The objectives that Israel pursues in Lebanon (and beyond)

Israel has been pressuring Hezbollah for a year to establish a security cushion of 7 to 12 kilometers to limit rocket attacks.

Israel’s penultimate military reorganization plan (Plan Momentum) focused its efforts for years on developing methods to quickly identify and destroy Hezbollah’s rocket launchers, because in the vision advocated by the Israeli JEMAD, this capability constituted the technical and strategic key to defeating Hezbollah and its Axis of Resistance allies.

Moreover, for the first time, instead of resorting to terms like “guerrilla”, “insurrection” or “State within the State”, reconceptualized Hezbollah as a “terrorist rocket army”. Army for its orthodox hierarchical organization; of Terror because its objective is to terrorize the civilian population (and not to destroy the IDF) as a formula for influencing the Israeli government and defeating it; and rockets because this cheap and easy to manufacture tool constitutes its main tool.

And a buffer border would not allow Israel to be completely protected, but would allow shorter range rockets to be deactivated (like Type 63s, mortars, homemade IRAMs or Katiuskas). And force all Soviet artillery rockets based at Grad to get too close to the border to fire, thereby diminishing their effectiveness and exposing them.

The basic idea is that It is this type of cheap weapon that requires spending on the much more expensive Iron Dome interceptor missiles.thus drying up the Israeli anti-missile arsenal. In this way, with a buffer border, the economy of the Israeli anti-missile forces would be significantly strengthened.

Now the border buffer zone is probably the minimum objective. And its key geographical areas are the towns of Bint Jbeil, Beaufort Castle and the mouth of the Biyada.

Beyond the mattress, and depending on the resistance offered by Hezbollah, the Israelis will attempt to advance to the Litani River, with the main objective of dismantling and studying Hezbollah’s infrastructure throughout southern Lebanon. AND the creation in the south of Lebanon of a neutral zone protected by a new status quo with a limit marked by the Litani.

It is possible that the Israeli advance will not stop in southern Lebanon and head towards Beirut, in which case it will have to be relatively simple, because otherwise continuing towards the capital would be too risky.

Hezbollah has been fortifying southern Lebanon and preparing its defense for 20 years. And the forces charged with this mission are less exhausted than their counterparts: rocket shooters, drone operators and even long-range missile battalions. All suffered from the furious Israeli bombing campaign.

In total, Hezbollah has three “divisions”, the Nasr and the Aziz (which would bear the brunt of the combat) and the Badr, the most sophisticated and responsible for the riskiest offensive operations, thanks to its availability of specialized means under the forms of drones, rockets and air defense, and has the Al Jalil Brigade, the most powerful of the forces deployed in southern Lebanon.

To bolster all of this, Hezbollah could also deploy the Radwan Brigade, which would add offensive potential with the most prepared and experienced troops, and could even introduce armored forces built in the wake of the Syrian civil war. Finally, the Golan Brigade would be used to put pressure on Israel in the Golan Heights.

Finally, Hezbollah maintains the Beirut Brigade as a force of last resort to protect the group’s political core in Lebanon. And it can also call on the Amal militias, the Shiite Saraya, the Hamas battalions in Sidon and Tyre, or even the Imam Hussein division deployed by the Resistance Axis.

The good news for Israel is that Hezbollah’s arsenal of long- and medium-range missiles was thwarted by the Israeli air force. SO one of Hezbollah’s main deterrents appears to be out of actionwithout even being able to deactivate the port of Haifa, on the other side of the border.

In short, we cannot expect a simple and rapid invasion of the border buffer zone. Hezbollah, despite the enormous losses of its military leadership and middle ranks, retains a relevant tactical capacity.

Until now, Iran has always intervened in the shadowsaccelerating the transfer of missiles, increasing military training programs or financing their movements across the East. Tehran’s loss of credibility, the feeling of being cornered and the need to protect its favorite student led to Israel’s docking on Tuesday.

It seems clear that Israel now aims to attack the nuclear program in its entirety as its primary objective. But what will happen the next day is less clear, especially when it comes to American military intervention, a closure of the Strait of Hormuz or the real capacity of the Israeli anti-missile shield to resist the immense barrages of missiles and Persian drones.

Even though the Israeli war cabinet has improvised its strategy on numerous occasions (which is generally not a recommended recipe), the idea seems to exist to take advantage of the circumstances to overturn the regional balance and the security of Israel at its borders.

NOW, Can Israel really destroy Hamas, Hezbollah or even Iran? Or will all this stay mow the grassby mowing down the “weeds” that Israel has grown next to its border farm fence?

Changing the regional balance would be a political objective of the highest magnitude and very positive for Israel. cut the grass the border, on the other hand, will mean a return to normal and gain a few years of peace before the next war. In other words, it’s business as usual.

For now, the ability to penetrate Lebanon will determine whether Israel can establish a 12-kilometer buffer zone, establish a neutral zone up to the Litani River, or bring about regime change by attacking Beirut.

However, there is no clear plan. Netanyahu will likely improvise and bite off as much as he can.

And what about managing an occupation of the border cushion? Would it be possible for UNIFIL to manage all of southern Lebanon once it has been “demilitarized” by Israel? And what about Hamas and Gaza?

At this point, no one (not the Bedouin tribes, not Egypt, not the UN, not the Arab states) is willing to deal with this gibberish called Gaza. And there is no alternative to a Hamas that is ultimately fueled by popular sentiment.

So there are more questions than answers. The final outcome of the war remains to be seen. Nevertheless, we can be sure that this war will trigger all kinds of new dynamics that are difficult to estimate, although we can highlight a few here:

1. Moscow-Tehran rapprochement in terms of military cooperation.

2. Resurgence of terrorism against Israel as a weapon of war.

3. Encouragement of nuclear and chemical weapons programs.

4. Improve China’s room for maneuver in the Middle East.

5. Conflict-induced energy crisis in Hormuz.

6. Arab-Israeli rapprochement or estrangement

7. Islamic fundamentalist coups against Arab monarchies.