The president of the Generalitat Valenciana Carlos Mazon responded late this Saturday to information disseminated by sources in State Meteorological Agency (Aemet) who confirmed that the Integrated Operational Coordination Center (Cecopi) He made no decision between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on October 29 and interrupted the meeting from 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.
The Valencian politician’s response came through his official account on the social network X. Mazón described the information as “worrying” and criticized government agencies for “doing nothing” despite his absence.
“I already knew from 5:30 p.m. that there was a risk of a dam burst which threatened the lives of 80,000 people and yet, even if they were able to act, They did absolutely nothing for 3 hours with the excuse of waiting president of the Generalitat, which is not even part of CECOPI and is not necessary to make any executive decision,” Mazón published.
As shown this Saturday Europe PressThe Integrated Operational Coordination Center (Cecopi) did not make any decisions between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on October 29 and interrupted the meeting from 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., according to sources at the National Meteorological Agency. (Aemet), present in the afternoon of this Tuesday when the DANA occurred which devastated the province of Valencia.
These sources stressed that the reasons for activating the ES-Alert system already existed before 6:00 p.m.
In this sense, the sources of Ministry of Ecological Transition and Demographic Challenge (Miteco) They highlighted that between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. hydrological alerts had already been activated due to the overflow of the Poyo ravine, the Magro river, Júcar and the Forata dam, as it was known that the situation was very serious.
“The new argument from the Ministry of Ecological Transition is worrying,” Mazón said.
“They say that CECOPI, whose steering committee includes the Spanish government, which had the full capacity to take command at any time, already knew as early as 5:30 p.m. that there was a risk of a dam failure. the lives of 80,000 people and yet, even if they were able to act, they did absolutely nothing for 3 hours under the pretext of waiting for the president of the Generalitat, who is not even part of CECOPI and is not necessary to take a decision. any executive decision.
For Mazón, there are only “two options.” “Either their argument is false and everyone at CECOPI worked on the basis of the information they had (which ended at 8 p.m. with the call from the Secretary of State saying that he could not guarantee that the dam would resist, at that time the order was sent alert).
“Either the Government knew since 5:30 p.m. that the dam could break without doing anything at all to alert the population even though they had the capacity to do so,” he denounced.
The new argument from the Ministry of Ecological Transition is worrying. It is said that CECOPI, whose steering committee includes the Spanish government, which had the full capacity to take command at any time, already knew as early as 5:30 p.m. that it risked breaking up…
– Carlos Mazón (@carlos_mazon_) November 16, 2024
three blocks
According to information from Europe Pressministerial sources distinguish three temporary blockages in Cecopi, convened by the Ministry of the Interior at 3:00 p.m. and constituted at 5:00 p.m.
A few minutes before 5:30 p.m., when the seriousness of the situation began to increase and the probability the rupture of the Forata dam and the expulsion of the population from the area were put on the table; the interruption of the meeting between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. and its resumption thereafter.
It is precisely around 7:10 p.m. that the debate begins, according to Aemet, on the possibility of launch the ES-Alert alarm to the population and the options for sending a containment message are being studiedrecommend going up to the upper floors of buildings, prohibiting traffic or issuing some recommendations on mobility. Eventually, the massive alert was sent out at 8:11 p.m. that day.
During his appearance this Friday at the Corts, the president of the Generalitat, Carlos Mazón, pointed the finger at two organizations dependent on the government: the CHJ and Aemet.
According to him, during DANA there was a “information cutoff» by the basin organization concerning the flooding of the Poyo ravine, while he reported on the situation of the Forata dam. Thus, he emphasized that it was “this reason, and no other, why Cecopi plans to send the ES-Alert alert system”.
In this regard, he explained that at 6:55 p.m. the CHJ warned that the Forata dam was leaving more than 600 m3/s, after which “at 7:45 p.m. he informed Cecopi that it was ‘possible that the situation would worsen’ . “, and added that the Secretary of State for the Environment, Hugo Moranreported at 8 p.m. “from Colombia” that it was not possible to guarantee that the dam would resist.
At that time, before the “real risk of imminent rupture“, it was when at 8:11 p.m. the mobile alert was sent to the population.
Messages
However, Miteco’s sources were transferred to Europe Press that since the creation of CECOPI, it was reported that the situation at the Forata dam was very serious.
Concretely, they affirm that the critical situation occurred before 5:30 p.m. – more than two hours before the activation of the Es-Alert system – and that the CHJ informed the Emergency Department at 6:55 p.m. that the dam was releasing 633 m3/s.
At this point, they point out that the Minister of Justice, Salome Pradaswas present at the meeting where the scenario of breaking the dam was considered, which is why they question Mazón when the head of the Consell assures that he went to Cecopi when he was warned that the situation at the dam de Forata was “getting worse”. “.
Regarding the reason for the activation of the Es-Alert system, which the head of the Consell attributes to the worsening of the situation at the Forata dam, Aemet detailed to Europa Press that this measure was put on the table around 7:10 p.m. and that , While it is true that there were concerns regarding the reservoir, it is not correct that the notice was sent solely because of its location.
Thus, they emphasize that two messages were ultimately sent: one to the entire province of Valencia in response to the floods caused by DANA; and another towards areas downstream of Forata.