Hamas had planned to carry out the attack against October 7, 2023 one year earlier, in 2022but he chose to wait and thus be able to count on the support of Hezbollah and Iran, at a time of notable political instability in Israel, without precedent in the history of the country. This “crisis” is due to the fact that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was accused of corruption, fraud and abuse of power during the 2018-2019 period.
For more than two years, the leader of the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas, Yahya Sinwarmet with his top commanders and mapped out what they hoped would be the most devastating and destabilizing attack against Israel in the 40-year history of the Islamic Resistance Movement.
Minutes of secret Hamas meetings, seized by the Israeli army and obtained by The New York Times, have now provided new information on planning the October 7 attack.
In turn, they also highlighted Sinwar’s determination to convince Hamas’s allies, Iran and Hezbollahso that they join the assault or at least engage in a broader struggle with Israel if Hamas carried out a surprise cross-border raid.
The documents revealed that the armed group Hamas tried to hide his intentions from Israel while preparing a daring attack. In fact, Sinwar hoped that this attack would provoke the “collapse” of Israeltaking advantage of the instability of the Netanyahu government.
The information from the New York newspaper consists of minutes of 10 secret meetings planning by a small group of Hamas political and military leaders to prepare for the attack on October 7, 2023. The files include 30 pages of previously undisclosed details about the way Hamas leadership worksdetailing their main strategies and the preparations that were made for their attack.
“The big project”
Thus, Hamas had initially planned to carry out this attack, which it described as a “grand project”. in fall 2022. But the group delayed execution of the plan while tried to persuade Iran and Hezbollah to participate.
Hamas leaders, in preparing arguments to convince the Shiite militias, highlighted Israel’s “internal situation” – a reference to controversial judicial reforms proposed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – as one of the reasons that brought them to feel “obligated to enter into a strategic battle“.
June 2022: almost finished
At a meeting in April 2022, Hamas leaders celebrated that the most tense periods of the holy month of Ramadan had passed without an increase in violence. This allowed them to “hide our intentions” and “camouflage our big ideaAdditionally, they discussed the importance of conserving ammunition and conducting an “effective process of disguise and deception.”
Preparations for a Hamas attack on Israel were almost completed in June 2022with attack plans 46 Israeli military positions and other infrastructure in southern Israel.
The leaders of the terrorist organization chose to keep details secret hours before the assault, recognizing that a large-scale attack would involve sacrificesparticularly among Palestinian civilians.
Even if the attack was to be launched in September 2022, was delayed due to seeking support from allies such as Iran and Hezbollah and by the need to evaluate the new far-right Israeli government. In May 2023strategic dates were discussed to avoid provocations that could ruin the plans.
Iran and Hezbollah
Hamas leaders feared the Israeli announcement of a new effective defense system and wanted to lead the attack before it is put into service.
The New York newspaper showed in its documents that There were talks between the Palestinian terrorist organization and Iranand files from August 2023 showed that a meeting with Hezbollah was planned, although it was postponed.
Without being able to confirm coordination between the three actors, communication between the different factions of Hamas and its exiled leaders was effective and they launched the attack.
The offensive began on October 7 surprise Israel and spark a full-scale conflict, in part because Israeli intelligence reports They had underestimated the intentions of the Movementconsidering them as defensive maneuvers.
July 2023: meeting in Lebanon
In July 2023, Hamas sent a senior official to Lebanon meet with a senior Iranian commander. During this meeting, he requested support to carry out an attack against sensitive sites.
The Iranian commander, for his part, informed Hamas that although Iran and Hezbollah were willing to provide support, they would need more time to prepare. The document does not specify the level of detail of the plan that Hamas presented to its allies.
Furthermore, in the “final version” it is mentioned that Hamas intended to discuss the attack in more depth in a later meeting with Hassan Nasrallahthe leader of Hezbollah killed by Israel on September 27, 2024. The documents do not specify whether this meeting actually took place.
The Islamic Resistance Movement felt the support of its allies but came to the conclusion that had to proceed without his direct participationin part to prevent Israel from deploying a new advanced air defense system before the assault.
They have avoided attacking since 2021
The decision to attack was also influenced by the Movement’s desire to disrupt efforts to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabiahe consolidation of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Israeli efforts to exert greater control over the Aqsa Mosque complex in Jerusalem, sacred in both Islam and Judaism and known to Jews as the Temple Mount.
It is also mentioned that the armed group has deliberately avoided major confrontations with Israel. for two years from 2021For maximize the surprise of the October 7 attack. According to its leaders, “we must keep the enemy convinced that Hamas in Gaza wants calm.”
Another exclusive piece of information revealed by the documents is that Hamas leaders in Gaza claim to have informed Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ political leader based in Qatar, about the “grand project.” Until now, it was not officially known whether Haniyeh, killed by Israel in July, had prior knowledge of the attack.
Prelude to “chaos”
The documents provide broader context on one of the most pivotal moments in recent Middle Eastern history. They reveal that this event was the result of a multi-year plan and an Islamic resistance movement which was influenced by specific events occurring after Netanyahu returned to power in Israel in late 2022.
The fact that Iran and Hezbollah knew about Hamas’s plans for October 7 was until now a mystery and today takes on particular importance, given that the conflict reached a regional level where Lebanon and Iran intensified their offensive actions against Israel, and vice versa.
For his part, the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, publicly denied that Iran played a role in the attack of October 7. Additionally, U.S. intelligence officials showed that top Iranian leaders were surprised, which remains unknown. whether Iran played a direct role in planning.
On the other hand, there are documents provided by the Palestinian armed group which indicate that Iranian and Hezbollah officials helped plan attack and train fighters.
The minutes were found on a computer that Israeli soldiers found in late January while searching for an underground Hamas command center in Khan Younis, southern Gaza, where the group’s leaders They had recently escaped.
The times assessed the authenticity of documents sharing part of its content with members and experts close to Hamas. Salah al-Din al-Awawdeh, a Hamas member and veteran of its military wing who is now an analyst in Istanbul, said he knew some of the details described in the documents and that the organized record-keeping was consistent with general practices of the group. .
A Palestinian analyst familiar with the ins and outs of Hamas, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive issuesalso confirmed some details as well as the general structural operations of the group which coincided with the documents.
The Israeli army, in an internal report, also concluded that the documents provided by the New York newspaper were real and They represent yet another failure on the part of intelligence officials. to prevent the attack of October 7.
Israeli intelligence questioned
The discovery of the documents sparked tensions within Israeli intelligence agencies, as an internal army study questioned why Israeli spies they failed to obtain them before the Hamas attack or they could not identify the strategy they contained.
Indeed, although Israel received information about Hamas’s battle plans before the October 7 attack, Top Israeli commanders repeatedly excluded the possibility that Hamas has the capacity or intent to carry out the attack imminently.
The Israeli military, for its part, refused to provide explanations, while Hamas and Hezbollah also did not respond to requests for comment.
THE Mission of Iran to the United Nations Yes, he responded and denied the statements made in the minutes.
“All planning, decision-making and guidance has been carried out solely by the military wing of Hamas based in Gaza; “Any statement that attempts to link it to Iran or Hezbollah, whether partially or completely, lacks credibility and comes from fabricated documents,” as Iran said.
A complex strategy
In summary, planning for the October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas reveals a complex strategy which had been brewing for years, awaiting a favorable political context in Israel marked by the instability of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government.
The documents obtained by The New York Times reflect not only Hamas’s secret intentions, but also its deliberate efforts to conceal its plans and gain strategic support from allies such as Iran and Hezbollaheven if, ultimately, they decided to proceed without their direct collaboration.
The discovery of the documents also reveals significant flaws in Israeli intelligence, who underestimated Hamas’ capabilities and intentions.
Orderly and precise planning revealed by the minutes contrasts with the perceptions of Israeli intelligence agencieswho thought Hamas was in a defensive posture. This has generated a crisis of confidence within Israeli intelligence structures and a series of questions about their preparedness and effectiveness.
