The new division of the European left reflects the tensions and transformations that this political space has been experiencing for decades. The ability of these parties to adapt and reinvent themselves will determine their relevance in the future.
Podemos, Insoumise France and other European forces launch a new party to stand out from the traditional left
The European left is once again at a crossroads. Recently, we have witnessed the splitting of the parties of the so-called “radical left” into two different alliances: the new “European Alliance of the Left” and the already existing “Party of the European Left”. This division has important repercussions, especially in the Spanish political landscape, where the two main left parties, Podemos and Izquierda Unida, now find themselves on opposite sides of this new ideological divide.
To understand the extent of this division, we must go back to the 1920s. It was then that the first major fracture between the social democratic and communist parties occurred, and Spain experienced the founding of the Communist Party in 1921, emerging from the ranks of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party. The influence of the Russian Revolution was decisive in this process, since the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, believed that in order to consolidate their revolution it was essential to extend it throughout Europe. With this objective in mind, they founded the Communist International in Moscow, which became the ideological and financial pillar of the European communist parties.
After World War II, communist parties experienced a significant rise in power, particularly in countries such as France and Italy. Their role in the anti-fascist resistance gave them unprecedented legitimacy. However, by the 1960s, tensions with the Soviet Union led to an ideological shift that, in countries such as Spain, Italy, and France, led to Eurocommunism. But the change went beyond ideology. Society was changing rapidly, driven by technological advances and the consolidation of the welfare state, and the traditional discourse of communist parties began to seem anachronistic in this new context.
In response to these social transformations, communist parties began to seek new political and ideological strategies. New concerns emerged: peace, civil rights, feminism and, above all, ecology. The latter acquired particular importance since the 1970s and 1980s, as scientific evidence accumulated on the impacts of the production and consumption model on the environment. It was in this context that green parties emerged all over Europe. Some were born from environmental movements, while others were nourished by disenchanted former communist and socialist activists. A new European political family was formed: the “green” family.
The fall of the Soviet Union marked another turning point. Some communist parties, such as the Italian one, completely abandoned their ideological theses. Others, such as the Greek or the Portuguese, retreated into traditional doctrine. The majority, however, sought common ground. In Spain, for example, the PCE promoted the creation of Izquierda Unida as a way to integrate new social demands without renouncing socialist ideology. This process of adaptation made it possible to bring together critical sectors of social democracy, giving rise to what we know today as the family of the “radical left”, a very heterogeneous political space.
This space of the radical left, which had experienced notable growth after the financial crisis of 2008 in countries such as Greece, France and Spain, is now facing a new division. Despite attempts at coordination, such as the creation of the Party of the European Left, ideological and strategic divergences have always existed. Within the European left, there are enormous divergences on issues such as immigration, Zionism or international politics. The new “Alliance of the European Left” in fact brings together the most ideologically moderate parties in economic terms, more oriented towards environmental and feminist issues and more inclined towards military alliances such as NATO.
In the Spanish case, this European division has direct consequences. Izquierda Unida and Podemos, the two main parties of the alternative left, are now institutionally separated at the European level. While IU was one of the promoters of the Party of the European Left, Podemos has always opted for a “fresher” space and less anchored in the communist tradition. But ironically, Podemos concludes this European landing at the very moment when at the national level it deploys the opposite discourse (harder, more left and more anti-NATO) precisely to differentiate itself from Sumar.
On the other hand, Sumar, the coalition that managed to integrate the multiple Spanish lefts for the legislative elections, now finds itself in a complex position. Without having fully consolidated the coordination of the left parties in Spain, Sumar is torn between the European green family and that of the radical left. This dilemma, present in the European left for decades, could only have been successfully resolved if the fundamental parties had not been left aside. With them on the sidelines, or even filming, it is impossible for Sumar to equip itself with a unifying identity. Without being able to solve the problem, we can only lead to it.
In short, the new division of the European left is a reflection of the tensions and transformations that this political space has been experiencing for decades. The ability of these parties to adapt and reinvent themselves will determine their relevance in the future political landscape of the continent. And despite the difficulties, electoral rules could once again impose unity. As is happening in France, the electoral system of the Spanish legislative elections will probably force the left forces to agree on a single candidacy. Although the negotiation will be arduous, the need for political survival could be the catalyst to relaunch the project of rebuilding the left, both at the national and European levels.
