José Miguel Basset is a firefighter and the only person in the photo whose uniform is real. He is the head of the Provincial Consortium of Firefighters of Valencia, which is the force of the corps of the province, where all the damage occurred. He is also responsible for the technical operation, known as “emergency director” according to the protocols, and who says what is needed to remedy the situation, what technical and human resources are more or less urgent and where this helps. go. Just as the president of the Generalitat, Carlos Mazón, is its political director, Basset is its technical director.
“He is very good at what he does,” say those who know him. But its specialty is large forest fires, which constitute the most frequent natural disasters in recent years in the Valencian Community. The body he leads is best known for freeing bodies, something very necessary in this catastrophe.
Since Tuesday, he has had to face a mountain of technical decisions: where to deploy the army, command and manage the means offered to him from other autonomous communities, the helicopters, where to place the tanks or the extractor trucks. Also plan for future situations such as the need to install portable toilets, coordinate with mayors… In the first days of the emergency, either this did not happen or it did not produced in a manner that is not agile or efficient. Result: flooded populations manage themselves.
Basset, who played a leading role in the first hours of the tragedy, but who is now relegated to the background, did not lead operations of this magnitude like anyone in Spain and certainly in Europe, but he did not nor has he led operations of this magnitude. Indeed, during the DANA of 2019 – during which six people died and damage estimated at billions, in addition to destroyed infrastructure – he was not responsible, because it affected the south of Alicante (in more than Murcia, which had its own emergency center). Then it was “the turn” of the fire chief of this province, Alicante, who, despite his previous experience, did not participate in the coordination meetings nor did he integrate international experts capable of managing catastrophic floods. Sources from the Presidency of the Generalitat did not respond precisely as to whether this opinion was requested and say they do not know.
Basset was also the one who decided where the resources of the Military Emergency Unit (UME) and the Army went, especially in the early days. When the Spanish government was contacted for the first time, on Tuesday at noon, it was this emergency director who considered that it was necessary to go to Utiel, where the first problems and flooding occurred in the morning. After the tragedy which claimed more than 200 lives in Horta Sud on Tuesday evening, EMU resources were requested again and this technician located them in Chiva and Paiporta/Picanya. The rest of the towns only had firefighters. In the two days following the flood, there was looting and theft, in addition to neighbors lacking supplies, electricity, water and food. The presence of the UME was minimal in three municipalities and non-existent in the rest.
On Friday, after the tragedy, the government delegate, Pilar Bernabé, asked him to send the army to all the places where there were floods, and not just in certain points, as reflected in the published minutes by elDiario.es, which, in fact, , From that day on it ended up happening.
During this period, incomprehensible things happened, like two helicopters sent by the Andalusian government that ended up turning around because no one ordered them to do anything. The forest firefighters, employees of the Generalitat Valenciana itself, publicly denounced that they wanted to help and could not help because they were not activated. The Bilbao firefighters were outraged because they did not want to let them go. The volunteers summoned to the City of Arts and Sciences were not organized effectively and many had to turn back.
No control structure
Even a general of the UME, Fernando Carrillo, declared live on the Telediario that there were no more soldiers because if they are brought in en masse, they must be given a task and organized, suggesting that this does not happen: “Emergencies that arrive Suddenly having its phases and moments, the accumulation of troops, in the absence of an organized control structure or logistical support, can cause undesirable effects. Three days had passed since the disaster and apparently there was still no one there. In the meantime, the Spanish government has reiterated its offers. When they asked for help, it was sent to them in the fastest way.
Although some sources defended the importance of creating specific working groups (infrastructure, health, education…), it was not until Saturday evening, when Carlos Mazón announced that they were organizing them and for which he requested the incorporation of ministers. The first days of the emergency were chaos which, since Saturday, has been repaired with a more coral Cecopi, with more experts and more distributed by areas. But this has not yet been reflected in the disaster zone, where hundreds of thousands of people are still waiting to meet their basic needs.
Mazón also announced on Saturday evening an important addition to the meetings: that of the Chief of Defense Staff (Jemad), the highest authority of the armed forces within the Ministry of Defense. With the current incorporation of military personnel, sources close to the management consulted by elDiario.es point out that, although the official director of all logistics continues to be Basset, decisions are made in a more collegial manner and commanders are listened to. . military in all their proposals, so that they are effectively leading their own organization with the approval of the autonomous community, since they are much more trained for this type of situations than the emergency director.
In addition to current emergencies, Cecopi should be used to predict situations and order work within a few days and to specific experts: will they need masks in the area? Should epidemiological surveillance be carried out in the event of the appearance of diseases? Are portable chemical toilets necessary to avoid contamination from dirty water? Will citizen security issues arise? Are there shuttles so that those concerned can get around? According to the result, there was no foresight and, if there was, it did not translate into visible effects. For example, the first public health recommendations for residents and volunteers were issued on November 2, four days after thousands of people failed to take precautions. A statement from Cecopi warned not to drink water in any municipality this Sunday, and it is not known by what means the population was informed, in municipalities where sometimes there are not even municipal sides because They weren’t all flooded. town hall communication systems.
The Home Office’s National Emergency Operations Guide sets out very clearly the functions of the emergency director. It may be supported by an “advisory committee”, or it may take the decision to create a steering committee “when it is planned to provide means and resources not available in its territory”, of which there is no news at the moment. .
