuring systems located in Riba-roja. This boulevard already carried 2,282 cubic meters per second. “The Rambla del Poyo experienced a rise of 2,000 cubic meters per second, at six o’clock in the afternoon, four times the normal flow of the Ebro,” Victòria Roselló, responsible for of meteorology on the public channel. .In Punt.
To all this information provided in real time and constantly by the CHJ to the Generalitat Valenciana, we must add all the alerts from Aemet, the first of them at 7:36 a.m. Further communications of the danger occurred at 8:04 a.m., 9:48 a.m., 10:03 a.m., 12:27 p.m. and throughout the day. However, the Cecopi did not gather until 5:00 p.m.
Although it has been proven and repeatedly denied that state agencies and the CHJ reported the situation at all times (and despite the fact that the power to send the mass alert to cell phones is exclusive in the Valencian Generalitat), national leaders and regional members of the PP, as well as related media, continue to try to hold Teresa Ribera and the representative of the CHJ responsible, and insist on spreading the hoax that there is no not had enough of alerts and that, for this reason, the alert to cell phones was sent too late. It’s the same strategy as during the 2006 subway accident: holding the train driver – the technician – responsible for the tragedy, instead of taking personal responsibility for it.
