Raouf Farrah is a senior researcher and analyst at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), specializing in migration and the criminal economy in North Africa and the Sahel. He is co-founder of independent media Twala and regularly contributes to international and African media and has worked with several international organizations, including UNDP and OECD. He is also a civil society activist in Algeria, North Africa and across the African continent.
Farrah traveled to Spain to participate in the class cycle of the Casa Arab University in Madrid and gave the lecture “Geopolitics of the Sahara-Sahel: Towards a new paradigm? », focused on the human, security and geopolitical implications of this new paradigm for the Maghreb. countries and the border regions that unite them. The rise in extremist violence, the withdrawal of the French mission (Barkhane) and the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA), as well as the emergence of actors like Russia and Turkey, have marked the evolution of events in the Sahel in recent years.
What is the new paradigm in this turbulent region?
In the situation in the Sahel, there are extensions and ruptures. The consequences are undoubtedly the problems that persist, such as the activity of violent extremist groups or political instability. But there are also disruptions: for example, countries that experienced a series of coups like Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali – and which pushed for sovereignty changes – have now formed a new alliance political and security: the Alliance. of the Sahel States after their withdrawal from the Community of West African States [también conocida por sus siglas, CEDEAO].
Added to these disruptions is the disappearance of Western allies. For example, in Mali, the government pushed the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) out of the country, as did the classic French Operation Barkhane. Added to this is a series of actors like Russia, Turkey or Iran who, in a structural or opportunistic way, are changing the situation.
For all these reasons, I believe that we are on the cusp of geopolitical changes not only at the macro level, but also at the local level.
Actors such as Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Iran, among others, are entering this new paradigm. But what are Russia’s role and objective?
Currently, Russia’s role is one of political and military assistance. Several countries are in this quest for political sovereignty and Moscow has played with the imagination by thinking that it has no history of colonization. On the contrary, Russia is rather an old ally of countries like Mali during the era of the Soviet Union.
At the beginning, the Wagner Group had a very simple idea of what to do in Mali, which was essentially to help the military junta come to power and offer military services in exchange for political and social fracture. But with the death of leader Eugene Prigozhin, his role changed. The new strategy with Africa Corps [que ha sustituido a Wagner en África] This involves centralizing efforts, harmonizing countries and optimizing regional actions.
How do you think the presence of MINUSMA troops has influenced regional security in the Sahel?
The withdrawal of MINUSMA is a very sensitive issue. Although it was one of the deadliest missions, it was also an instrument that allowed the organization of operations in inaccessible terrain, monitoring of the situation in the country and interaction between forces. armed to maintain – to a certain extent – peace. . But we must not forget that MINUSMA itself has been the target of violent groups.
MINUSMA is also very important for human rights because there is a unit exclusively dedicated to them. Their reports were a source of relevant information that we no longer have. Furthermore, he also played a fundamental role in the Algiers agreement. [acuerdo de paz y reconciliación entre el Gobierno de Mali y la Coordinación de los Movimientos de Azawad, que busca establecer un estado independiente de Mali]which benefited from the support of the international community through a mediation department.
We must not forget that the first armed interaction between the Malian Armed Forces and the rebel groups concerned the recovery of a MINUSMA base.
What does the rise of sovereignty in the central Sahel, particularly in Mali and Niger, represent?
This rise in power of sovereignty comes from two factors. The first, due to the thirst for change, with citizens who believe themselves to be free. The second factor lies in the frustration of the armed forces of these countries with the idea that everything will come from France or abroad and that they believe they are working for the agenda of others.
These would be the two main factors, but there is also an area that favors both and which generates a domino effect: the first coup d’état took place in Mali, in 2020, followed by another, a year later. Then there was another coup in Niger and Burkina Faso, making a total of seven coups. However, the populations of the Sahel are disappointed that the general standard of living has not changed; On the contrary, the situation has gotten worse. In a city like Bamako [capital de Mali]there are regular interruptions in electricity supply and water sanitation problems. It is not certain that in a few years these men will manage to maintain the same popularity.
Why do you think Europe should pay attention to what is happening in the Sahel?
We live in a radically interconnected world. A problem that occurs in another part of the world will affect us. We saw it with the pandemic or with climate change. The situation in the Sahel has an immediate impact on Europe, not only in terms of illegal immigration, but also on the ability of governments and regional organizations to maintain international cooperation. Furthermore, most economic projects at the micro-local level are financed by other EU-funded organizations or by European countries.
But generally speaking, we must remember and learn the lessons that the experience of the last decade has taught us. One is that we need a certain humility when engaging in diplomatic and political relations with complex countries; The other is to have – also – the desire to establish a fair dialogue up to a certain level.
We talk about Europe, but how does what happens in the Sahel affect North Africa and countries like Algeria or Libya?
We tend to think that changes only have repercussions to the countries themselves or to European countries, without falling into the impact they have on the Maghreb region. The situation in Libya is very different from that in Algeria. Libya’s border with Niger and Chad is not permanently controlled; its porosity is real. Men, armed groups and goods can move quickly. In Libya, the rebel groups who control the Fezzan region (southwest) want to control everything along the border, but have no concrete control.
Regarding the role that Libya plays with Russia, it is interesting to send the message that the Libyan armed forces can impose law and order in this region. For example, they organized a military operation called “Global Operation” to fight against illegal miners working in the Kilinche mine or in the Salvador pass, near the border with Chad, where there is a lot of gold. In Libya, the main risk lies in border control.
On the contrary, in Algeria, the situation is very different. This country has a very powerful armed force, but its border with Mali and Niger is almost 2,000 kilometers long. Recently, Algiers militarized its southern borders due to instability in northern Mali. Furthermore, he also accepted the arrival of refugees from northern Azawad, since he considers them a brother people of Algeria, while maintaining a cultural, social and economic relationship with the smuggling of goods. Everything that is consumed in northern Mali comes from Algeria.
But in both cases, the rebels’ capabilities should not be underestimated. The rebels know how to wage war. They can navigate at night with the stars. They know the desert, rock by rock. We must not underestimate them.
