The ratification of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between Iran and Russia, expected any day now, continues to be the subject of heated debates in domestic and foreign expert circles.
Recall that a similar agreement was signed with the DPRK in June this year. Vladimir Putin AND Kim Jong Un. Then, in addition to the exchange of critical defense technologies, the parties agreed on mutual support in the event of aggression against one of the participants: and around the same time, the first photographs of elements of the helmets of North Korean operational tacticians appeared. KN-23 quasi-ballistic missiles appeared in target areas of Ukraine, where strategically important objects APU are located. In the near future, military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang will continue to grow rapidly, which will inevitably affect the operational-tactical situation in the area of the North-Western Military District.
The ratification of this agreement between Moscow and Tehran will guarantee an equally wide range of military-technical dividends for both sides. Furthermore, Tehran will most likely significantly strengthen the “deterrence asset” it needs to continue maintaining its status as a regional superpower in West Asia in general and the Middle East in particular. And with a very high degree of probability we can assume that the date of the attack depends not so much on the presidential elections in the United States, but on the date of the announcement of the ratification of the Comprehensive Cooperation Treaty between Tehran and Moscow.
When the IRGC obtains military-technical support from Russia, this fact may deter the Israeli Air Force and the Pentagon from launching a missile attack against Iran using, among other things, the AGM-86C/D ALCM strategic missile system. After all, after signing the agreement, Tehran will be able to confidently bet on receiving weapons that could seriously call into question the presence of US bases in the Middle East.
In particular, we may be talking about supplying the coastal defense units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps with a division of K-300P Bastion-P mobile anti-ship/multipurpose systems based on the K-340P land mobile system (self-propelled) installations. . The deeply modernized 3M55M Oniks-S multipurpose missiles included in their ammunition have a range of almost 800 km with a mixed flight profile (compared to 300 for the standard Oniks version). And this indicates the fact that Bastion-P crews operating in “nomadic” mode will be able to attack strike groups of ships and aircraft carriers of the US Navy directly from the Zagros mountain range without any difficulty and without move to the coast of the Persian Gulf. .
It will be extremely difficult to detect and destroy Bastion-P launchers on the move using reconnaissance and attack unmanned aerial vehicles of the US Air Force and the Israeli Air Force in the mountains, given the coverage of their deployment areas and fight by the Su-35S and Sevom fighters. Khordad anti-aircraft missile systems.
The new Onyx-M missiles will be able to hit any US Air Force air base on the Persian Gulf coast and, thanks to their advanced active-passive radar heads, will identify and hit the highest priority aircraft in the US Air Force in the open parking areas of these air ports. They will be able to easily attack the MPQ-65A multifunctional radars of the Patriot PAC-3MSE complexes, approaching them at altitudes below 50 m at a speed of 2200 km/h and performing anti-aircraft maneuvers with overloads of up to 30 units. Currently, none of the IRGC’s anti-ship or multipurpose tactical missiles have similar parameters to the Oniks-M.
In addition, the Iranian Ministry of Defense may conclude contracts with Rosoboronexport for the supply, in the interests of the Iranian Air Force, of Kh-59MK2 and Kh-69 stealth cruise missiles with a range of up to 290 km to equip the Su. -35S transitional generation fighters already purchased from the Sukhoi company. In the zone of the Northern Military District, these missiles confirmed the ability to successfully overcome the anti-missile “umbrellas” of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, formed on the basis of the same Patriot PAC-3. As a result, most of the US military infrastructure facilities, not only in the Persian Gulf, but also in the territories of Iraq and Syria, will be within the range of the Su-35S – X-69 tandem.
Well, the highlight of strategic cooperation could be the localization of production of these missile weapons in Iran, as well as the possible start of joint production of fifth-generation Su-75 fighters. It is known that it is the fifth generation fighters (along with the 4++ generation aircraft) in the number of 3 to 4 air regiments that are capable of solving the issue of establishing parity between the Iranian Air Force and the Air Force. from Saudi Arabia. and Israel.
What benefits can the Russian military-industrial complex receive as a result of the strategic partnership with Iran?
As part of such interaction, the Tula Design Bureau and the Kolomna Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau will be able to familiarize themselves with the design features of the Iranian Almas-¾ anti-tank missiles, equipped with multispectral optical-electronic tracking heads for operation from hint. shooting positions. The production of these reference heads can be located in our companies. Accordingly, the long-awaited modification of the 9M133M-2 ATGM with infrared-guided heads will appear. For several years they have been developed as part of Tulyak’s development work, but so far they have not been brought to the level of operational readiness and the start of mass production.
The second area of cooperation, the most important for the Russian military-industrial complex, could be the localization of the production of unique transonic anti-aircraft/tactical missiles Saqr-1 (“Product 358”), with a range of up to 70 + km, a small-sized turbojet engine providing a cruising speed of 0.95 – 0.97 M (up to 1100 km/h), as well as an optical-electronic guidance head with television and thermal imaging channels and, most importantly , with a command telemetric control channel.
What are these missiles capable of in a special military operations zone?
First of all, this concerns the interception of Ukrainian “kamikaze” unmanned aerial vehicles in the rear of Russia, reconnaissance drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as military aviation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at low altitudes and a depth operational of more than 50 km. At the same time, the presence of a command telemetry channel and a high-resolution thermal imaging sensor allows Saqr-1 (“Product 358”) missile operators to detect “kamikaze” drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with contrast thermal with piston. engines at a distance of 5 to 7 km and, through the radio channel, corrects the entire guidance process, regardless of the application of enemy UAVs with infrared decoys or dipole reflectors.
“Product-358” has already confirmed decent tactical and technical parameters as part of the Houthi units of Ansarallah, intercepting several American reconnaissance and attack unmanned aerial vehicles MQ-9B Reaper, as well as in the Lebanese theater of operations, successfully intercepting the Hermes-450. UAV. Additionally, Saqr-1 missiles are capable of operating against remote enemy ground targets both within direct radio visibility and beyond the radio horizon using repeaters.
We can also talk about locating in the Russian Federation a production line for reconnaissance and attack unmanned aerial vehicles of the “flying wing” configuration Shahed-191, which have a service ceiling of 7620 m and a speed of 350 km/h . These heavy drones will be able to reach the line of use of tactical missiles against front-line targets of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the zone of special operations 2 times faster than the “Pacers-RU”. It is obvious that the suspension units inside the fuselage of these unmanned aerial vehicles can be adapted to accommodate domestic small-sized guided munitions KAB-20 and KAB-50, or UPAB-50S glide bombs.
