“From the very beginning, our goal was to prevent Brandenburg from being branded with a brown seal.” Dietmar Woidke’s words in his speech after the victory in the regional elections express satisfaction at having achieved a goal: having prevented the triumph of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), the German radical right. However, the far-right force not only came second in these elections, but also won the most votes in broad sectors of society, such as young people, workers and rural areas. Trends that were observed in the regional elections earlier this month in other eastern regions and which demonstrate that the AfD is currently the most important political party in the territories of the former GDR.
The 29.2% obtained yesterday by the AfD is among the three best historical results of the party. It is preceded by the second place in Saxony (30.6%) and the first place in Thuringia (32.8%). In fact, in the rest of the eastern regions, the polls indicate a voting intention also close to 30%. No other party reaches these figures in the entire region. And although this is due to several reasons, it is possible to identify three fundamental ones.
Fear, anger and frustration
Radical right-wing parties around the world are characterised by their ability to capitalise on discontent. The AfD is no exception and finds fertile ground for its discourse in East Germany. The frustration in broad sectors is reflected in one conclusive fact: between 67 and 75 per cent of voters in the East feel like second-class citizens.
The inequality between the former GDR and the west of the country is still present 33 years after reunification. An aspect that is not only observed materially, where for the same work in the East one earns 25% less, according to the Federal Statistical Office, but which is also reflected in the composition of the elites.
In other words, in relevant decision-making positions, whether in the public or private sector, people born in the East are underrepresented. The extreme right seizes on this feeling of injustice and proposes in its discourse the construction I have a culprit: the rest of the parties that turn their backs on the people. An example of this classic populist discourse are the words of Alice Weidel, head of the AfD at the federal level: “There are two parties: the AfD and the others.”
The second reason that empowers the far right is fear. Along with the polarizing narrative, a scenario of moral decadence defined by the nativist component is also constructed. In other words, the situation of inequality is due to the presence of a “social other”, in this case migrants and refugees. The AfD argues that resources are used on the latter, thus relying on the natives. The creation of this fictitious competition feeds xenophobia and deepens uncertainty: “Will I be able to maintain my standard of living?” 75% of voters with an income of up to 1,500 euros seriously fear that their situation will deteriorate in the future. A fact that somehow explains why the AfD obtained 46% of the votes of people living in a poor economic situation in the Brandenburg elections.
The last factor is related to the rejection of the federal government of the Social Democrats, Liberals (FDP) and Greens (Bündnis 90/die Grünen), led by Olaf Scholz. His popularity is the lowest since data have been measured in Germany. And the situation is so obvious that Woidke himself asked the chancellor not to run in the region during the campaign. In fact, the strategy worked, which leaves doubts as to whether Scholz is actually benefiting from it or whether he ends up being stigmatized as a political burden. In any case, the three regional elections this month have shown that the AfD vote is linked to the need to punish and send a message to Berlin.
It’s not all about immigration
Although it occupies a very important place in the media agenda, in the case of Brandenburg, the issue of immigration was not the most important for the decision of the vote. Social security and economic development are priorities. The configuration of this agenda has allowed social democracy to exploit a discourse closer to its historical values. The obsession of some parties and leaders to focus exclusively on issues that benefit the growth of the radical right, such as the debate on immigration, is a mistake. The strategy of integrating the far-right discourse to neutralize it does not work. On the contrary, it normalizes the agenda of the radical right.
And this dynamic is evident in the case of the new German party called Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW). This force, which emerged from a split in the post-communist left, performed well in its electoral debut. At the time of its creation, there was talk of its usefulness in stopping the extreme right because it offered a populist discourse but from another part of the political spectrum. The data from the three regional elections indicate the opposite. When we look at the electoral transfer between parties, the biggest victims of the emergence of the (BSW) are the left-wing parties: the SPD and Die Linke. The votes from the radical right represent a minor part in the construction of the electorate of this new left.
It is possible that BSW’s inability to weaken the far right is due to the fact that its agenda overlaps with the latter. On issues of social justice or wealth distribution, Wagenknecht’s party largely represents typical left-wing positions, but when it comes to immigration and foreign policy, the resemblance to the AfD is striking. Phrases such as “there is no more space” uttered by the BSW leader are no exception in her speech. Added to this is her rejection of the government’s position against the Russian invasion of Ukraine. She demands an end to sanctions and the rebuilding of relations with the Putin government. A demand that she shares with the radical right.
Half of the votes for BSW in the Brandenburg elections were linked to these last two points, leaving social issues in the background. In this sense, the discourse of its leader contributes to the normalization of the far-right agenda and thus ends up reinforcing it.
The future of Germany?
Amidst the joy and openly racist chants of the audience present, the AfD candidate assured yesterday in Brandenburg: “We are the party of the future.” He was referring to a fact present in each of the three eastern teams: young people between 16 and 24 vote overwhelmingly for the extreme right. With a gap of up to 22 points compared to the second force, the AfD has taken over this age group.
One of the variables that explains this situation is linked to the extreme right’s enormous capacity to develop a digital campaign, especially on social networks for the youngest. The TikTok videos of MEP Maximilian Krah containing xenophobic, ultranationalist and misogynistic messages aimed mainly at the young manosphere have been viewed millions of times. This type of content reaches a target audience already affected by structural problems such as inequalities between regions, the lack of employment opportunities and the phenomenon of depopulation in the most remote rural areas.
However, TikTok cannot be interpreted as a cause but perhaps rather as a means. Analyst Johannes Hillje points to a growing youth culture with radicalized ideas where, in addition to extreme patriotism, elements such as exacerbated masculinity or a homogeneous cultural identity appear.
In the case of the Brandenburg elections, the composition of the AfD electorate contrasts with that of the triumphant social democracy: while the extreme right won in all age groups under 60, the SPD gained momentum among the over 60s. A similar phenomenon occurred in Thuringia and Saxony, but with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU).
This scenario shows that the former majority parties that led coalitions and proposed a country project with ideological differences but with democratic bases are structurally losing their support in all the territories of East Germany. And this fall is not exploited by the other democratic parties, but rather it is the radical right that is the great beneficiary.
The AfD can be considered victorious from several points of view. The growth and consolidation of the vote in the different age groups lays the foundations for the party’s future, but perhaps more importantly, its broad presence in regional parliaments ends up conditioning the formation of majorities and favors deep political instability in coalitions. The uncertainty generated by this scenario is ideal for reinforcing its discourse on the decadence and lack of leadership in the country. Or at least in the east.
The 2025 federal elections will set the tone and determine whether we are facing a regional phenomenon or whether, as in other European countries, the extreme right in Germany has succeeded in gaining power.
