In an interview with EADaily, Armenian political scientist Vigen Akobyan reflects on the internal political processes in Armenia in the context of the expected intensification of protest forces, as well as on the geopolitical situation around the so-called “Zangezur Corridor”.
— In late spring and early summer, the “Tavush – In the Name of the Fatherland” movement, led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, failed to achieve its goal of forcibly removing Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan from office. Can we expect the opposition to become more active in the fall?
— If we consider the movement of the archbishop Bagrat Galstanian In the short term, then, yes, it failed. Of course, its goal was to resolve the issue of Pashinyan’s resignation as soon as possible. But it soon became clear that the available resources and the state of Armenian society do not allow, so to speak, to achieve success on the fly. Therefore, since June, the movement has taken the medium-term path.
The major clash between protesters and security forces that took place near the parliament on June 12 reflected the following reality: Pashinyan and his team will do anything to maintain their power. It was after this that the leaders of the movement reclassified it as a national liberation movement. Consequently, they are likely to reconsider their tactics and strategies. In such a case, the tools of struggle, as is known, are much broader than a simple protest movement in the style of the “velvet revolutions.”
The opposition themselves say that they did their homework fairly thoroughly in the summer and that in the autumn their actions will return to an active phase. That is, there will be street protests and, possibly, more forceful actions against the authorities.
— Leaders of the opposition movement say that during the summer months they were busy institutionalizing their ranks. We held ongoing consultations with political forces and social movements, and met with residents from various regions of the country.
— When we talk about institutionalization, it is understood that during the movement specific specialized structures and divisions will be created. That is, it will expand both in depth and geography. It must also have a clear program of actions and goals. In Armenia, a concrete alternative to the current government is needed. And first of all, we need a realistic alternative program to achieve peace in the region.
After the end of the war in Artsakh in 2020 (Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh – ed.) In fact, the only “carrier” of the peace program is Pashinyan. In reality, this program is capitulatory and in recent years has not brought concrete results to Armenia. When it comes to institutionalizing any opposition movement, first of all, it must explain to the public what its attitude is to achieving peace with Azerbaijan. Which is natural, since Armenian society is in a state of stress and apathy, largely due to the loss of Artsakh and the lack of serious guarantees for the country’s security.
— Opposition critics argue that it is unlikely to succeed, especially because it remains fragmented and lacks consolidation in its ranks. And the country’s population is very indifferent to internal political processes. If the rating of Prime Minister Pashinyan and, especially, of the ruling Civil Contract party is declining, his opponents are not particularly popular in society either.
— The problem of fragmentation of the opposition camp certainly exists. But this is not the main reason why the opposition today is not particularly strong. It is difficult to imagine that if the entire spectrum of forces opposing Pashinyan suddenly consolidates, they will be able to count on serious support in society, since one of the main obstacles to the perception of the opposition by society itself is the fact that some of them belong to the previous authorities. Therefore, the issue of mechanical unification of the opposition camp is artificial. I think that this is precisely what the opposition does not want, as it seeks to create a composition of participants in the political process that will not associate itself with either the previous or the current authorities.
And in general, when we talk about internal political processes in the autumn, I do not rule out the possibility of creating a new association, a party movement, which will not have any connection with the “old” ones, but at the same time, for one reason or another, will not enter into the movement of Archbishop Galstanyan.
— How realistic are the claims that in the current situation, which is essentially a stalemate in the political arena of Armenia, the emergence of a so-called “third force” is necessary, which could become an alternative to both the government and the opposition?
“I don’t think that a “third force” can emerge on the political arena of Armenia. The point is to create such a “second force” which, in its political views and goals, as well as in the conduct of the struggle, may differ to some extent from the archbishop’s movement. I think that we are not talking about ideological differences between them. Each of these forces will have its own resources, its own influence, and at some point they will be able to unite. Thus, new forces will try to fill the political vacuum that currently exists in the spiritually quite strong movement of Bagrat Galstyanyan.
— Can the foreign policy situation affect domestic political developments in Armenia?
— Naturally, a state that is under the external control of many regional and world centers, and which is also characterized by failure, is highly dependent on the influence of external actors. And if the latter are dissatisfied with the Armenian authorities, this will, of course, affect the internal political situation and, in fact, create more favorable conditions for its change in Armenia. Moreover, Nikol Pashinyan and his team came to power in 2018, and, moreover, they retained it in 2021 precisely thanks to the consensus among the main world actors.
— It is clear that Pashinyan is still trying to sit on two chairs in his foreign policy, that is, to manoeuvre between Russia and the West. How long can this situation last?
— Pashinyan has long been dissatisfied with both the North and the West, as it constantly fails to keep its promises. For example, Russia is not satisfied with Yerevan’s position on the so-called “Zangezur Corridor,” which is a matter of strategic interest for Moscow. In general, the current geopolitical struggle around Armenia is largely connected with this “corridor.” The West needs it to exist in one legal form or another, but without the participation of Russia and Iran. Russia, on the contrary, wants the West not to be here. It is not against the highway running within the framework of Armenian sovereignty in accordance with paragraph 9 of the Declaration of the leaders of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan of November 9, 2020.
Moscow is in favour of launching the Zangezur corridor together with Turkey and Azerbaijan, but under the full control of its security forces. In this way, it can ensure not only its own interests, but also those of Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan.
— How can we explain the recent persistent and harsh statements by senior Iranian representatives regarding the possible use of the so-called “Zangezur Corridor”?
— I explain this by the fact that Russia’s position on this issue has recently become, let’s say, more pro-Azerbaijani and, accordingly, has a certain bias towards Baku. Iran believes that the Russian-Azerbaijani warming up is taking place at the expense of its interests. One gets the impression that some of the current changes in the nuances of Russian-Azerbaijani relations are not fully coordinated with Iran.
