Israel first infiltrated Hezbollah’s supply chain to place explosives in thousands of the organization’s communications devices and detonate them simultaneously remotely throughout Lebanon. Then, after several targeted bombings in the capital, the army killed its main commanders, including its leader, Hasan Nasrallah.
The same country was unable to detect and stop on October 7, 2023 an assault launched from a strip of 365 square kilometers completely blocked and besieged for 17 years and in which at least 3,800 Hamas members participated. After a year of brutal offensive, Israel devastated the entire Gaza Strip, destroyed 53% of all its infrastructure and killed more than 41,500 people without finding the leader of Hamas and mastermind of the October 7 attacks, Yahya Sinwar. Of the 251 people kidnapped in Gaza, Israeli authorities managed to rescue only eight alive in special operations – 105 were released in negotiated exchanges.
Israel’s immense and surprising penetration into Hezbollah’s networks in Lebanon contrasts with Gaza, which has proven to be a black hole for Tel Aviv. This situation responds to a combination of multiple factors at different levels, from the design of the threat to the objectives and methodologies used by the secret services.
“Mow the grass” or the failure of deterrence
For years, Israel prioritized the threat of Hezbollah over Hamas. Tel Aviv is convinced that its immense superiority in all areas has succeeded in deterring Hamas. Moreover, just weeks before October 7, Israel had authorized the continuation of payments from Qatar to the Hamas authorities in the Gaza Strip – in which even agents of Mossad, the secret service, directly participated –, a policy described by his detractors. as an attempt to “buy calm”. An old phrase from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sums up this policy well: “Tranquility will meet tranquility.”
Netanyahu believed it was in his interest to keep Hamas more or less stable and focused on the government – under a strict blockade – to contain his enemy while its presence gave him justification to avoid negotiating a Palestinian state . Even the current far-right ministers came view Hamas as an asset to Israel.
This strategy was to be complemented by another called “mowing the lawn”. This involves launching occasional operations to maintain deterrence capacity, as well as to reduce Hamas’ offensive capabilities. Israel simply did not believe Hamas could or was interested in launching a massive attack like the one on October 7.
“While much of our attention was focused on preparing for a confrontation with Hezbollah, we somewhat neglected the southern scenario and the evolving situation with Hamas in Gaza,” the analyst said Carmit Valensi, researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Israel. , in the middle Break the defense.
Hezbollah’s focus on the northern flank has also translated into a lack of attention to Gaza’s southern flank, Israeli security experts agree.
The role of the secret services
When Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, a gradual disconnection occurred. In the words of Zohar Palti, former Mossad intelligence director – reported by the “New York Times” – “everyone had had enough of Gaza”. “We all said, ‘Let’s forget Gaza’ because we knew it was in a stalemate. »
The disengagement has made it increasingly difficult for Israel to obtain information via HUMINT (human intelligence – based primarily on sources on the ground). Furthermore, “the Shin Bet [servicio de inteligencia interior de Israel y encargado de Hamás en Gaza] suffered from technological ‘addiction,’ Israeli analyst Amir Rapaport wrote in a column in Israeli defense.
This greater reliance on SIGINT [inteligencia de señales –interceptación de comunicaciones—] prevented Israel from having a complete picture of the situation in Gaza. Normally, before a major project – like that of October 7 – there is operational silence in communications to avoid detection. Likewise, sensitive issues that could help locate their leaders or hostages are also likely not discussed via devices, but only face-to-face or via messengers.
In fact, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar does not use electronic devices to communicate and relies on a vast network of personal messengers and coded written notes – a communications system confirmed by international mediators dealing with both Hamas and with Israel. Much of the intelligence information Israel has obtained so far in Gaza has been through the seizure of documents, computers and other devices obtained during its ground offensive in the Strip.
“Before 2020, Hezbollah dismantled several internal spy cells, but did not carry out a radical cleansing, unlike Hamas, led by Yahya Sinwar, which executed and ordered the neutralization of dozens of spies, which left the Israelis in the dark,” explains to elDiario.es Ignacio Gutiérrez de Terán, professor at the Department of Arab and Islamic Studies at the Autonomous University of Madrid and author of the book “Hezbollah: the labyrinth of the Middle East‘ (published on October 14 by Catarata editions).
The commander of the Israeli army’s SIGINT unit resigned this month for “failing to fulfill” his “mission” as expected. Among the reasons, the brigadier general underlined in his letter that the information collected on Hamas’s plans did not make it possible to sound the alarm for October 7.
In terms of operational security, it is evident that Hezbollah was also aware of Israeli monitoring of its communications, which is why it used low-tech pagers and walkie-talkies. Nasrallah himself asked all his supporters, during a televised speech, to put down their cell phones. “You ask me where the agent is [infiltrado]. And I tell you that the phone in your hands, in the hands of your wife and your children, is the agent,” he said in February. “Bury him. Put it in an iron box and close it.
This awareness of operational security in the ranks of Hezbollah favors the hypothesis of the importance of HUMINT (agents in the service of Israel) in the coup against Nasrallah, since the army knew that there was a meeting high level at headquarters despite the fact that its members were probably not talking about it via traceable means of communication. However, the role played by communications interception or SIGINT in the operation is unknown. “We had real-time intelligence and an operational opportunity that allowed us to carry out this attack,” the Israeli army spokesperson said.
On the other hand, “the ability to create human intelligence in Gaza in a very dense and small area, where everyone knows everyone and a stranger immediately stands out, makes life much more difficult,” he said. he told the Wall Street Journal. a former member of the Israeli intelligence services. It is easier to access people in Lebanon or outside Lebanon linked to Hezbollah.
Gutiérrez de Terán also highlights the overconfidence on the part of the Lebanese Shiite group: “Hezbollah’s disasters were born from the overconfidence and ineffectiveness of its security services, which involved very poor security systems. Iranian communications. » Hezbollah is a strong ally of Iran.
“As Tel Aviv’s ground offensive approaches, we will see an information blackout and the disappearance of its leaders, as they did in 2006. This is their only option to resist the dam,” he adds. The professor explains that during many attacks against Hezbollah leaders, there were Iranians nearby.
“Hezbollah has exposed itself”
Hezbollah’s role in the Syrian war also affected its level of exposure to Israel, says Gutiérrez de Terán. “Hezbollah exposed itself when it entered Syria after 2012, revealing its distribution networks and leaving gaps for Zionist intelligence,” he adds.
“Becoming Tehran’s enforcement arm in Syria, training troops in Iraq, coordinating with the Houthis in Yemen, etc. “He was involved in an open communications network managed by the Iranians, already infiltrated by Israel,” explains the professor.
“If they want to survive, they just need to go back to the Stone Age in terms of communication,” concludes Gutiérrez de Terán.
Israel had been preparing for a war with Hezbollah for years and a week of offensive on the northern flank proves it.
