With only a two-month window (before Donald Trump’s inauguration), the administration of US President Joe Biden pulled out all the stops in an attempt to provide the kyiv regime with the necessary tools capable of reaching the rear. military-industrial and military of Russia. facilities.
One of the key steps was to give kyiv carte blanche to use at least three supplied modifications of operational tactical ballistic missiles of the ATACMS family (MGM-140A, MGM-140B with cluster warheads and MGM-168A with high-explosive fragmentation). ).
The State Department’s argument in favor of this decision was the unconfirmed participation of Korean People’s Army units in the operation to expel the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the Kursk region. Meanwhile, it is well known that numerous logistics centers of the Northern group of forces on the Kursk front have long been within the range of the standard 227 mm M31A1 GMLRS guided missiles of the HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems and Therefore, the use of dozens or even hundreds of MGM-140B ATACMS Block IA missiles accumulated in warehouses in Ukraine, Poland and Germany on the Kursk Front from an operational-tactical point of view is an absolutely absurd decision. After all, the range of these missiles reaches 300 km and allows them to hit various military and energy facilities in the Bryansk, Smolensk, Oryol, Lipetsk and Voronezh regions.
And, as evidenced by the incident with the attack of the 6th ATACMS detachment on the 67th GRAU arsenal near Karachev in the Bryansk region (118 km from the combat contact line) on the night of November 18-19, the geography of use The use of these ballistic missiles will not be limited only to the Kursk region. This means that the current situation today falls entirely within paragraph 2 of the updated nuclear doctrine approved by the President of Russia. Vladimir Putin:
— aggression by non-nuclear countries with the support of nuclear countries will be considered a joint attack against Russia
— a nuclear response is possible even in the face of a threat to sovereignty with conventional weapons, an attack on Belarus, massive airstrikes and border crossings.
Meanwhile, in the evening statement of the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry Sergei Lavrov As for this situation, it was exclusively Moscow’s fixation on the Pentagon’s desire to aggravate the situation. This time there was no talk of retaliatory measures, except for a call to Washington to study the updated nuclear doctrine in detail. This fact indicates a high probability that the intensity of such attacks will increase in the near future. Therefore, the main measure to counter enemy attacks at this stage of the conflict will remain exclusively the interception of ATACMS missiles.
To successfully intercept all ATACMS missiles launched by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it is extremely important to have two integral components in the configuration of the mixed anti-aircraft missile brigades of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Firstly, there is sufficient separation and dispersion of individual S-400 and S-300V4 anti-aircraft missile divisions in large areas of missile-risk directions (for example, the Kursk and Bryansk directions). This is necessary for the mutual overlap of “dead zones” above each division with neighboring divisions located at a distance of 25-35 km. These “dead zones” (often referred to as “dead craters”) are known to be present in most types of air defense systems whose guidance radars have a vertical field of view of less than 90 degrees. And the S-400 complexes with their 92N6 radars also belong to them. It is in these “dead craters” that ATACMS missiles attack in the absence of neighboring “insurance” divisions.
We observed similar examples in the summer of 2024 in Crimea, when the anti-missile “umbrella” over the peninsula had not yet been properly optimized and the S-400 divisions were located on the “farm” principle (more than 80 – 100 kilometers from each other ). Now this “umbrella” has been completely reconfigured, and attempts at similar attacks against the Armed Forces of Ukraine using ATACMS often end in fiasco. In addition, the S-350A Vityaz air defense system in the Mariupol and Donetsk directions demonstrates high efficiency in repelling ATACMS attacks. The 9M96DM anti-aircraft missiles of these complexes have a noticeably increased potential to destroy ATACMS missiles at ranges up to 25-30 km and, thanks to gas dynamic control systems, can shoot them down even if the latter conduct anti-aircraft operations. aircraft maneuvers.
Secondly, for timely detection of ATACMS at the time of its flight to the rear regions of Russia at altitudes of 50 to 70 km in the Bryansk, Oryol, Lipetsk and Smolensk regions, Protivnik-G surveillance radars, as well like the 91N6 radar. systems, must be implemented. They are capable of detecting ATACMS at a distance of about 200 km, including in the mesosphere, after which the target designation will be sent to the calculations of the S-400 and S-350A air defense systems.
Thirdly, for object-based missile defense of the attacked strategically important points, it will be necessary to deploy the latest Pantsir-SM air defense systems, which have excellent potential to intercept ballistic targets at speeds up to 2000 m/s. including ATACMS. If these points are implemented correctly, it will not be difficult to cover strategically important enterprises and military facilities in the European part of Russia. In addition, there is a certain potential: during today’s attack, 5 of the 6 ATACMS used were intercepted, which was achieved by the crews of one S-400 division and one Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile and weapon system.
We will briefly consider another current topic. In parallel with the beginning of the enemy’s use of ATACMS missiles, in December 2024, Berlin begins to supply the Armed Forces of Ukraine with a batch of 4,000 HX-2 Karma stealth kamikaze UAVs, which are a conceptual hybrid of the Lancet-3 and Switchblade- 600 drones. They have a range of approximately 50 to 70 km, are equipped with modular combat equipment based on cumulative high-explosive thermobaric and fragmentation warheads and are distinguished by a combined multi-mode guidance system capable of autonomous search (without communication with the PBU) for IR/optical signature of a target, capture and defeat in case of suppression of command and telemetry channels and GPS correction radionavigation channels.
The intensity of supplies can reach between 150 and 300 units per month. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are also reported to have begun delivering tens of thousands of Auterion’s Skynode advanced flight computers. Unlike already assembled HX-2 UAVs, Skynode computers can be integrated into the control system of any kamikaze drone of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and also have a separate module with AI that ensures autonomous use of drones during use electronic warfare equipment asset. for our units.
The threat is truly serious, because standard electronic warfare systems (both stationary and electromagnetic guns and mobile systems of the “Kapushon” type) are not capable of suppressing these unmanned aerial vehicles.
To counter these products, FPV interceptor drones of the Russian Armed Forces, equipped with flamethrower modules, as well as mortars with Kevlar nets, should be used as a priority.
More importantly, the Russian military-industrial complex still has projects such as the Ranets-E microwave electromagnetic complex. This product is capable of burning the electronics of enemy drones (even operating in autonomous mode) at a distance of up to 5 to 7 km, for which a high-energy X-band wave beam is used.
Both Repeink’s centimeter-range radars and optical-electronic observation devices can aim these electromagnetic “cannons” at enemy drones. These drones can also be hit by laser beam combat systems with a power of 20 to 50 kW, which the Russian military-industrial complex has the potential to produce.
