What if the problems of the Russian counterattack prove Ukraine right?

From the moment it became known about the entry of thousands of Ukrainian troops into the Russian province of Kursk a month and a half ago, it was clear to everyone that this was primarily a diversionary maneuver to force Russia to send troops to this area and withdraw them from the Donbass front line. The maneuver was both a success and a small failure. This success was due to the ease with which Ukraine found itself under the yoke its control 1,500 kilometers square meters of Russian territory, something not seen since World War II.

The small failure was related to the ineffectiveness of the strategy. True, Russia sent men to defend itself and prevent the enemy incursion from going even further, but they were mostly freshly demobilized, inexperienced and with units that had little to do. northern Kharkiv and southern Zaporizhzhia. Few troops were diverted from the Donetsk front and certainly very few elites. Moreover, the invasion coincided with two particularly hard months (August and September) for Ukraine and during which Russia managed to advance more ground than in the previous twelve.

Well, there was a trick there. Russia could afford not to divert its troops because it had no intention of retaking Kursk. It is not clear whether the Ukrainians were aware of how little interest Russia would give to their country. in maintaining its territorial integrityThe Kremlin did not even bother to announce a nuclear holocaust, it limited itself to treating the issue with the utmost contempt, as if the neighbor’s children had sneaked into the yard to play football. Let them be, they will get tired.

However, all that changed the moment Russia announced a counterattack and did so with the same arrogance as always: setting a deadline (October 1) and assuming that it would more than meet it. Putin thought that by adding more men, even if they lacked the necessary training or experience, he would be able to drive the Ukrainians out in a matter of days. Not so. The obvious progress of the first two days was followed by a slowdown that could end up proving Syrsky right. when he embarked on his August adventure.

The dangerous border of the Seym River

It is true that Russia managed to drive the Ukrainians out of the area around Korenevo and advanced southeast of the Seym River towards Sudzha, the capital of Russia. “Ukrainian Kursk”. Today, this advance seems to have stopped and the troops (about 38,000 men, according to Forbes magazine estimates) run the risk of finding themselves in a no man’s land, stuck between the territory previously controlled by Ukraine, the border with the neighboring country and the river itself… and the troops that Syrsky is sending from the west, crossing the border again at Novyi Put and advance towards Glushkovo.

Leaving those 38,000 troops out of action along with the mere 10,000 that Ukraine has committed to the entire Kursk operation would be a round decision, but it is probably not necessary to ask for that much to gain an advantage on the overall chessboard of the conflict. Now that the counterattack has stalled, Putin must decide whether to take the bait once and for all or not. In other words, whether to continue to trust his second-rate soldiers or to take the reconquest seriously and finally send his best men to sort out the mess.

In the first case, the paper would be important. It is not only that Ukraine occupies Russian soil, but that Russia, having trumpeted its counteroffensive, would not have been able to recover what had been lost. It is not certain that the proud Kremlin will accept such a situation. In the second case, it must be borne in mind that defending is one thing and attacking is another. You cannot leave the enemy dominate 1,500 square kilometers and I hope to take them out as if nothing had happened. The Ukrainian army in Kursk is not very numerous, but it is well prepared and, after more than a month, it is understood that it will have built reasonable defenses.

A movement from Donbass?

It is curious that Russia has not learned the lesson of two and a half years of war on foreign territory: progress is not easy at this stage. On no front. Having left all these advantages to Ukraine could now cost it dearly. If Gerasimov decides to divert his troops and abandon the pressure on Kupiansk or Siversk, for example, this would already allow Syrskyi to move the men stationed there to the south for protection. the Pokrovsk-Selidove-Vuhledar axiswhich is currently in serious danger.

That would be enough. It would not even be necessary for the Russians to withdraw from Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Ukrainsk or Vodiane, to name just a few of the cities partially or completely taken in recent days. It is understood that this will not happen, but if a minimum of troop movements allows the rest of the Donbass front to breathe, it will necessarily be seen in defend access to Pokrovskthe major communications center of this Donetsk region.

Of course, one must also consider the opposite scenario: the Russian army’s “B team” could achieve its objective and expel the Ukrainian troops while the advance continues on the Eastern Front. In this case, yes, it would be necessary to say that, beyond the symbolic, the incursion into Russian territory would not have been worth much. The American press would attack Syrsky, the White House would murmur the umpteenth “We already told you” and the Kremlin would win a clear moral victory.

So we are facing the moment of truth regarding Kursk and the next few hours will be decisive: it will be necessary to assess to what extent Putin wants his victory on October 1 or if he can change the dates somewhat. what to get used to in this operation. It will also be necessary to see if Ukraine is able to resist with what it has at its disposal. or if she is forced to retreat. Whatever happens on Russian territory, what will really matter will be the consequences in Donetsk. Only there will it be possible to judge the success or failure of Syrsky’s decision.